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ABSTRACT 
Looking beyond mushroom-cloud imagery, this dissertation investigates the greater effect 
that radiation science had on intellectually and imaginatively stimulating the visual artists 
László Moholy-Nagy, Ralston Crawford, Ben Shahn, and Bruce Conner, who sought 
knowledge of the long-range consequences of nuclear testing. Primarily concerned with 
the specter of the tests’ aftermath rather than the spectacle of the explosions themselves, 
these artists explored the toxicity of radiation and ultimately discovered, I argue, that they 
lived in perpetual and uneasy co-existence with their subject. This study chronologically 
follows the course of scientific inquiry into radiological effects, from the Second World 
War to the height of the Cold War, beginning in the first chapter with a discussion of the 
role of nuclear medicine in the work of Moholy-Nagy. In postwar Chicago, he developed 
his earlier engagement with x-ray photographs into a deeper knowledge of atomic 
processes, which culminated in two paintings that suggest the healing and hazardous 
effects of nuclear energy. The second chapter considers Crawford’s commission by 
Fortune magazine in 1946 to illustrate an atom-bomb test in the Pacific, for which he 
vii 
 
 made several renderings based on post-blast meteorological and radiological data. The 
critical response to these works exposed not only the public’s lack of understanding about 
the invisible phenomena of the bomb, but also Crawford’s own loose grasp of the 
pertinent science. Continuing the focus on newsworthy nuclear events, the third chapter 
examines Shahn’s portraits of J. Robert Oppenheimer, following the latter’s official 
censure by the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954, and Shahn’s paintings and drawings 
about a contemporaneous fallout disaster leading to the death of a Japanese fisherman. 
Both series link the heedless actions of scientists and their government employers to the 
rise of universal radiation sickness, precipitated by what Shahn perceived as mass 
dehumanization. The fourth and final chapter addresses Conner's long-held view that San 
Francisco, the city in which he lived, was radioactively contaminated and a potential 
target of nuclear attack. Through the representation of self-destruction in his assemblages 
and films, Conner mimed a cultural malaise that struck him as particularly rampant in the 
local environment of nuclear experimentation. 
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INTRODUCTION  
At the heart of every study on nuclear culture is a reference to the iconic image of the 
mushroom cloud. Reaching a widespread audience through popular print media, still and 
motion photography of atomic explosions proved instrumental in shaping public 
perceptions of the U.S. nuclear program. The Atomic Energy Commission, the 
government agency established in 1947 to oversee aboveground testing and research on 
atomic energy, as well as the public-relations campaign for both, relied on sublime 
mushroom-cloud imagery to convey the formidable dominance that the nation possessed 
with its weapons arsenal. Ordinary observers had little recourse but to regard these 
images at face value, often accepting them as givens of the nuclear program, insofar as 
AEC spokesmen were able to convince the American public that their exposure to post-
test radioactivity was “small in comparison to the radiation to which man is subjected by 
nature from the earth and air and from medical treatment.”1 By the mid-1950s, when 
irrefutable evidence of biological and environmental hazards slowly began to belie the 
myth of safety, mushroom clouds, with their blazing plumes of deadly radioactive dust, 
appeared ideologically charged in a new light. Nonetheless, this photographic imagery 
supplied by the government remained a persuasive tool for propaganda, even after 
nuclear tests went completely underground in 1963 and left behind the visual record of 
the weapon’s destructivity. The continued use of such images throughout the subsequent 
1 John W. Finney, “Fall-out Hearing Will Open Today,” New York Times, May 27, 1957. This statement, 
which the AEC supplied to the newspaper, comports with the secondary findings of historian Catherine 
Caulfield, who writes, “AEC officials frequently compared exposure to fallout to having a chest x-ray or 
wearing a watch with a radium dial, which exposed the wearer to at least eight times more radiation than 
did testing.” See Catherine Caulfield, Multiple Exposures: Chronicles of the Radiation Age (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1986), 126. 
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decades was a testament to their powerful dramatization of blast and radiation effects, 
those disturbing aspects of the bomb in full public view.      
Without minimizing the considerable cultural prevalence and resonance of 
nuclear-testing imagery, this dissertation investigates the greater effect that radiation 
science had on stimulating the intellect and imagination of visual artists who sought an 
in-depth awareness of nuclear testing’s long-range consequences. Frequently turning their 
focus to the tests’ aftermath rather than to the explosions themselves, a small number of 
painters and sculptors, though more than the four who fall inside the scope of this 
particular study, made works between 1945 and 1976 that suggested the manifestations of 
ionizing radiation in human bodies and the environment. For László Moholy-Nagy, 
Ralston Crawford, Ben Shahn, and Bruce Conner, the unseen perils of radioactive fallout 
displaced the force of the explosion as the primary problem of the U.S. nuclear program 
and, as such, redefined the stakes of testing not as primarily cultural, which was too 
narrow a concept, but as profoundly human. Demonstrating an appetite for knowledge 
about radiation, these artists acquired such information to varying degrees and through 
different channels, but collectively pursued it with the express determination not to 
accept at face value what the AEC presented as fact.  
While the “nuclear” works of Moholy-Nagy, Crawford, Shahn, and Conner 
occasionally portray a mushroom cloud, it serves more as a jumping-off point than a 
theme. In order for it to be considered a theme, the artists would have to treat the icon as 
a subject of discourse or a unifying idea. In truth, the point of their enterprise was to 
change the topic. This dissertation turns on the question of how to steer the nuclear 
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dialogue toward a subject whose lethal potential the AEC routinely denied for years, not 
to mention whose existence was invisible to the eye. In one way or another, all four 
artists represent a looming nuclear entity, directly or indirectly making reference to the 
mushroom cloud, but its explosive force is downplayed to emphasize its role as a 
transmitter of energy. Reconceived and re-contextualized, this source of radioactivity 
does not display its power all at once. Rather, it exhibits a temporal dimension 
characterized by slowness. The nuclear body, in all the varied forms it takes at the hands 
of different artists, shows signs of gradual movement and change, signaling its own 
dissipation towards a total loss of energy. This is the very definition of the radioactive 
half-life: the time it takes a substance to lose half its activity until that half equals zero.2 
Along the same lines, any matter that begins its life as an “emanation” of energy renders 
radioactive everything with which it comes into contact, and those new radioactive 
bodies also decay with time. The representations I study in the following chapters often 
underscore this act of radiological transmission, from a dominant entity to a vulnerable 
one, illustrated in the convergence of forms or in an all-over aesthetic, the sense that a 
contaminative element has spread over the entire surface to cover the compositional field.   
As if to manifest this abstract concept in their everyday experiences of living in 
the Atomic Age, the artists seem to have shared an awareness of the risks to which 
medical or environmental radiation exposed their bodies. In implying a human presence 
in their work, they engaged with the consequences of nuclear science that the AEC would 
not touch, for the government agency’s realm was that of the nuclear-landscape 
2 Marjorie C. Malley, Radioactivity: A History of a Mysterious Science (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 47. 
 
 
                                                 
4 
 
photograph. Such images, as Scott Kirsch has aptly observed, were “designed, quite 
literally, to take the place out of the landscape.”3 Towards this end—the desire to erase 
recognizable details that would lend a distinctive character to the setting—the kind of 
camera used to capture atomic explosions lacked any specialized technology that could 
register invisible elements. “Radioactivity,” Kirsch writes, “was not conducted through 
the pages of Life, Time, or Popular Science,”4 three widely circulated magazines that 
consistently reproduced nuclear landscapes, and thus the radiological subject was largely 
absent outside specialized literature. For Moholy-Nagy, Crawford, Shahn, and Conner, 
conveying an individualized experience of radiation through their work was one way in 
which to posit a unique voice and a specific activity in the plethora of anonymous 
representations of nuclear subject matter. And yet, the artists sparingly depicted actual 
bodies—the human figure—just as they tended to tread lightly around the standard 
iconographical imagery of nuclear explosions. But rather than entirely displacing the 
body, whether that of the person or the cloud, they reworked some aspect of preexisting 
material that related to these subjects to imagine how radioactivity might find formal 
expression in them. 
The interplay between radiological science and visual culture was not a new 
phenomenon of mid-twentieth-century art: the two spheres overlapped from the moment 
when, in 1895, physicist Wilhelm Röntgen found a way to render images of radiation. By 
placing various objects between a source of rays (in this case, radiation) and a photo-
3 Scott Kirsch, “Watching the Bombs Go Off: Photography, Nuclear Landscapes, and Spectator 
Democracy,” Antipode 29, no. 3 (1997), 229 (italics in the original).  
4 Ibid.    
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sensitized plate, he inadvertently employed the same method of creating a photographic 
print that professional “art” photographers, such as William Henry Fox Talbot, had used 
since 1839. These earlier photograms were photographic prints made without negatives 
through a process in which an object was directly placed on photosensitive paper and 
exposed to electromagnetic rays, most often in the form of light. Throughout the first half 
of the twentieth century, scientists involved in the medical field, the major producers of 
such camera-less prints, continued to exploit the photogram’s expressive capabilities, 
even though the basic elements of the image-making technology underwent little change.  
It was not until the end of World War II that the invention and subsequent use of 
nuclear weapons called for the immediate development of new ways to make radiation 
visible, specifically for the purpose of measuring external exposure. Government-
contracted scientists responsible for addressing this need once again turned to 
photographic means, recommending the Kodak film badge (which I will discuss further 
in regard to Crawford) as the primary means of individual radiation-monitoring. Despite 
the limited reliability of these pocket-sized instruments to measure data accurately, they 
proved indispensable to the testing program’s radiation safety unit, known as “rad-safe,” 
just as the original set of tools for radiological examination —the x-ray machine and its 
attendant imagery—underwent more widespread use in medical treatments.  
Radiation technologies integral to the scientific and health fields inevitably played 
a part in the creative and working processes of those who acquired amateur expertise on 
radiological effects, but in many cases the artists would abandon the photographic 
imaging for more personal imaginings. Moholy-Nagy and Conner explored the idea of 
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the irradiated body as an extension of their individual needs for survival, visualizing 
microcosmic environments in which the human form or surrogate is vulnerable to 
potentially destructive forces.5  If Moholy-Nagy and Conner’s vision of radioactivity 
could be described as internalized, Crawford and Shahn aimed for a broader view of the 
subject to convey a universal experience of radiation. From these scientifically minded 
artists to politically motivated governmental agencies, radiation drove the quest for 
advanced knowledge at all levels of interest in nuclear testing—to such a degree, I argue, 
that it came to structure popular notions of Cold War science and technology as much as 
actual nuclear weapons. Joseph Masco similarly claims that atomic culture gave rise to 
such competing notions of techno-scientific experimentation in the mid-1950s,6 though I 
trace the gradual awareness of fallout hazards to an earlier date in light of artistic 
responses to radioactivity beginning in the previous decade.  
Scholars have yet to address in any comprehensive or direct sense the relationship 
between the radiological effects of nuclear testing and the visual arts in the United States. 
If their studies mention the cultural impact of radioactivity, it is usually characterized as 
one among several factors that divided public opinion over the American nuclear policy, 
particularly the Eisenhower administration’s military doctrine of deterrence in the 1950s. 
While a balanced examination of this period is necessary and desirable, there is an equal 
need for a more focused analysis to demonstrate how the issue of fallout, whose gradual 
5 Art historian Kristine Stiles might categorize the work especially of Conner as “destruction art,” which 
she defines as the presentation of the “‘imagery of extinction,’ localized in the body, the object which is 
offered both as a destructible material and/or an agent of that destruction.” In my chapter on Conner, I 
discuss his survivalist impulse. See Christine Stiles, “Survival Ethos and Destruction Art,” Discourse 14, 
no. 2 (Spring 1992), 76.  
6 Joseph Masco, “Mutant Ecologies: Radioactive Life in Post–Cold War New Mexico,” Cultural 
Anthropology 19, no. 4 (2004), 517–550.  
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impact made it difficult to study and understand, eclipsed the catastrophic notion of an 
immediate and total nuclear holocaust. An increasing number of Americans questioned 
whether the greatest nuclear threat they faced was the toxic environment of their own 
creation—not hostile communist nations, as the government insisted. To affect such a 
sweeping change in Americans’ preoccupations, from spectacle to specter, radioactive 
contamination provoked reactions beyond generalized notions of fear and anxiety, two 
unspecific terms often used to describe Cold War psychological unrest.7  
 A substantial body of scholarship on nuclear imagery rightly underscores how the 
visual culture during this period shaped the arts aesthetically and intellectually. Yet their 
efforts to assign almost exclusive ideological power to the mushroom-cloud icon 
perpetuate the predictable emphasis on the concept of the spectacle in modern and post-
modern culture. One finds examples of this recurring theme across the many disciplines 
that have contributed to the visual studies of the nuclear discourse, beginning with 
historian Spencer Weart’s attempt, in his book Nuclear Fear: A History of Images 
(1988), to categorize and interpret a comprehensive “history of images.” Eschewing art-
historical models of visual analysis, Weart carves out a new discipline for nuclear 
imagery by combining the methodologies of psychology, anthropology, and sociology to 
associate nuclear weapons with groups of “pictures, symbols, beliefs, rational concepts, 
7 As a representative example in art-historical texts, in Serge Guilbaut’s seminal book on Cold War politics 
and American art, he writes, “Justified or not, fear and anxiety took hold of the country. It is this 
phenomenon that interests me here” (emphasis added). Historian Michael L. Krenn, the author of another 
book that attempts to situate American art in a Cold War political context, makes this generalization: “The 
Cold War mind-set in the United States . . . helped, at times, to create a climate of fear and anxiety” 
(emphasis added). See Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art: Abstract 
Expressionism, Freedom, and the Cold War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 141, and 
Michael L. Krenn, Fall-Out Shelters for the Human Spirit: American Art and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2005), 6. 
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and emotions” conjured up by explosions.8 In her article “The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud 
as Cultural Image,” Peggy Rosenthal’s hybrid interests in literary criticism and nuclear 
history reflect the broadening of the visual-studies field in the early 1990s. Like Weart, 
Rosenthal compiles a “record of the multiple late twentieth-century meanings of so 
loaded a cultural image” as the mushroom cloud.9 Cultural geographer Scott Kirsch has 
taken another cross-cultural approach to representations of atomic explosions, as noted 
above, in showing that the AEC intentionally suppressed details of the environmental 
surroundings in such midcentury pictures to prevent the public from recognizing how the 
tests affected people who lived downwind. Since publishing this important study in the 
late 1990s, Kirsch has increasingly addressed the problem of fallout hazards—first, in a 
2004 essay on a mathematician whose findings on radioiodine challenged the AEC’s 
guidelines on acceptable dosages of radiation, and second, in a 2005 book on the 
Commission’s failed enterprise, called Project Plowshare, to excavate large tracts of land 
with “peaceful” nuclear explosions.10  
My own trajectory of research about nuclear-related topics has followed a similar 
path to that of Kirsch. For my Master’s thesis in 2006, I initially studied the embedded 
allusions to atomic culture in the art of Bay Area–artist Jay DeFeo; later, in my catalogue 
essay for an exhibition I organized at the Boston University Art Gallery in 2009, I 
8 Spencer R. Weart, Nuclear Fear: A History of Images (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University  
Press, 1988), xii.  
9 Peggy Rosenthal, “The Nuclear Mushroom Cloud as Cultural Image,” American Literary History 3, no. 1 
(Spring 1991), 64. 
10 See Kirsch, “Watching the Bombs Go Off”; Kirsch, “Harold Knapp and the Geography of Normal 
Controversy: Radioiodine in the Historical Environment,” OSIRIS 19 (2004), 167–181; Kirsch, Proving 
Grounds: Project Plowshare and the Unrealized Dream of Nuclear Earthmoving (New Brunswick, NJ: 
Rutgers University Press, 2005).  
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connected the appearances of declassified bomb imagery through different registers and 
media in post-Cold War contemporary art. Although this present study at times grapples 
with the mushroom-cloud image, like the artists themselves, I attempt to tread carefully 
around iconographical readings—not because of any inherent flaw in them, but because 
of their tendency to reinforce the oversimplified notion that visual culture, in relation to 
nuclear weapons, was primarily the creation of the government, which selectively 
revealed the most compelling imagery for public consumption. According to this 
conventional line of argument, artists made limited contributions on nuclear-themed 
subject matter, given the prescriptive range of images that the government-controlled 
media allowed them to see. I emphasize greater agency on the part of Moholy-Nagy, 
Crawford, Shahn, and Conner in their search for sources beyond what the AEC provided 
to the public, resulting in a trenchant knowledge of nuclear testing and, more 
significantly, its radiological effects. Ultimately, this dissertation overlaps with the 
conceptual territory covered by Kirsch and his contention that the AEC’s radiation safety 
operations centered on the “key assumption” that “safety from fallout hazards could be 
planned and account for.”11 My investigation essentially germinates from the artists’ 
refusal to accept this assumption passively. 
 Given the preponderance of references to the mushroom-cloud icon in cultural 
studies, which fall outside the discipline of art history, it is not surprising to find that art 
historians themselves have often treated nuclear imagery in iconographical terms. Most 
recently, in his 2008 essay “Futile Metaphors,” Benedict Burbridge made the familiar 
11 Kirsch, Proving Grounds, 28. 
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equation between the “creation of the bomb” and the “visual icon [of the explosion] it 
served to create” as mutually reinforcing factors in “fundamentally” altering artistic 
practices.12 In her dissertation “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” also published 
in 2008, Denise Rompilla centered her thesis on the “single iconic image of the 
mushroom cloud,”13 which served as the only observable phenomena of nuclear-weapons 
tests’ “technological spectacle” that suited the expressive representational style to which 
combat and activist artists of the early Atomic Age, such as Ralston Crawford and Ben 
Shahn, were accustomed.14 These arguments share in common a belief in nuclear-themed 
artworks as symbolic expressions of the culture of sensationalism in which they were 
created. While it would be misleading to place all art-historical scholarship on the Cold 
War in the same category as the studies by Burbridge and Rompilla, I use these examples 
as a comparative model to contrast with my dissertation’s strong history-of-science 
component. Other scholars have taken the cultural dominance of nuclear weapons’ visible 
phenomenon—the concept of spectacle—as an unassailable fact, whereas I aim for more 
interdisciplinary range and techno-scientific acuity in demonstrating the greater hold that 
invisible radiation had on the minds of artists.15   
Chronologically arranged according to the evolution of popular thought on the 
history of nuclear science, from the years of World War II through the height of the Cold 
12 Benedict Burbridge, “Futile Metaphors: Contemporary Art and the Bomb,” Photoworks (Spring/Summer 
2008), 44. 
13 Denise M. Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb: American Artists Witness the Birth of 
the Atomic Age,” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2008), 9. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 As I point out in the chapter on Moholy-Nagy, art historian Linda Dalrymple Henderson has written 
extensively about the relationship between art and “invisible realities,” such as the fourth dimension, but 
Moholy-Nagy and other mid-twentieth-century American artists are not covered in these texts. For 
Henderson’s most comprehensive study, see The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in 
Modern Art (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983). 
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War period, my dissertation begins in the first chapter with a discussion of the role of 
medicine in introducing visual codes for radiation to postwar America, as read through 
the work of Hungarian-born artist László Moholy-Nagy. I focus in particular on Moholy-
Nagy’s late career in Chicago, from 1937 through 1946, of which he spent the last two 
years engaging in a series of nuclear-themed paintings and drawings. Moholy-Nagy’s 
diagnosis of leukemia in 1945 and subsequent radiation treatments prompted him to 
research radiation broadly. For example, according to his wife, he avidly pored over the 
information in the “Smyth Report,” the first official publication on the development of 
the atomic bomb released shortly after the war, and empirically analyzed the environment 
in which his radiotherapy sessions were conducted. These clear indications about his 
nuclear curiosities appear to correlate to his earlier exploration of x-ray photography, 
particularly in the most prolific years of his creation of photograms, which scholars have 
seen as artistic analogues to radiographs.16 But his interest in these products of x-ray 
photography precipitously waned around the time that he became more familiar with 
radiation processes. At this point, he appeared to turn his attention to the energy’s 
transformative properties and to its potential reactions in different scenarios, ranging 
from remedial to apocalyptic. I suggest that this attempt to understand the material on a 
more cognitive and visceral level than ever before, perhaps supported by other factors 
that related to his postwar practices in occupational therapy and professional ties to 
16 For example, see Oliver A. I. Botar, “László Moholy-Nagy’s New Vision and the Aestheticization of 
Scientific Photography in Weimar Germany,” Science in Context 17, no. 4 (2004), 525–556; Akira Mizuta 
Lippit, “Phenomenologies of the Surface: Radiation-Body-Image,” Qui Parle 9, no. 2 (Spring-Summer 
1996), 31–50; and Herbert Molderings, Moholy-Nagy: The Photograms, Catalogue Raisonné, edited by 
Hattula Moholy-Nagy, Renate Heyne, Floris M. Neususs (Stuttgart, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2009).  
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scientific fields, marked a distinct change from his results-driven fascination with x-rays 
prior to those firsthand experiences toward the end of his life. 
In the second chapter, I explore painter and photographer Ralston Crawford’s 
involvement in a series of U.S. nuclear tests in 1946 as a way of charting concurrent 
cultural movements between the medical uses of radiation, as described in the preceding 
chapter on Moholy-Nagy, and radiological safety in the hard sciences. Fortune magazine 
commissioned the artist to illustrate the atomic blasts for a report on Operation 
Crossroads, selecting him on the basis of his proposal to elucidate the “unseen” 
phenomena that their documentary photographers could not capture. Like Moholy-Nagy, 
Crawford came to this subject of radiation at a moment when scientists could not yet 
accurately predict its behavior. The instability of the methodological terms of Crawford’s 
study therefore negatively affected the outcomes of his research, which he had initially 
hoped would provide the factual basis on which to construct visual approximations of the 
information. Instead, Crawford needed to rely more heavily on his wartime background 
as a meteorological cartographer for the U.S. Army. Employing his amateur training in 
meteorology seemed in some ways to work to his disadvantage, due to the imprecise 
nature of this nascent science. Other potential visual resources by which to interpret the 
nuclear tests—film badges, spectrographs, line graphs, and maps—may have also proven 
inadequate, judging by the military’s reports on the scientific results of Crossroads. 
Fortune ultimately published two of Crawford’s three finished oil paintings, only five of 
several photographic snapshots, and none of his drawings about the Bikini tests. The 
article also included a single meteorological chart, in which he incorporated explicit 
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symbols for radioactive fallout. To understand his system of coding, I compare these 
paintings to the weather charts he made in relation to the D-Day invasion, which include 
representations of radar technology, notorious for their fuzzy translations of atmospheric 
data. Without recourse to stronger scientific ground, Crawford struggled to convey the 
complexities of the radiological catastrophe and, contrary to his original plan, allowed 
blast effects to predominate his pictures.  
The third chapter, on the activist-artist Ben Shahn, continues the previous 
chapter’s focus on the particular issues with the AEC’s program of “radiation safety,” in 
that the unpredictability of fallout made safety a fiction. Beginning his work on radiation 
hazards in the 1950s, in the era of the hydrogen bomb (“a thousand times more powerful 
than an atomic bomb,”17 to cite an oft-quoted statistic of the time), Shahn forged 
productive relationships with scientists through his professional commissions and 
appointments—incidentally, the very kind of personal connections that Crawford had 
lacked in his endeavor at Bikini. I first discuss Shahn’s portrait drawings of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer, in which the physical features of the physicist bring to mind period-
specific notions of genetic mutations and radiation sickness. Then, through a close 
analysis of the artist’s drawings for a magazine article on the fallout tragedy that befell 
the crew of a Japanese fishing boat in 1954, I explore Shahn’s associations with physicist 
Ralph Lapp, who not only authored the text but also included in it an important reference 
to a method for mapping fallout. The “cigar-shaped” or “elliptical” form, which visually 
articulated the predicted range in which radioactive particles would spread, comes to full 
17 For example, see Robert F. Bacher, “The Hydrogen Bomb,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 6, no. 5 
(May 1950), 136.  
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bloom as a recurrent motif in the painting We Did Not Know What Happened To Us of 
1960, Shahn’s monumental statement on the concept of all-over contamination. The 
implications of his allusion to the ubiquitous pattern seem to point to the absurdity of 
such forecasting strategies and to the farce of the system of radiation controls. Three late 
works of the 1960s extend this critique, as well as the underlying thesis of Shahn’s 
message throughout: the entire world is filled with mutated fallout victims, including 
those who helped give rise to the condition, thereby blurring the distinction between 
human and beast.      
Radioactive toxicity is also the theme of the final chapter, in which I examine San 
Francisco-based artist Bruce Conner’s deep-seated concerns about living in a geographic 
area that he had long perceived as hazardous. Unlike Moholy-Nagy, who desperately 
needed to believe in the capacity of radiation to heal, Conner saw nothing redeeming 
about nuclear science; in fact, by 1961, he openly admitted to believing that an atomic 
disaster in the Bay Area was an imminent and real possibility. A few years earlier he had 
begun to produce assemblages that seemed to anticipate his growing artistic fascination 
with cultural malaise, of which manmade forms of mass destruction constituted a central 
preoccupation. Informed by Conner’s own analogy for his assemblages, I regard these 
“environments” of the assemblage as the material approximations of his surroundings, 
which he considered hostile toward outsiders, like him and those he associated with the 
“ratbastard” type undervalued by society. I also invoke my own metaphor to compare his 
degraded constructions to radiological laboratories, the internal equivalent of nuclear 
testing grounds and a significant locus of activity in the Bay Area. This chapter 
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specifically treats the local National Radiological Defense Laboratory as a character that 
exhibits several similar tendencies and characteristics suggested by Conner’s 
assemblages, such as the subjection of rats to violent experiments, the exposure of 
vulnerable materials to extreme conditions, the production of harmful waste, and the 
ceremonial containment and disposal of this waste as if it were treasure. In the second 
part of my study on Conner, I scrutinize four of his films in which footage of atomic 
explosions construct unexpected meanings, subverting the aesthetic pleasure of the blast 
imagery. The two films that feature mushroom clouds most prominently reinforce notions 
of radioactive contamination via Conner’s conjuring of human figures’ contact with 
water sprayed up from the bomb’s detonation. With his work in both sculptural and 
photographic media, he aggressively situated the object or scene amid perilous 
circumstances, inside a built environment, which he explicitly viewed in his own life 
through a nuclear lens.   
In the conceptualization and execution of several artworks discussed in this study, 
photography functions as a foil to the AEC paradigm of the nuclear landscape, 
undercutting the traditional role of the medium in official documentation of atomic 
effects. Moholy-Nagy, who practiced as a photographer for most of his career, came to 
understand the basic principles of radiation through x-ray photographs, decades before 
“nuclear energy” entered the popular lexicon following World War II. When the artist’s 
interests later shifted to the ways in which radiation affected his own body, he rejected 
photography in favor of other media that permitted him to control his representation of 
the radiological subject. Crawford, an artist who often employed photographs as part of 
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his preparatory method for paintings, made it his mission to capture the invisible aspects 
of atomic explosions through non-photographic means (painting), but he ultimately 
achieved this by gathering scientific data from the related technologies of spectrographs 
and film badges. Shahn, sharpening his critique of the photographs on which he regularly 
based his drawings of people, altered his graphic translation of a photographic portrait of 
Oppenheimer, creator of the first atomic bomb, in ways that suggest his overexposure to 
the “fallout” from his invention. In other words, Shahn posed a challenge to the 
photograph, an old image from the days of the physicist’s involvement with the 
Manhattan Project, which had omitted any hint of his personal suffering from the record. 
Finally, in two of his best-known films, Conner exploited the sophisticated photo-
technology that captured extreme close-ups of atomic explosions in order to train the 
camera’s view on the part of the cloud that would inundate its surroundings with 
radioactivity. Another film by Conner included an aerial shot of Nagasaki to place the 
location of the previous image: a towering mushroom cloud, which quickly vanishes 
from sight.   
All four artists thus upend conventional uses of atomic-testing photography by 
attempting to ascribe specificity to the human and geographical sites of radiation 
exposure otherwise absent from AEC-sanctioned imagery. While this rejection of the 
common “nuclear” type links the divergent approaches of Moholy-Nagy, Crawford, 
Shahn, and Conner, no single iconography for radioactivity emerges in the following 
pages. Similarly, there are no distinctive characteristics of radiation that would make it 
recognizable in any context other than the specific works of art in which the subject is 
 
 
17 
 
presented. The lack of a common visual ground proves fertile for the artists’ productivity, 
allowing each “outsider” to seek the best specialized resources at his disposal and reshape 
the content at will. My own research into fine art, popular art, medicine, meteorology, 
and physics for this dissertation mimics the artistic shaping of such histories into a 
complex conglomeration, out of which I hope to have represented below the depth and 
clarity of the artists’ understanding of radioactivity—one of the so-called “unknowable” 
concepts of the Atomic Age they came to know too well.  
 
 
 
18 
 
CHAPTER 1: László Moholy-Nagy: The “New Vision” of Radiation in Postwar 
America 
At a time when radiation was still an innocuous concept in the minds of most Americans, 
Hungarian-born artist László Moholy-Nagy immigrated to the United States in 1937 and 
brought with him an already keen awareness of what this mysterious energy could 
contribute to art and design. Moholy-Nagy had intensively studied scientific x-ray 
photographs, also known as radiographs, since the early 1920s, sensing all along that 
visual inspiration and innovation could be found in these images that exposed the inside 
of biological specimens with the aid of “x-radiation.” While teaching at the Bauhaus in 
Dessau, Germany, beginning in 1923, Moholy-Nagy established his reputation as a 
leading practitioner of avant-garde aesthetics largely through his promotion of 
photography as a medium that could shift artistic practice away from the status quo and 
tap into the ever-increasing, unexplored potential of scientific technology. His first book, 
Painting Photography Film, published in 1925 to advance the Bauhaus’s alternative to 
traditional training in the fine arts, was essentially a “manifesto for embracing the 
expanded role of photography in modern life,” according to curator and Bauhaus scholar 
Leah Dickerman.1 In the book, Moholy-Nagy made such repeated references to x-ray 
photographs in relation to photograms that it appeared as if, as another art historian has 
noted, “in Moholy-Nagy’s eyes, the photogram was the artistic equivalent of the X-ray 
photograph.”2 In later publications, he continued throughout the years to show 
1 Leah Dickerman, “Bauhaus Fundaments,” in Bauhaus 1919–1933: Workshops for Modernity, exh. cat., 
ed. Barry Bergdoll and Leah Dickerman (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2009), 26.   
2 Herbert Molderings, Moholy-Nagy: The Photograms, Catalogue Raisonné, edited by Hattula Moholy-
Nagy, Renate Heyne, Floris M. Neususs (Stuttgart, Germany: Hatje Cantz, 2009), 16.  
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radiographic imagery in tandem with art photography as a means of pointing to the 
potential inherent in scientific ways of seeing the world through an enhanced depth of 
vision. 
For Moholy-Nagy, photograms were an artistic exploration of the same basic 
photographic materials and process used in the creation of radiographs, also known as x-
ray photographs, first produced shortly after the discovery of x-rays in 1895. Typically 
considered a type of medical photography, radiographs are rendered by passing the non-
visible radiation of x-rays through the human body, placed in front of the photosensitive 
film on which an image of the body’s interior is captured. The photographic method for 
producing a photogram is very similar, except the form of electromagnetic energy is 
visible light, which passes around, rather than through, the photographed object. Like the 
radiograph, the resulting photogram is a one-of-a-kind print without a negative. Although 
light exposure renders the exterior of any opaque material completely white in the 
photogram, transparent or translucent materials can be used to mimic the shades of grey 
found in radiographs of humans, for example, where x-rays have passed through the skin 
to reveal the tissues and organs below. Further conflating the two photographic forms, 
Moholy-Nagy even defined the x-ray image as a product of the “penetration of the body 
with light,” while knowing full well that light played no actual part in radiography. These 
minor distinctions of process and materials mattered little to Moholy-Nagy, so long as the 
way his photograms looked convincingly imitated the abilities of the x-ray paradigm to 
reveal a simultaneous play between opacity and transparency and other effects that 
appeared to challenge the limits of ordinary looking. 
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 In this chapter I will show how Moholy-Nagy’s concept of x-rays as a visual 
technology—a means by which to inscribe the image of an interior on an external 
surface—radically shifted when the artist was diagnosed with leukemia and began 
receiving medical treatments. The radiation therapy he selected, probably at the 
recommendation of a doctor, did not involve radiography—not even at the diagnostic 
stage, given that leukemia is a cancer of the blood. While the imaging technique of 
radiography privileged the photographic result, radiation therapy centered on the internal 
process that occurred when the x-rays’ energy was released to act upon cancerous cells. 
Radiotherapy delivered doses of x-ray beams into the blood, making their mark in ways 
that were imperceptible to the human eye. I contend that the change in his relationship 
with x-ray technology enabled him to visualize on his own terms the infusion of foreign 
energy into his body. When Moholy-Nagy received radiotherapy in Chicago during the 
fall of 1945 and summer of 1946, he abruptly ceased producing photograms and instead 
embarked on a series of nuclear-themed works, including the paintings Nuclear II (fig. 
1.1) and Nuclear I, CH (fig. 1.2). Nuclear II, in particular, with its all-over cloud of 
white, cellular dots, appears to depict his visceral responses to a force at once destructive 
and life-saving. Moholy-Nagy’s faith in the latter quality led him to take proactive 
measures, from engaging with different media in his artistic practice to making choices 
that would shape his medical experiences—all aimed at simultaneously internalizing x-
rays into both new imagery in works of art and into a comprehensible presence in his own 
body.  
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The connection between Moholy-Nagy’s eventual turn away from the photogram 
and his direct experience with x-rays is not part of the current literature on the artist.3 
While it is not possible to establish with certainty that he intended for the images I will 
discuss in this chapter to be read as literal translations of his thoughts on nuclear energy, 
the cumulative effect of the pictures suggests that he was making a visual response to his 
radiological treatment and to the informal research he conducted on nuclear weapons. In 
his interpretations on these subjects, however, he downplayed scientific accuracy in favor 
of emphasizing the creative source of his abstractions. That the “nuclear” paintings, for 
example, do not depict any iconography that could be easily read as derived from 
medicine or physics underscores the images’ openness to different possible readings. 
What further imbues this body of work with mystery is the fluidity exercised by the artist 
himself: although he was powerless over the circumstances of his illness, he took the 
opportunity to expand both his understanding of new subject matter and his engagement 
with media he had largely abandoned since his years at the Bauhaus in Germany. It is this 
turn away from the creation of x-ray analogues, embodied by his photograms, around the 
same moment that he was physically immersed in x-rays that I will first examine.  
In a series of late photograms (figs. 1.3 and 1.4), created three years before 
Moholy-Nagy began radiotherapy, he explored artistically visualizing the act of splitting 
3 For example, see Linda Dalrymple Henderson, The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in 
Modern Art (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983), 337–338. Linda Dalrymple Henderson has 
argued that “invisible realities,” such as the fourth dimension, captured the imagination of avant-garde 
artists Max Weber, Marcel Duchamp, and others in their milieu. Ultimately, Henderson concludes, this idea 
did not hold up in the United States beyond the 1920s, as the newer concept of time introduced by Albert 
Einstein’s theory of general relativity “was a much easier concept than the fourth dimension to 
understand.” According to Henderson’s analyses in more recent studies, modern European artists appear to 
have sustained their interest in invisible phenomena by shifting their subject matter between several current 
concepts, from x-rays and electromagnetism, to wireless telegraphy and telepathy. Mid-twentieth-century 
American artists, however, fall outside the scope of Henderson’s thesis. 
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a single entity into two halves—a concept that would come to be primarily linked to the 
concept of fission after atomic weapons entered the public consciousness in 1945. In 
1939, he moved to Chicago to found a school of design called the New Bauhaus (later 
called the School of Design and the Institute of Design, respectively), and it was around 
this time that he added physical science courses to the otherwise traditional Bauhaus 
curricula at his school. Still practicing photography, Moholy-Nagy demonstrated a 
greater interest in describing physical processes than in previous explorations of the 
medium, in which he emphasized the visual effects he was able to achieve in the final 
photographic product, as will be discussed later in this chapter. In these examples from 
1941, representing some of the last photograms he ever produced, the splitting motif 
suggests a wish to pull apart the subject under visual scrutiny, to illustrate how it is 
dissected. The photograms feature twin ellipses, overlapping at their tips like circles in a 
Venn diagram, and seem to be conceived as part of a sequence, though the order in which 
they were made is unknown. The halves that do not touch each contain a geometrical 
design, like electrically charged nuclei, and appear even more prominent in the image in 
which the two elliptical forms barely touch, seemingly moving farther apart. If Moholy-
Nagy had indeed rendered the photograms in this order, it seems possible that he was 
considering this illustration of fission in scientific terms, especially given his allusion to 
ameba-like masses that contain a distinct, changing core.  
  Exploring a similar motif in another photogram (fig. 1.5) two years later, Moholy-
Nagy presents an even larger split between the two ellipses. Pulled in opposite directions, 
they have formed an interstice, at the center of which appears a new “nucleus” encircled 
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by a third body. Surrounding this motif is a string of vignettes that depict the two primary 
masses in the process of cleaving, each in a slightly different state. Whether these three 
photograms present an indirect representation of the newly discovered nuclear theory of 
fission, which physicists triumphantly announced to the world in 1939, or simply 
illustrate fission as a general action, they perhaps serve as a starting point for considering 
Moholy-Nagy’s sustained interest in how changes in bodies (both nuclear and human) 
can be traced over time. At the same time, these photograms still mimic the radiographic 
product—that is, they reveal a view inside the primary form, while maintaining its 
exterior structure.  
Moholy-Nagy never abandoned his attempt to emulate the illusory simultaneity of 
transparency and opacity, even when he eventually focused on painting; rather, his works 
began to clarify that these effects were made by a process. In Nuclear II, marking his 
shift to oil on canvas,4 that active operation takes place on the large orb at the center, 
which is subjected to the penetration of an invisible force. Some areas of the orb, such as 
the white square in the left half, suggest the opaque body was cut with the utmost 
precision, in contrast to the horizontal bands in other areas, where the exterior shell is 
roughly peeled away to expose layers underneath. Here again, as in the photograms with 
the fission motif, Moholy-Nagy has retained the shell yet uncovered the interior contents. 
But Nuclear II also demonstrates a more advanced kind of vision: the enlarged body is 
treated as a specimen, targeted for close inspection among a sea of smaller bodies. This 
4 Timothy Garvey has argued that Nuclear II preceded Nuclear I, CH, in spite of the titles that suggest the 
opposite dating. See Timothy Garvey, “László Moholy-Nagy and Atomic Ambivalence in Postwar 
Chicago,” American Art 14, no. 3 (Autumn 2000), 23. 
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simulation of extreme magnification appears to suspend the mass in a split-second 
moment, imitating the way in which special kinds of photography, including x-ray, “can 
render, precisely register, the speed of objects or stop motion.”5 Nuclear II may thus 
constitute the kind of study in “space-time” that Moholy-Nagy had explicitly sought to 
conduct near the end of his life. He notes in his last book, Vision in Motion:  
In x-ray photos, structure becomes transparency and transparency manifests 
structure. The x-ray pictures...are among the outstanding space-time renderings on 
the static plane. They give simultaneously inside and outside, the view of an 
opaque solid, its outline, but also its inner structure.6 
 
The descriptiveness of this observation in comparison to Moholy-Nagy’s earlier 
statement about x-ray pictures is revealing. Moving beyond the relatively simplistic 
notion that the “penetration of the body with light is one of the greatest visual 
experiences,”7 he was no longer interested in radiography simply for the technological 
progress that it symbolizes. Rather, by 1946, when he wrote the book, his text is peppered 
with commentary on the x-ray pictures’ portrayal of actions and movement—not 
coincidentally, the very oscillating movement between “inside and outside” that he 
portrays in Nuclear II. Throughout the pages of Vision in Motion, which will prove 
throughout this chapter a useful source of insights on Moholy-Nagy’s late-career 
methodologies, he further points to the x-ray picture as exemplary of the intellectual 
content that art should aim to capture. He poses to artists a challenge to incorporate the 
5 László Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1947), 206. The book was published 
only a few months after Moholy-Nagy’s death on November 24, 1946. 
6 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 252.  
7 Moholy-Nagy, “Photography Is Manipulation of Light,” 1928, in Andreas Haus, ed., and translated by 
Frederic Samson, Moholy-Nagy: Photographs and Photograms (New York: Pantheon Books), 47.  
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“scientific knowledge of the physicist and the technological skill of an engineer” and to 
do so by experimenting with media other than photography.8  
 
Forging a New Relationship with X-rays  
 In the postwar world of medicine, radiation certainly was no longer innocuous by 
any standard. While early in the twentieth century radium-infused products, from 
toothpaste to bottled water, helped to entrench the cultural notion that radioactivity could 
be healthful, thereby rendering radiation an acceptable part of everyday American life, 
nuclear weapons came to complicate popular applications of nuclear science.9 By mid-
century, the most widespread medical use for radiation was electron beam therapy, also 
known as radiotherapy. X-ray machines aimed ionizing radioactive particles at the 
malignant area of the patient’s body to infuse the tissues with energy, a method thought 
to be more healing than harmful if carefully administered in measured dosages. American 
hospitals made this treatment available to the general population just before World War 
II, though the demands of research directed toward the development of the atomic bomb 
during the war brought about a delay in improving x-ray therapy.10 It was not until after 
the war that the significant wartime developments in radiological technology, particularly 
related to the research conducted for the Manhattan Project at the University of Chicago’s 
laboratories, found practical and far-ranging purposes in medicine. Beginning in the 
1950s, hospitals throughout the country offered radiological treatments with super-
8 Ibid., 168.  
9 See Matthew Lavine, A Cultural History of Radiation and Radioactivity in the United States, 1895–1945 
(PhD diss., University of Wisconsin-Madison, 2008), esp. 138–170.  
10 See James M. Slater, “From X-Rays to Ion Beams: A Short History of Radiation Therapy,” in Ute Linz, 
Ion Beam Therapy Fundamentals, Technology, Clinical Applications (Berlin: Springer, 2012), 3–16. 
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voltage (1 million-volt) x-ray machines, more effective in deeply penetrating cancerous 
tissues and cells by comparison to the lower-energy models of the immediate postwar 
period.11  
This era of advanced cancer therapy therefore came about five to ten years late for 
Moholy-Nagy, who in 1945 would probably have received his radiological infusion from 
what was commonly called a “deep therapy” machine. In most hospitals in the 1940s, 
these standard machines administered less powerful, but still potentially hazardous, doses 
of 250-kilovolts or greater of x-rays to patients.12 For those who sought a cure for 
systemic cancers, including leukemia, which required all-over treatment, the “target” 
method of radiotherapy could lead to unusually adverse reactions. To treat the patient’s 
blood, radiologists sometimes concentrated dosages of x-rays on the spleen or, 
alternatively, “sprayed” the entire body, thereby scattering excessive radiation to non-
cancerous tissues.  
 It seems that Moholy-Nagy was one of the unfortunate sufferers of an 
unsophisticated method of radiological treatment. According to his widow, Sibyl, the first 
ten successive x-ray treatments he underwent in the late fall of 1945 caused violent 
reactions in his system: “He became sick after each treatment, and his body trembled for 
hours.”13 She found Moholy-Nagy’s deteriorating health equally alarming in the wake of 
a second round in the summer of 1946, describing how after each x-ray session he would 
“lay in a dark room covered with ice packs” to recover for seven hours a day during one 
11 Ibid., 7.  
12 Dr. Charles DeForest Lucas, “The Therapeutic and Economic Indications for Teleradium and the 
Supervoltage X-ray Machine,” Radiology 34 (February 1940), 193–199.  
13 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy: Experiment in Totality (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1969), 223. 
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“nightmarish week.”14 Moholy-Nagy made it clear to his wife that the place in which he 
would receive the treatment mattered more to him than whether it was truly the best 
treatment available. According to Sibyl, he chose a hospital with a “Catholic order . . . 
staffed exclusively by men,” called “brothers.”15 This description indicates that the 
hospital was most certainly the Alexian Brothers of the Immaculate Conception Province 
of Chicago, established in 1866 by a lay order of German immigrants.16 The Alexian 
Brothers eventually incorporated a School of Nursing, which admitted only Catholic men 
until a nursing shortage during World War II necessitated the admission of secular 
students.17 When Moholy-Nagy stayed there for his radiotherapy just after the war, the 
Alexian Brothers Hospital would have been enjoying a fresh influx of students who had 
returned from duty, eager to take advantage of the GI Bill and the school’s relaxed 
restrictions.  
At Alexian Brothers, the doctors and nurses working with x-rays received 
particularly extensive technical training due to the hazardous consequences of the 
technology’s misuse. They were also aware that the x-ray machine itself could be a 
14 Ibid., 229.  
15 Ibid., 221.  
16 Although Sibyl attributed Moholy-Nagy’s aversion to general hospitals to “the idea of being nursed by a 
pretty young woman,” his attraction to the Alexian Brothers Hospital could partly be due to its roots in 
Germany and staff of mostly Germanic descent.  
17 Until the end of World War II, many of the male nurses were conscientious objectors employed by the 
Civil Public Service, under the auspices of the selective service, and some of the men stayed on during 
Moholy-Nagy’s time at the hospital. These nurses, in particular, prided themselves on going above what 
was considered the call of duty in general hospitals, performing “extras,” like routine back rubs for the 
patients, presumably because the men showed their appreciation for working in an atmosphere where their 
views were accepted. Moholy-Nagy purportedly also registered for the selective service in 1942, according 
to an article in the Chicago Tribune, which listed his name among the “Who’s Who of Chicagoland” 
planning to sign his name to the draft roll. Perhaps Moholy-Nagy felt an affinity to the nurses who shared 
his commitment to public service. See Barbra Wall, American Catholic Hospitals: A Century of Changing 
Markets and Missions (Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2011), 66–7.  
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powerful tool in assuaging whatever preconceived fears patients brought with them to the 
hospital, where they might be surprised to find a calming and controlled environment. 
Matthew Lavine has noted that the patient experience dramatically improved along with 
the increased sophistication of the x-ray machines over the first half of the twentieth 
century, so that, by mid-century, the once-monstrous and cacophonous apparatus was 
now “circumspect, quiet, and supervised by a medically trained operator with a deeply 
ingrained aversion to even the slight possibility of overexposure.”18 Given the danger 
involved, an x-ray specialist was apparently seen as one of the more “masculine” roles 
that a Brother served at the hospital, where the staff continually defied gendered 
stereotypes about the field of nursing.19 The gender of the medical staff influenced how 
Moholy-Nagy anticipated his patient experience. When faced with the reality that he 
would soon spend a long period of time away from home, he refused to submit to the care 
of what he called the “flippant young ladies” at Chicago’s general hospitals.20 
Significantly, this remark reflects his expectations about what he wanted from his 
treatment: he insisted on an atmosphere of high-minded seriousness and rigorous 
discipline—all of which couched this new, unfamiliar experience in the familiar way he 
approached his work and art-making. Scholars have noted that, from the beginning of his 
career, he adopted scientific and technical language to project the persona of an expert, 
enhancing this image with his everyday costume of workman or laboratory technician’s 
18 Lavine, A Cultural History of Radiation and Radioactivity in the United States, 1895–1945, 94.  
19 Wall, American Catholic Hospitals, 64.  
20 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 221.  
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uniform.21 This sober, professional discipline carried over to his work in Chicago, as 
evidenced by his decision to require the study of scientific principles at his new school 
and, as will be proven by later discussions, his personal research on nuclear science.    
 Convinced that the medical staff should share his scientifically-based faith in a 
cure, Moholy-Nagy gave careful consideration to the place where he would receive 
radiotherapy. Unlike the Brothers, who integrated monastic rituals and spiritual retreats 
into their medical practices as an extension of the Catholic religion, he drew upon his 
belief in the power of x-rays. At first, when it seemed that the radiation had worked to rid 
the cancer from his body, Moholy-Nagy credited the treatment with having a wholly 
transformative effect on both his professional and spiritual life. He told Sibyl, “I shall 
always remember this sickness as a great ally.”22 He would later suggest that the true 
catalyst of change in his life was not the sickness but the healing energy that allowed him 
to overcome it. About six months after the first round of treatment, he steeled himself 
against the devastating news of his relapse by reasserting his faith in the radiation. He 
assured Sibyl, “Now that I’m going to have more X ray I’ll get well fast.”23  
 Local news stories affirmed Moholy-Nagy’s optimism about the healing effects of 
x-rays. Medical experts who contributed to the Chicago Tribune’s syndicated health 
column, “How to Keep Well,” in the early 1940s repeatedly extolled the virtues of 
radiology. In attempting persuade the public, they mitigated concerns over irradiation 
sickness. The side-effects were generally mild, ranging from “languor,” to nausea, to 
21 See, for example, Dickerman, Bauhaus 1919–1933, 30.  
22 Ibid., 224.  
23 Ibid., 229.  
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olfactory irritation from the “odors that emanate from the apparatus,” such as the “smell 
of ozone.” As the experts assured readers, these discomforts could easily be addressed 
with a combination of vitamins and minerals “potent enough to neutralize completely all 
untoward manifestations.”24 A later article in the Tribune, written between Moholy-
Nagy’s first and second hospital stays, argued that the potential applications of advanced 
x-ray technologies far outweighed the drawbacks:  
We now know that the benefits [of x-rays] to mankind are incalculable. It has 
been stated that radiation has already saved more individuals thru diagnosis and 
treatment than were killed in the two World wars. The present atomic age is 
confronted with a like problem, for, although the destructive power of this type of 
energy has been uppermost in the news, its possibilities for peace are almost 
unlimited.25    
 
The author of this op-ed piece, Dr. Theodore Van Dellen, likely allied his claims with a 
more widely circulated and oft-cited article by the MIT physicist Robley Evans. He 
asserted earlier in 1946, “The sober truth is that through medical advances alone, atomic 
energy has already saved more lives than were snuffed out at Hiroshima and Nagasaki.”26 
The enthusiastic acceptance of radiological science by physicists and physicians alike 
would have resonated with Moholy-Nagy, who similarly observed that x-ray images 
“have to be studied to reveal their meaning; but once the student has learned their 
language, he will find them indispensable.”27 With statements like this, he demonstrated 
his admiration of the various and seemingly endless uses of x-ray technology, never 
24 Dr. Irving S. Cutter, “How to Keep Well: The Effects of X-Ray Treatments,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 
March 30, 1943.   
25 Dr. Theodore R. Van Dellen, “How to Keep Well: From X-Rays to Atom Smashing,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, March 15, 1946. 
26 Robley D. Evans, “The Medical Uses of Atomic Energy,” Atlantic Monthly 177, no. 1 (January 1946), 
68. 
27 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 252. 
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wavering on his position when others began to advocate what were thought to be cutting-
edge medical alternatives, such as phosphorus.  
Yet, even as he continued to venerate the visible outcomes engendered by x-rays, 
his experience as a leukemia patient called for a drastically different appreciation of what 
x-rays could offer as agents of invisible change in the body. This shift was not seamless. 
In the face of little evidence for the x-rays’ efficacy in combating his illness, there could 
be few explanations why he trusted they would eventually work, other than taking into 
consideration his past engagement with radiographic imagery. Those earlier experiences 
were purely aesthetic: at the German Bauhaus in the 1920s and early 30s, he employed x-
ray photographs to raise awareness of their use-value outside scientific fields and to draw 
formal comparisons to his own photographs, as a means of entrenching his work in the 
context of a technologically sound and adventurous discipline. At that point in Moholy-
Nagy’s career, radiographs were integral to his artistic identity, but in Chicago, where he 
brought greater intellectual focus to his practice through the study of science, he began to 
look beyond mere visual correspondences between x-rays and photograms. His diagnosis 
with cancer seemed to provide further impetus to do so, giving him reason to investigate 
the capabilities of radiation once it was absorbed into his bloodstream. Facing this new 
situation, which required certain awareness about the effect of x-rays on his metabolic 
processes, he may have sought ways to understand his bodily responses through some 
tried and true means.  
 In his characteristically methodical approach to radiotherapy, Moholy-Nagy had 
the opportunity to put into real-life practice his philosophy on sensory experience, a 
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foundation of his pedagogy at the Institute of Design in Chicago. The core curriculum 
emphasized what he termed “tactility exercises,” adapted from one of his major 
contributions to the European Bauhaus’s preliminary course. As outlined in his book The 
New Vision of 1928 (first published in German), the exercises involved recording 
psychological responses to different textures, which would later guide the artist in 
translating those sensations into visual form.28 At his new American school, Moholy-
Nagy modified this tactile method of teaching to encompass experiences not typically 
associated with art, in the hope that an unconventional approach might attract equally 
non-traditional students. For an interview in the Chicago Daily Tribune, which included a 
photograph of a middle-aged female student in the evening school intended primarily for 
“business executives, teachers, and veterans,” Moholy-Nagy explained the concept of 
“touch experimentation” in layman’s terms:  
Only thru working with all sorts of materials can a designer best determine his 
medium. He touches it, and thru that touch he learns whether it is hard or soft, 
light or heavy, rough or smooth, brittle or malleable, warm or cold. He determines 
the breaking point, the expanding and retraction qualities. He knows whether he 
likes to work with it.29 
 
The article cites the most “kindergarten” exercise of the Institute: in the introductory 
course for industrial design, students create paper cut-outs to test out basic templates, 
which can then be developed into more advanced patterns for anything from “kitchen 
utensils” to “luxury articles.” If such a method were followed, Moholy-Nagy believed, 
28 László Moholy-Nagy, The New Vision: from Material to Architecture, 3rd rev. ed., trans. Daphne M. 
Hoffman (New York: Wittenborn and Co., 1946), 23.  
29 Genevieve Flavin, “Knowing Hands Learn to Shape Ideas of Future: Sight and Touch Direct Design,” 
Chicago Daily Tribune, December 2, 1945. See also Dianne Kirkpatrick, “Time and Space in the Work of 
László Moholy-Nagy,” Hungarian Studies Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 1988), 63–76.  
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every student would effectively begin the creative process on a level field.30 Applied to 
subsequent practices, this deep sense of a material would turn even the most novice artist 
or designer into an alchemist of sorts, who, in the words of another scholar, “by 
mastering crude matter technologically in order to refine it, also acted on their own 
consciousness and transformed it into a more precious—a wiser—entity.”31  
 This routine training of the tactile sense may have served as a guide to Moholy-
Nagy’s recalibration of his relation to x-rays. According to his wife, Sibyl, he acquainted 
himself with all the things made of metal in his hospital room. “While blood and glucose 
drained into his arm, and one doctor after another examined him, he sketched versions of 
his bed with one hand. The many parts of this contraption—screws, bolts, boards, and 
bars—delighted him.” 32 Further evidence of the sensorial pleasure he took in this new 
experience was the change that radiotherapy inspired in his artistic practice. In 1945, the 
decision to renew his long-dormant engagement with painting gave rise to Nuclear II and 
Nuclear I, CH, following years of his sustained interest in technical and industrial 
materials, from the photosensitive paper of his photograms to the plastic of his kinetic 
sculptures, both dating as far back as the 1920s. Unlike those media, which depended on 
the relatively unpredictable behavior of light to determine the works’ visual effects, 
paintings permitted the artist to exercise a greater degree of precision, to individualize the 
work with his facture. If Nuclear II and Nuclear I, CH could be read as records of the 
sensorial properties he observed in the hospital environment, the act of mark-making with 
30 Flavin, “Knowing Hands Learn to Shape Ideas of Future.”  
31 Alain Findeli, “Moholy-Nagy’s Design Pedagogy in Chicago (1937–46),” Design Issues 7, no. 1 
[“Educating the Designer”] (Autumn 1990), 17. 
32 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 221.  
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his own hand—the “touch” of pigment to the canvas—may have satisfied his need to 
register traces of that past physical contact.  
 The ability of a painter to “control” his medium (to use Moholy-Nagy’s term) was 
a problem of intense contemplation for him, particularly in the pages of his final 
manifesto, Vision in Motion, posthumously published in 1947. Although the central 
premise of the book was to advocate a “trend away from . . . [the mere] pigmentation of 
surfaces toward a kinetic ‘light painting,’” such as the work of the early light artist 
Thomas Wilfred (fig. 1.6),33 no artist had yet achieved a method to paint in light “with 
the same precision as the painter of yesterday [who] controlled the effects of his 
pigments.”34 Therefore, as part of the process to devise a better system of the application 
of light—Moholy-Nagy’s preferred techno-scientific medium—it may be necessary to 
chart the new course using conventional materials like paint. In some ways, then, his 
“nuclear” paintings can be seen as extensions of his pictorial investigations of light; 
during this period in the mid-1940s, it was not unusual for him to produce what he called 
“light modulators”—works that explored the spatial effects of reflection and shadow—in 
various media, including paint on canvas. Alternatively, Nuclear II and Nuclear I, CH 
may expand on Moholy-Nagy’s idea that light could legitimately serve as the subject 
matter of works of art and, moreover, particularly when considered in conjunction with 
33 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 252. Moholy-Nagy had long admired the kinetic light abstractions of 
the Danish-born, American artist Thomas Wilfred (1889–1968), who forged an international reputation by 
the mid-1920s with the art form that he collectively called “Lumia.” These works are essentially an artistic 
system of projection onto a flat screen—whether on a stage, as in cinema, or in a box, like a proto-
television—a composition of changing colored forms. Moholy-Nagy acknowledged the path-breaking work 
of Wilfred in his influential essay “Production-Reproduction” (1922), in the second edition of his Bauhaus 
book Painting, Photography, Film (1927), and again in his final book, Vision in Motion (1947).  
34 Ibid.  
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his medical experience with x-rays, the paintings may constitute an in-depth study of 
energetic processes.  
Another work (fig. 1.7) of 1946, painted on Plexiglas, suggests interactions 
between splitting orbs and atomic motifs, which abstractly refer to a nuclear reaction. The 
painting features a large circle in which are encapsulated a number of the ubiquitous ball-
and-spoke models of atomic molecules often illustrated in professional and popular 
scientific periodicals. Moholy-Nagy likely exploited this type of resource to find the 
image of a hydrocarbon (“CH”) molecule that he reproduced in Vision in Motion, under 
the title “Power puzzle” (fig. 8). The accompanying caption read, “As a reminder of the 
atomic age, here is the model of the chemical structure of a material.”35 This image 
provides important evidence not only that Moholy-Nagy clearly identified these structural 
models as “atomic,” thereby allowing them to be interpreted as such in the Plexiglas 
painting, but that he also searched for these symbols in popular culture. If the molecules 
in the untitled painting derive from such research, both the representational and the 
intellectual content that they impart to the overall composition may have implications for 
the other “nuclear” paintings and drawings that share strong formal affinities. Yet, an 
equally applicable lesson to be taken from the Plexiglas work is that Moholy-Nagy’s 
atomic models do not correlate to any specific element. Rather, they seem to point 
somewhat generically to the recurrent motif of the large orb as a locus of nuclear activity, 
in which interrelationships appear to form among the unidentifiable molecules, but the 
exact equation of their “power puzzle” cannot be discerned.    
35 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 267. 
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 Representing the culmination of Moholy-Nagy’s thoughts on media of all kinds, 
Vision in Motion further marked a concise shift from his earlier conception of the 
relationship between x-rays and photograms. Rather than demonstrating their correlation 
with an example of his own work, he discussed the x-ray as a means to an end, rather 
than the end in itself, by which radio-waves facilitated not a specific visual effect but a 
technical innovation. Explaining his long-held belief that radiation could hold the key to 
the easy and inexpensive reproduction of photographs, he wrote in his book: “Many years 
ago I suggested ‘photoprinting’ by X-ray. This would enable the production of thousands 
of sheets at once of photo-sensitized paper with the help of a well and carefully designed 
master-‘negative.’”36 In an uncharacteristic withdrawal from understanding radiographs 
as aesthetic objects, Moholy-Nagy did not consider the use of x-rays beyond mere 
technique. His new direction of thought, relegated to a footnote in the text, lay in a re-
interpretation of the x-ray as subject matter, subordinating the issue of photographic 
reproducibility. 
 Given his evident fascination with the procedural role of x-rays in new forms of 
mechanical technology, Moholy-Nagy may have noted the Alexian Brothers Hospital’s 
recent acquisition of the latest inventions of the Westinghouse X-ray Company. 
Westinghouse products apparently were a source of great pride for the hospital, 
signifying a gold standard of care that patients could expect from those who handled the 
medical equipment. Alexian’s x-ray department boasted two Westinghouse machines—
diagnostic and therapeutic—both of which the staff characterized as “‘ultramodern’ . . . 
36 Ibid., fn. 306. 
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when it was necessary to convey the effectiveness of treatment,” according to a historian 
who studied the history of the Chicago facility. 37 Specifically, the hospital used a deep-
therapy Quadrocondex Type D, with an “output of 220,000 constant potential volts.”38 
An advertisement for the machine stated that it was designed for the “therapist who 
refuses to COMPROMISE.”39 Further underscoring a message of promise, 
Westinghouse’s ad for the Quadrocondex (fig. 1.9) emphasized its “large output . . . [that] 
can now be still further increased, to a level beyond any ever reached” and its 
“microvernier flexibility at the small, beautifully counterbalanced, easy-to-position 
head,”40 achieving just the blend of scientific precision and aesthetic appeal Moholy-
Nagy might well have appreciated. The bipartite structure of the tube apparatus calls to 
mind the recurrent image of the cleaved ellipses depicted in Moholy-Nagy’s photograms 
of the early 1940s (see figs. 3–5).  
 Nuclear II also bears evidence of what could be interpreted as a vestige of the x-
ray machine acting upon the human body. In the painting, the left side of the central orb 
features a square, suggesting a window through which the background of tiny white dots 
can be seen; this shape mimics the cubic measurement that traces the path of radiation 
traveling between the x-ray tube on the machine and the target inside the patient’s body. 
Well before 1945, when Moholy-Nagy began receiving his treatment, medical 
37 Lawrence Davidson, The Alexian Brothers of Chicago: An Evolutionary Look at the Monastery and 
Modern Health Care (New York: Vantage Books, 1990), 113. 
38 Ibid.  
39 Advertisement for Westinghouse X-Ray Co., Radiology 33, no. 2 (August 1939), xv.  
40 Ibid.  
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practitioners employed the Newtonian “Inverse Square Law,”41 which holds that the 
intensity of the radiation hitting the object is inversely proportional to the distance from 
the source—the “head” of the x-ray tube, in the case of radiotherapy. Square units, as 
visualized in this contemporary diagram (fig. 1.10), measure the intensity of radiation at 
regular intervals between the start and end points. The x-ray aperture on the machine also 
happens typically to be square, including in the Quadrocondex models used at the 
Alexian hospital, where Moholy-Nagy may have encountered this terminology. In 
relation to Nuclear II, the “square” principle seems a particularly apt visual analogy for 
an artist known for engaging in geometrical abstraction, who at the time demonstrated 
increasing interest in the technical uses of x-rays beyond the photographic image.   
Moholy-Nagy had artistically explored this hole-through-the-body effect before. 
The illusion of empty space had most recently appeared in the graphical image created 
for the Institute of Design advertisements in 1945 and 1946, likely by Moholy-Nagy 
himself (fig. 1.11). It pictures an open-faced right hand gripping a ball—approximately 
the same size and shape as a hole that has been cut through the palm—between an unbent 
index finger and thumb. This image was a calling card of sorts for Moholy-Nagy, for it 
conjured up associations with a time when he was a leader at the German Bauhaus, 
making his signature photograms, among which the most well-known were those images 
41 For two typical examples of period literature on the Inverse Square Law, see L. F. Lamerton, “A Physical 
Investigation of the Radiation from a Low-voltage X-ray Tube (Cautery Technique)” British Journal of 
Radiology 13, no. 148 (April 1940), 136–146, and M. H. Jelinek, “Measurement and Analysis of Small-
Angle X-ray Scattering,” Industrial and Engineering Chemistry [Analytical Edition] 18, no. 3 (March 
1946), 172–175.      
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of human hands.42 One particularly reminiscent example (fig. 1.12) shows a hole in the 
middle of the hand. In the first negative image from which this contact copy was made, 
he produced the “hole” effect by placing a circular object directly on the photosensitive 
paper and then, as the design began to emerge in the development process, putting the 
woman’s hand on the paper to make at least one more exposure. The recurring motif of 
the hand was in itself a riff on the first and most iconic x-ray picture (fig. 1.13) of the 
human body ever taken, of the hand of Anna Bertha Ludwig Röntgen, the wife of x-ray 
inventor Wilhelm Röntgen. In his first book, Painting, Photography, Film (1926), 
Moholy-Nagy illustrated a “Roentgen photograph” of an x-rayed human hand from a 
medical textbook, which pictured the appendage broken into six fragments, all pointing in 
the same direction. The hand motif, as a recognizable symbol that connects Moholy-
Nagy’s early and late career, always pointed the viewer back to the x-ray, for which his 
photograms served as artistic analogues.  
 In addition to the Quandrocondex x-ray therapy machine, other types of 
Westinghouse technology proved relevant to Moholy-Nagy’s experiences outside the 
hospital. When the U.S. military draft for World War II began in 1940, the Westinghouse 
company secured a contract with the army and navy to supply equipment for a 
revolutionary method of rapidly processing x-ray prints on 35-millimeter film, the fastest 
method of photography at the time.43  Both military branches required a diagnostic x-ray 
42 For the complete set of photograms with hand imagery, see Hattula Moholy-Nagy, et al., Moholy-Nagy: 
The Photograms, 154–163. For a discussion on the “detached-hand photograms” as representative of 
Moholy-Nagy’s tendency to subvert authorship, see Louis Kaplan, László Moholy-Nagy-Nagy: 
Biographical Writings (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995), esp. 119–156.  
43 Bettyann Kevles, Naked to the Bone: Medical Imagining in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic 
Books, 1998), 114. 
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to be taken of every serviceman’s chest before he entered active duty. This record-
keeping system meant that Moholy-Nagy, who served in the U.S. civil service as an 
occupational therapist during the war (a subject to which I will return), had access to such 
x-ray prints for all of his therapy patients. The remarkable speed at which these prints 
were produced—less than a minute per image—was a hallmark of the Westinghouse 
brand, whose research in stop-motion photography also led to the development of a 
camera that could take x-ray pictures at a one-millionth of a second.44 Moholy-Nagy 
reproduced the most famous image associated with this camera in Vision in Motion, 
noting how the radiograph suspended the full-speed motion of the razor to yield a crystal-
clear picture of the metal object (fig. 1.14).45 Moholy-Nagy would have likely examined 
such documents—both the medical records and the stop-motion photographs—with 
special interest. They represented new technological processes, resonating with the 
invention of “photoprinting by X-ray” that he had advocated for many years but had been 
unsuccessful in implementing on a large scale.  
Nuclear I, CH and Nuclear II appear to embody some of the conceptual results of 
Moholy-Nagy’s turn away from radiography to the technical uses of the x-ray. With the 
reproduction of a photogram for the Institute of Design’s advertising campaign, he 
continued to imitate the aesthetic of radiography in a self-referential way, but the 
paintings told of different and emerging interests. Embedded within them are clues about 
his forays in nuclear science that at once demonstrate intellectual command of the 
44 Moholy-Nagy might have noted a brief article in the local newspaper on the subject of Westinghouse’s 
latest inventions in stop-motion photography. “X-ray to Catch Photo as Shell Pierces Armor,” Chicago 
Daily Tribune, December 27, 1944. On the same subject, see also “The Camera Clicks for Uncle Sam,” 
Popular Mechanics (April 1938), 38. 
45 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 253.  
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mechanical processes associated with the x-ray and physical control over the subject. In 
the single image of Nuclear II, the focus of this chapter thus far, the square-cut hole 
evokes a footprint left behind by radiowaves as they pass through a spherical cell, yet 
surrounding it are white dots, each seemingly applied with one touch of the brush, which 
suggest his very personal “touch experiences” in radiotherapy. As such, the “nuclear” 
paintings allowed Moholy-Nagy to be both an active patient and student of x-ray 
technology, engaging with it on levels previously unknown to him.    
 
Supplementing Radiotherapy   
There is no doubt that Moholy-Nagy’s increasing preoccupation with the practical 
applications of science and technology corresponded with the period in which received x-
ray therapy, but questions remain about his rationale for integrating these ideas into his 
artistic practice. One explanation is that he already thought of his art-making in 
therapeutic terms even before he conceived of the “nuclear” paintings. Occupational 
therapy was a central component of the curriculum that he developed during World War 
II at the Institute, for which he led a course designed to help returning American veterans. 
This treatment method quickly became one of his passions, partly because it gave him the 
chance to incorporate past experiences into his present teachings. As an artillery officer 
for the Hungarian army in World War I, he spent months afterward in military hospitals 
recovering from a shattered thumb and gangrenous infection. It was during this time, 
about 1916–17, that he performed a kind of self-therapy in making sketches of his war 
experiences—his very first works of art—and developed a certain comfort with medical 
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environments, as his wife recounted. 46 He would later summon this empathy for the 
patient, Sibyl said, when making frequent bedside calls to war veterans, at hospitals 
throughout Chicago, to practice occupational therapy exercises that he had devised 
specifically for that purpose.   
 Moholy-Nagy believed in the power of his creatively focused brand of 
occupational therapy not only to enhance the present circumstances of disabled veterans, 
but also to provide a potential lifelong regimen for the most disciplined devotees. Setting 
forth a program in his published essay on the subject, entitled “Better than Before,” he 
explained that the baseline expectations for “unaffected”—that is, healthy—therapy 
patients involved a daily routine of creative activity, but for the “handicapped person” 
such a routine would require extraordinary commitment to a “doubly careful, intensified 
training.”47 Calling on the recovery efforts he himself had undertaken to lend authority to 
his writing on the therapeutic methodology, he cautioned prospective patients:  
Such a person must be trained in the use of all his faculties. In order for his buried 
energies to be released for contemporary orientation, he has to overcome his old 
habits, ideas, and judgments not any longer applicable to our age. Creative work 
and conscious personality development can overcome [such] maladjustments . . 
.48 
 
Once again, he invoked the sensory exercises taught at the Bauhaus in Germany, though 
for the new program it would be he, not his students, who charted their levels of activity 
and progress. The training’s emphasis on sensation, repetition, and latent potential was, 
however, such a natural extension of his broad pedagogy that he was able to sketch an 
46 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 184.  
47 László Moholy-Nagy, “Better than Before,” Technology Review 46, no. 1 (November 1943), 23. For a 
discussion of the artist’s occupational therapy program in collaboration with psychotherapists, see Findeli, 
“Moholy-Nagy’s Design Pedagogy in Chicago (1937–46),” 17.  
48 Ibid.  
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outline for a nascent field with his essay and practice on patients, despite his lack of 
formal training in therapy. Above all, what motivated Moholy-Nagy’s commitment to the 
idea was the patient’s agency, his or her ability to take control of a physically and 
psychologically strenuous situation.     
 As Moholy-Nagy had emphasized in his 1943 essay, sensory experience 
represented just one aspect of occupational therapy that required further scientific 
research to flesh out the proper applications of combined mental and physical activities. 
Without such “fundamental knowledge,” he feared his therapeutic program would lack 
credibility among the medical community.49 His earlier efforts toward the rehabilitation 
of others had reinforced the importance of conducting therapeutic exercises in an 
atmosphere where such alternative approaches to healing were accepted. Perhaps this 
knowledge influenced his decision to seek treatment at the Alexian Brothers Hospital, 
where the philosophy of patient care, like his own, was centered on ritual and discipline.  
Moholy-Nagy’s approach toward occupational therapy showed his dedication to creative 
activity as an integral component to the process of recovery. Applied to his own 
experience, counterbalancing the debilitating aftereffects of radiotherapy, occupational 
therapy manifested most clearly in the series of untitled, atomic-themed drawings of 
1946. Moholy-Nagy recognized a need to supplement radiotherapy’s adverse effects with 
beneficial stimuli—a form of part intellectual, part creative self-therapy. Sitting in his 
hospital bed, he used crayons that Sibyl brought him from home to make a series of 
colorful sketches. Recalling his earlier photograms of twin ellipses, one drawing (fig. 
49 Ibid.  
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1.15) depicts a sphere that encircles a pair of nodules, set in mirrored opposition, as 
though they had once comprised a single form and released a spray of multicolored dots 
upon splitting. Encased by a fiery halo, the orb appears to vibrate within an electrically 
charged environment, in which dynamic lines of force emanate from the central source. 
These lines conform to a loose grid, echoing the more uniformly spaced network of 
horizontal and perpendicular lines in Nuclear I, CH, which predates the drawing by only 
a few months.  
When Moholy-Nagy first included the image of splitting forms in his work in 
1943, it had held somewhat different meanings, seemingly unrelated to the concept of 
nuclear fission. But he later returned this leitmotif to provide a pictorial framework for 
his developing notions of the radiotherapy experience. A link between the photograms 
and the more recent drawing (see fig. 1.15) may be the visualization of cellular 
proliferation, a concept that the medical field was just coming to understand as the most 
problematic symptom of leukemia. At the time, study of the disease was still in its 
infancy, with chemotherapy just entering the field in experiments with mice and a small 
number of patients involved in human trials. The first experiments with chemotherapy 
proved unpromising, a poor substitute for the standard form of radiological treatment that 
Moholy-Nagy and most others received. In reality, neither approach curbed the death rate 
of leukemia. 50 During the war and immediate postwar years, at least 5,000 Americans 
had died from the disease per year, and the number likely should have been much higher. 
Still under-informed about the various forms leukemia could take, doctors often 
50 Adolph J. Creskoff et al., “Urethane Therapy in Leukemia,” Blood 4, no. 3 (1948), 896.   
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diagnosed it in such unspecific terms as anemia, a disease of the spleen, or simply 
cancer.51 In Chicago, one of the medical experts for the local paper mischaracterized 
leukemia as a “disease which attacks and destroys the white blood corpuscles,”52 stating 
the opposite of its actual corporeal effects. While leukemia indeed damaged immature 
white blood cells, it did so, more accurately, by inducing cellular proliferation rather than 
degeneration. In patients with chronic leukemia, the body produces an excess of 
abnormal white blood cells, which accumulate and overcrowd healthy cells.53 It was 
precisely this condition of splitting cells that radiotherapy was intended to eradicate.  
 Moholy-Nagy’s last works, in particular the nuclear-themed drawings, did not 
attempt to illustrate these scientific concepts with any degree of accuracy but, rather, they 
blended the intellectual content with the imaginative. The drawing with the haloed 
particle and grid, for example, evokes the concept of radiant energy, whereby electrically 
charged photons shoot in straight lines in all directions. In this way, the lines of the grid 
suggest indexes left behind from Moholy-Nagy’s tracing the movement of the energy 
through space. This grating pattern also conjures up associations with a standard x-ray 
machine, fitted with a grid that controlled the intensity of the radiation. A crucial 
component, it allowed the x-ray technician to increase the voltage without altering the 
51 Milton S. Sacks and Isadore Seeman, “A Statistical Study of Mortality in Leukemia,” Blood 2, no. 1 
(January 1946), 2. 
52 “Atom Victims’ Delayed Death Stirs Debate,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 23, 1945.  
53 For relevant secondary literature on the history of cancer treatment, see Peter Keating and Alberto 
Cambrosio, Cancer on Trial: Oncology as a New Style of Practice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2012), and Ilana Löwy, Between Bench and Bedside: Science, Healing, and Interleukin-2 in a Cancer Ward 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).  
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heat directed at the patient’s body.54 In abstracting idea of the grid as a structure by 
which to mitigate the forces of energy, Moholy-Nagy also seems to imagine in the 
drawing how larger units of energy, represented once again by the orb, could act as 
“carriers” (to use a scientific term) of an array of smaller and potentially life-saving 
radioactive particles.   
 In another hospital-made drawing (fig.1.16), Moholy-Nagy hints at awareness of 
the theoretical nuances of the science behind leukemia. The repeated semicircular 
markings that comprise the background again call to mind cellular proliferation (that 
telltale characteristic of leukemia) and, more obliquely, the concept of “peripheral 
blood,” which occupies areas surrounding the target of radiological treatment. 
Researchers used peripheral blood as a control group in their experiments on normal cells 
to measure whether radiation elevated or destroyed the white cell count. If the count in 
peripheral blood increased even by a small percentage, the odds of the overall 
effectiveness of the treatment decreased significantly.55 Moholy-Nagy’s background 
design, while literally constituting the periphery around the primary form, plays an 
important role in setting up a contrast in the composition, as if to reflect the actual 
significance of peripheral cells in indicating the patient’s health. Here the concept of 
periphery is manifest in Moholy-Nagy’s translation of it into an inconspicuous but 
meaningful visual element.   
54 A. Eisenstein, “A Grid Controlled X‐Ray Diffraction Tube,” Review of Scientific Instruments 13, no. 5 
(1942), 208. 
55 Dr. Raphael Isaacs, “Roentgen Therapy in Diseases of the Blood-Forming Organs,” Radiology 44 
(January 1945), 61. Dr. Isaacs, a physician based in Chicago, delivered this paper at the Twenty-Ninth 
Annual Meeting at the Radiological Society of North America in that city in 1943.  
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 The extraction and abstraction of ideas loosely derived from medical terminology 
may have helped Moholy-Nagy to form images of the physical processes involved in 
radiotherapy. Although there is no concrete evidence that he acquired such medical 
expertise, his recent development of a therapy strategy for veterans suggests that he, too, 
would have strived to be an engaged patient, with a mind and hand kept equally active. If 
he followed through with the regimen as rigorously as those patients he treated in 
wartime, he would have considered these drawings of energy, rendered in his hospital 
bed, the products of his occupational therapy. It seems equally plausible, given his 
characterization of the therapy as “intensified training” of “all the faculties,” that he 
might have engaged his own mental powers in research on the disease and its bodily 
behaviors. The next section of this chapter will discuss what is definitively known about 
Moholy-Nagy’s relationship to the field of nuclear science.  
 
Making Contact with Scientific Communities 
 Moholy-Nagy briefly lived in London in the mid-1930s, where he had moved 
partly in the hope that he and the architect and German Bauhaus founder Walter Gropius 
would establish an English version of the school. While various circumstances prevented 
them from doing so, Moholy-Nagy nonetheless immediately entered the social circle of 
émigrés involved in the fields of art, architecture, and science. Among this peer group of 
theoretically minded people, he seemed to thrive on engaging in their debates about how 
these interrelated disciplines could be productively linked. As a teacher in Dessau he had 
previously focused on the ways in which scientific technology could serve visual 
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purposes in art and design, but in London, where some of his friends were experts in the 
fields from which Moholy-Nagy freely appropriated ideas, he was challenged to defend 
his preconceived notions.  
To a certain degree, Moholy-Nagy was aware that his closest associates in the 
London art scene—including sculptors Naum Gabo, Ben Nicholson, and Barbara 
Hepworth—were skeptical of the notion that his art could meaningfully integrate 
science.56 Judging by their philosophical differences, so, too, did the x-ray 
crystallographer and physicist J. D. Bernal, the most prominent figure affiliated with their 
group, who would a few years later publish his seminal book The Social Functions of 
Science (1939). Bernal’s text set forth a groundbreaking argument for the acceptance of 
science as a subset of the social world that should be subject to a different system of 
definitions, assessments, and rules than most societies applied to scientific institutions. 
Central to this reformulation was the premise that science belonged under the purview of 
governmental management, which would come to be the central question of scientific 
debate in postwar America. In considering how art could properly fit under this new 
rubric of “social science,” Bernal assessed the hard-carved stone and wood sculptures of 
Hepworth. He recognized in them   the “relation of an extremely refined and pure art 
form to the sciences with which it has special affinities,” capable of inspiring reciprocal 
“mathematical” study in the scientific fields from which the sculptures’ subtle but 
complex shapes derived.57  
56 Achim Borchardt-Hume, Albers and Moholy-Nagy: from the Bauhaus to the New World exh. cat. (New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 90. 
57 J. D. Bernal, “Foreword,” in Sculpture by Barbara Hepworth, exh. cat. (London: Reid & Lefevre 
Gallery, October, 1937), n.p. 
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If Bernal upheld these abstractions from nature as the true integration of art and 
science, thereby defining the “nature” of discourse between the two fields, the readymade 
materials and industrial forms of Moholy-Nagy’s works certainly would not have 
qualified them as worthy of emulation, at least not to the scientist’s mind. In his 1937 
article “Art and the Scientist,” published in the journal co-edited by Hepworth, Gabo, and 
the architect Leslie Martin, Bernal implied a critical view of such “readymade solutions,” 
which seemed to inhibit artists and scientists from perceiving their mutual goal.58 This 
negative rhetoric led Moholy-Nagy to withdraw from the English group and, by 1937, to 
pursue relocation to the United States, to a city that he hoped would show greater regard 
for his particular philosophy toward disciplinary cross-pollination. In letters to his 
colleague Walter Gropius and his brother, Jenó, Moholy-Nagy described his years in 
London as “enervating,” “hectic,” and “disjointed,” adding that the prospect of leading 
the New Bauhaus in American gave him hope of “something positive again.”59  
 Complicating Moholy-Nagy’s escape from his alienating experience in London, 
Bernal continued to extend his influence beyond Europe and reach receptive audiences in 
centers of government-sponsored science institutions, like Chicago. Of particular interest 
to Chicago scientists was Bernal’s advocacy concerning the allotment of federal 
resources to the natural sciences and the policy of democratically sharing scientific 
knowledge within nations and across national borders. These social issues particularly 
engaged the concerns of scientists on the progressive left, who were beginning to 
58 J. D. Bernal, “Art and the Scientist,” in Leslie Martin, Ben Nicholson, and Naum Gabo, eds., Circle: An 
International Survey of Constructivist Art, exh. cat. (London: Farber and Farber, 1937), 123.  
59 See Borchardt-Hume, Albers and Moholy-Nagy-Nagy, 90. 
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organize a Chicago branch of the American Association of Scientific Workers. As part of 
their efforts, they generated considerable enthusiasm by inviting Bernal to speak at a 
public meeting in the summer of 1939, two years after Moholy-Nagy’s arrival in 
Chicago. The British Marxist, by then “somewhat of a celebrity,” according to historian 
Peter Kuznick,60 might have addressed the majors themes of his book, including 
economic insecurity of scientists in a capitalist society, government interference with 
scientific research, the critical need for intellectual freedom, and the lack of efficiency in 
communicating scientific knowledge to the general public. To develop a centralized 
system of publication, he proposed to replace printing presses, which had proven to be an 
impediment to scientific publishing, with the reproduction of texts by means of direct 
photography, known as microfilm.61  
 If Moholy-Nagy knew of Bernal’s visit to Chicago,62 he might have felt 
compelled to attend the talk and would certainly have taken notice of his former 
acquaintance’s comments about photographic duplication. Perhaps earlier conversations 
with Moholy-Nagy had even stimulated Bernal’s thinking on the subject. One can only 
speculate about their interactions based on the frequency with which Moholy-Nagy 
discussed the untapped potential of photography. Although neither one of the men ever 
directly acknowledged each other’s work, Moholy-Nagy suggested some points at which 
their views would have both overlapped and diverged—again, in the pages of Vision in 
60 Peter J. Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory: Scientists as Political Activists in 1930s America (Chicago and 
London: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 237–238.  
61 Pamela Spence Richards, Scientific Information in Wartime: The Allied-German Rivalry, 1939–1945 
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1994), 17. 
62 The Chicago Daily Tribune advertised Bernal’s visit, specifying that he would speak on “The Social 
Function of Science” on the University of Chicago campus. See “London Professor Speaks at U. of 
Chicago Tomorrow,” Chicago Daily Tribune, July 17, 1939.  
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Motion, which would serve as the artist’s last word on his cumulative knowledge of art, 
science, and technology. Invoking Bernal’s favorite phrases and words,63 Moholy-Nagy 
adopted a universal position:  
Artists . . . seldom have the mathematical knowledge to visualize in scientific 
formulae the analogies of their own work. [For example,] Einstein’s terminology 
of ‘space-time’ and ‘relativity’ has been absorbed by our daily language. Whether 
we use the term ‘space-time’, ‘motion and speed’, of ‘vision in motion’, rightly or 
wrongly, they designate a new dynamic and kinetic existence freed from the 
static, fixed framework of the past. Space-time is not only a matter of natural 
science or of esthetic and emotional interest. It deeply modifies the character of 
social ends, even beyond the sense that pure science may lead to a better 
application of our resources.64 
 
In the first sentence of this passage, Moholy-Nagy addressed Bernal’s claim regarding 
Hepworth’s sculptures that works of art did not possess the capacity to illustrate scientific 
theories in ways that could be considered at all accurate or reciprocally useful. Rather, 
those theories had already been abstracted through everyday language by the time they 
reached the consciousness of the artist. The last sentence of Moholy-Nagy’s statement 
similarly challenged the notion whether a “better application of our resources” toward 
science was merely for society’s practical benefit or whether, instead, as Moholy-Nagy 
believed, the application of such ideas had humanistic implications beyond the “fixed 
frameworks” of rational understanding. With his earnest desire to grasp as many ideas as 
possible, Moholy-Nagy invested considerable mental and emotional energy in 
63 For example, in his chapter entitled “The Applications of Science,” Bernal writes, “The rational plan is to 
mobilize . . . a national constructive effort to socialize all the resources of scientific knowledge.” The word 
“resources,” which Moholy-Nagy also uses above, was one that he repeatedly applied to scientists on both 
the giving and receiving end of the social system. See Bernal, The Social Function of Science, rev. ed. 
(1939; repr., New York: Routledge, 1944), 180. 
64 Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion, 279. Linda Dalrymple Henderson also notes the importance of this 
statement in revealing Moholy-Nagy’s notion of “space-time” not in terms of a direct correlation with 
Albert Einstein’s Relatively Theory but of a generalized awareness about the concepts that the Theory 
brings to light. See The Fourth Dimension and Non-Euclidean Geometry in Modern Art, 337–338.    
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contemplating how creative work—whether artistic or scientific—could lead to the most 
constructive ends. This motivation manifested in his art as the expression of “vital 
meaning,” intellectually grounded in the essential truths of pure science but not 
imitatively bound to its specific subject matter.65  
 Despite minor philosophical differences with Bernal, Moholy-Nagy shared the 
progressive viewpoint of the Chicago scientists who invited the English crystallographer 
to represent their organization that night in July 1939. Soon after this event, the American 
Association of Scientific Workers’ local branch launched a campaign on patent reform, 
taking a first step toward the wider dissemination of scientific information. The 
University of Chicago physicist and radiological expert Arthur Compton, one of the key 
organizers of this effort, emerged as the clear leader of the AASW in the few months 
preceding the start of World War II in Europe. But already by mid-1940, Compton 
proved unable to persuade the disparate factions within the Chicago-based organization 
to coalesce around a peace resolution—a statement that committed the AASW to an 
antiwar stance—that Compton helped to author. Although the resolution made its way to 
the top of government, to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the controversial move to 
oppose war, amid a growing pitch of antifascism in the AASW ranks and throughout the 
country, effectively marked the demise of the Chicago chapter and, indeed, the entire 
organization.66 Compton nominally continued to support the AASW but shifted most of 
his work toward fission research when, in 1942, he became director of the University of 
65 For a discussion of his aesthetic philosophy, see László Moholy-Nagy, “In Defense of Abstract Art,” 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 4, no. 2 (December 1945), 74–76.  
66 Kuznick, Beyond the Laboratory, 242–244.  
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Chicago’s Metallurgical Laboratory, where the investigations into the properties and 
manufacture of uranium for bombs took place under the Manhattan Project.  
 The once-politically active scientists faded from the public stage of Chicago 
politics just as new wartime organizations were coming to the fore—including the left-
leaning Hungarian-American Council for Democracy, for which Moholy-Nagy served as 
the de facto leader of the local chapter. In his leadership role with the organization, 
Moholy-Nagy could relate to the organizational difficulties faced by Compton, a fellow 
pacifist at heart. Both men appealed to Roosevelt for help with a humanitarian cause—in 
Moholy-Nagy’s case, that being the urgency to support a democratic government in 
Hungary—and both attempted to distance themselves from the accusations that their 
members harbored communist sympathies.67 Beyond Compton, Moholy-Nagy may have 
known other Chicago scientists, considering that the community of those who shared his 
national heritage was relatively small in that city. Hungarian-American nuclear 
physicists, such as Edward Teller and Leo Szilard, remained quiet about their politics 
during the war, due to the secretive and politically sensitive nature of their significant 
contributions to the Manhattan Project.68 Free to voice their political opinions in the 
67 There are several other secondary sources of information on Moholy-Nagy’s political involvement, 
which appear largely absent from the art-historical literature. See Oliver Botar Jr., “Documents on László 
Moholy-Nagy,” Hungarian Studies Review 15, no. 1 (Spring 1988), 77–84; Botar, “László Moholy-Nagy 
and Hungarian-American Politics II,” Hungarian Studies Review 21, no.1–2 (Spring–Fall 1994), 92–102; 
N. F. Dreisziger, “Émigré Artists and Wartime Politics: 1939–45,” Hungarian Studies Review 21, no.1–2 
(Spring–Fall 1994), 43–75; Tibor Frank, “Pioneers Welcome: The Escape of Hungarian Modernism to the 
U.S., 1919–1945,” Hungarian Studies 8, no. 2 (1993), 237–260. 
68 Teller and Szilard also made their cause known to President Roosevelt. After the two physicists 
discussed a strategy to ask the government to fund nuclear weapons research, Szilard then proposed and 
drafted a letter from his friend, Albert Einstein, to Roosevelt, who was finally persuaded to support the 
project. In the postwar, Szilard became a vocal activist for nuclear arms control. See Tibor Frank, “Ever 
Ready to Go: The Multiple Exiles of Leo Szilard,” Physics in Perspective 7 (2005), 222. See also William 
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postwar, perhaps it was one of them who spoke out in the Chicago Tribune about recent 
reports from Hungary that suggested it had irrevocably fallen under communist influence. 
“The future looks hopeless for Hungary,” the “anonymous scientist” lamented.69 
Similarly, when Moholy-Nagy discovered that his Chicago-based organization had 
accepted the financial backing of the communist party, he severed his political affiliations 
entirely.70  
Up to that point, many meetings of the Hungarian-American Council for 
Democracy were held at Moholy-Nagy’s Institute of Design, momentarily transforming it 
into a prominent center of not just artistic but also political activity. Among the regular 
attendees of those meetings were former Hungarian politicians, doctors, journalists, and 
two non-practicing scientists—all of whom rallied around the cause to ensure the 
progressive leader Michael Karolyi would become president of a democratic Hungary 
once the war against the Nazi Germans was won.71 Overseeing the entire HACD 
organization was Hollywood actor Bela Lugosi, famous for his portrayals of Count 
Dracula in both theater and film. Although Lugosi was based in California, it is possible 
that his pre-war connections to Chicago physicists Teller and Enrico Fermi put them into 
Lanouette, “The Science and Politics of Leo Szilard, 1898–1964: Evolution, Revolution, or Subversion?” 
Science and Public Policy 33, no. 8 (October 2006), 613–617. 
69 Carl Wiegman, “U.S. Hungarians See Native Land Doomed by Reds,” Chicago Daily Tribune, 
December 12, 1945. The only clue offered in the newspaper article about the identity of the scientist was 
that he “lived in Hungary during the brief bolshevik regime of Bela Kun in 1919.” This fact applied equally 
to Teller and Szilard. 
70 Letter from László Moholy-Nagy to William Benton, Assistant Secretary of State, February 14, 1946, in 
Botar, “Documents on László Moholy-Nagy,” 82.  
71 The scientists in the Council were the married couple George and Barbara Striker, who took jobs in 
industry when they immigrated to Chicago from Hungary in the late 1938. Nonetheless, the Strikers may 
have been well-connected to scientific circles through George, the first cousin of a Nobel Prize winner in 
chemistry. See Botar, “László Moholy-Nagy and Hungarian-American Politics II,” 92.   
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contact with the city’s HACD branch.72 Whether or not Moholy-Nagy ever met these 
scientists or the others who temporarily relocated to Chicago to be involved in the 
Manhattan Project, the artist could not have known of their work at the time. After the 
war, however, he made it his new mission to learn all he could about their experiments 
and discoveries, which had suddenly become of urgent concern to his personal 
circumstances.   
 
Learning from Literature 
The painting Nuclear II and its companion piece, Nuclear I, CH, represent a mid-
point, between Moholy-Nagy’s first and second rounds of radiation therapy, in his 
coming to terms with the effects of nuclear warfare and the effects of nuclear technology 
upon his body. Timothy Garvey has persuasively argued that Nuclear I, CH depicts a 
cartographic representation of Chicago as a target of a hypothetical atomic-bomb attack, 
in which the nuclear threat is symbolically pictured as a giant radioactive orb hovering 
over the city blocks.73 This interpretation accords with the recollection of Moholy-Nagy’s 
wife, Sibyl, that “the dropping of the first atomic bomb on Japan had made a profound 
impression on [him].”74 In late 1945—as with the paintings, coinciding to the time 
between his periods of treatment—the atomic bombings prompted him to read from cover 
to cover Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, popularly known as the Smyth Report, a 
thorough scientific account about the development of nuclear weapons, including an 
72 Istvan Hargittai, The Martians of Science: Five Physicists Who Changed the Twentieth Century 
(Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2006), 86, fn. 103. 
73 Garvey, “László Moholy-Nagy and Atomic Ambivalence in Postwar Chicago,” 30–31. 
74 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 229. 
 
 
                                                 
56 
 
entire chapter on those secret experiments in nuclear fission conducted at the University 
of Chicago. Written by the Princeton physicist Henry De Wolf Smyth, at the request of 
the director of the Manhattan Project, General Leslie Groves and ultimately President 
Harry Truman, the “report” was actually a 170-page book describing many of the secret 
experiments that led to the development of nuclear weapons, two of which had been 
dropped on Japan less than a week before the release of the publication.  
What motivated Moholy-Nagy, a novice in the practical matters of science, to 
read a book “intended to be intelligible to scientists and engineers generally and other 
college graduates with a good grounding in physics and chemistry”?75 Sibyl offered the 
explanation that he was “anxious to grasp the potentialities of nuclear fission for 
constructive purposes.”76 Another impetus for Moholy-Nagy might have been to 
envisage all the activity that had happened between 1942 and 1945, just over ten miles 
south of his home on Chicago’s north side, near the hotbed of research on fission; at the 
University of Chicago, Fermi and Szilard had led a team of physicists to conduct the first 
self-sustaining controlled nuclear reaction in 1942, and their experiments continued to 
drive swiftly forward the development of the first atomic bomb. If the intrigue of this past 
secrecy were not enough to fuel Moholy-Nagy’s appetite for more information, the 
realization that the Manhattan Project had rendered him an outsider—he who had not 
long ago considered himself part of the city’s most influential circles—might have altered 
75 Henry De Wolf Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes (York, PA: Maple Press, 1945), 1. Smyth 
states outright that the text was “not written as a ‘popular’ account of the subject.”  
76 The Smyth Report was the only text on nuclear science that Sibyl noted in her biography of Moholy-
Nagy. Of her husband’s preoccupation with the nuclear subject, she observed, “Although he usually stayed 
aloof from political events, he felt a personal concern. For months he lived through an intense inner 
struggle, weighing the official claim of a shortening of the war against the implications of an amoral 
precedent.” 
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his sense of place and purpose. In addition to his registration for the civil service and his 
work in occupational therapy, Moholy-Nagy acted as a consultant on the Civilian 
Defense Council for the project to camouflage the city aerially.77 He took great pride in 
the civic contributions he made during the war, spending countless extracurricular hours 
in meetings for civil defense, draft deferment, and political organizations—all for the 
sake of beneficence.78  
 In spite of his dedication, Moholy-Nagy clearly felt by the end of the war that his 
deeds had gone overlooked by the government, which had accepted his help but was 
seemingly unwilling to offer theirs in return. Due to his involvement with a leftist 
Hungarian-American organization during the war, the F.B.I. conducted a four-year 
investigation of his political activities before granting him U.S. citizenship. “All in all I 
tried to do my best as a loyal and useful citizen,” he explained in one of the numerous 
letters in which he pleaded with the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Services to end 
the investigation. “And I feel most bewildered and deeply hurt by the treatment meted out 
to me.”79 The tone of this letter hardly concealed his resentment about the prolonged 
mistreatment, calling to mind the parallel experiences of Laura Fermi, wife of the 
physicist Enico Fermi, who tested the first self-sustained nuclear chain reaction. 
Describing her life in Chicago as the “period of great secrecy,” she endured 
condescending jokes about her “ignorance not of chemistry but of the lingo developed for 
77 Garvey, “László Moholy-Nagy and Atomic Ambivalence in Postwar Chicago,” 34, 39n26.  
78 Botar, “Documents on László Moholy-Nagy,” 77. 
79 Botar, “László Moholy-Nagy and Hungarian-American Politics II,” 98.  
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secrecy’s sake,”80 at the same time that she was assigned the low-clearance task of 
monitoring the scientists’ blood-cell counts for radiation exposure. Only after the war 
ended, when her husband gave her a copy of the Smyth Report, did she begin to sketch in 
the broad outlines and details that he had hidden from her.81 For Moholy-Nagy’s part, not 
unlike that of Laura Fermi, whose subordinate position made her painfully aware of her 
ignorance and exclusion, he could partially reclaim his sense of self-importance by 
acquiring inside information. Reading every page of the Smyth Report was Moholy-
Nagy’s silent protest, a challenge to the arrogant implication that the complexities of 
nuclear science were beyond his level of understanding.  
 In Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, Smyth devoted an entire chapter to the 
experiments conducted in Chicago, no doubt piquing the curiosity of those, like Moholy-
Nagy, who unwittingly lived and worked in the shadow of the radioactive bubble. 
Nuclear I, CH reflects this phenomenological state of the outsider, represented by the 
grid, whose spatial relationship to the environment is compressed by an imposing 
external force. Nuclear II registers a different experience of that force, which affects a 
different environment. A visible fissure runs down the center of the bubble, structuring 
the conceptual framework around the internal process of fission. Aided by the scant 
illustrations (fig. 1.17) in the Smyth Report, Moholy-Nagy could have comprehended 
only a small amount of the content and still perceived that the common theme was 
nuclear fission by way of the neutron, the process in which “atomic nuclei split into 
80 Laura Fermi, Atoms in the Family: My Life with Enrico Fermi, 14th ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1995), 228. 
81 Ibid. 
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fragments with the release of an enormous amount of energy.”82 Exactly where Moholy-
Nagy imagined that the energy would be released is suggested in the backgrounds of both 
paintings, with the grid referring to an outside, urban environment on the one hand, and 
the white dots to cells inside a body on the other. To follow Smyth’s logic, the ball of 
energy in Nuclear I, CH, would therefore represent an explosive type triggered by a chain 
reaction and, in Nuclear II, a radioactive type emitted by the uranium- and plutonium-
rich materials that the scientists handled. Smyth provided detailed accounts of the 
laboratory tests that gave rise to discoveries about both explosive and radioactive effects, 
focusing less on the latter, since radiation exposure of the scientists was a secondary 
concern in comparison to their “plans for the large-scale production of plutonium and for 
its use in bombs.”83  
 To the minds of most Americans, trying to make sense of how scientists 
developed the atomic weapons, Smyth’s emphasis was appropriate. Yet, even with such a 
thorough analysis of the secret experiments, a major question remained unanswered: once 
the scientists produced the necessary quantity of uranium or plutonium material, how did 
they construct the bombs to activate a nuclear reaction? Of course, U.S. government 
officials ordered Smyth to omit this sensitive information from his text, but others, 
including members of the press, were free to speculate. Within a week of the report’s 
release, Life magazine published an article on fission, complete with a quarter-page 
82 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 2.  
83 Three primary objectives guided the research of the Chicago laboratory, as Smyth explained: “1) 
establish a chain reaction with natural uranium; 2) establish whether it would be possible to separate 
plutonium chemically from uranium; 3) obtain data for producing explosive chain reaction with U-235 
[uranium] or plutonium.” In order to begin the development phase of bomb construction, which would later 
take place in Los Alamos, New Mexico, the objectives in Chicago first needed to be accomplished. Ibid., 
88–89. 
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visualization of a plutonium-bomb trigger (fig. 1.18). The rendering resembled Moholy-
Nagy’s Nuclear I, CH in a single but remarkable way: a large strip of empty space 
separates two semi-circular halves of a nuclear body—the orb in the painting, 
corresponding to a plutonium core in the Life illustration. Once the missing piece of 
fissile material is injected into the void, via a mechanism triggered upon impact with the 
ground, the newly formed sphere of “critical mass” would cause an explosion “exactly 
like the sun had come up and then suddenly come down again,”84 as Life noted of one 
stunned observer’s reaction to an atomic test. Henry De Wolf Smyth, also quoted in the 
article, called the explosion “brighter than the sun itself.”85  
The title Nuclear I, CH subtly alludes to Smyth’s cosmic analogy. A shorthand 
designation for the hydrocarbon compound (see fig. 1.8), “CH” referred to the key 
elements in the production of energy by the sun. As Smyth writes, early experiments with 
nuclear fission investigated how to simulate the sun’s self-multiplying chain reactions, 
including a series of C + H conversions, to create a similar outcome—an unparalleled 
amount of energy.86 By constructing a visual analogy between the sun and the 
hydrocarbon molecule, as though this entity were hovering above the earth, Nuclear I, 
CH maintains the visual relationship between atomic energy and human beings, but the 
nature of that relationship is left open to interpretation.  
As vivid as the comparison to the sun made the mental image of a nuclear fireball, 
the artist ultimately proved unwilling to articulate on his canvas the terrible beauty of an 
84 Francis Sill Wickware, “Manhattan Project: Scientists Have Harnessed Nature’s Basic Force,” Life, 
August 20, 1945, 100.  
85 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 160n.  
86 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 23.  
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exploding mass. The orb remained suspended in mid-air, forever trapped in its pre-fission 
phase, as if it were one of the “dud” models discussed in Life’s story.87 This position on 
the part of Moholy-Nagy was decidedly neutral—understandably so, given that he had 
every personal reason to reject the destructive side of the science.      
 Amid Smyth’s technical analysis in the book, fission was given the most visual 
treatment of any subject. The book included only non-pictorial graphs and charts to map 
statistical data, with the exception of three illustrations of fission (fig. 1.19). Here again, 
Life expanded on Smyth’s simple models (fig. 1.20). Recognizing a need to make fission 
appear graspable, the magazine imbued the atomic forms with vivid detail. The 
plutonium atom resembled a rounded berry; the fission-inducing neutron, a bullet-like 
pellet; the site of fission, an aureole of smoke; and the resultant energy, a burst of light. 
While Moholy-Nagy’s own depiction of fission, in Nuclear I, CH, shared the 
illustrations’ graphical and atmospheric qualities, his version translated the concept in 
less literal terms, thus downplaying the painting’s “scientific” value. Rather than creating 
the illusion that the nuclear form carried an atomic weight, he equated the invisibility of 
matter not only with transparency but also weightlessness, a sensation that people could 
relate to floating in water or flying through air.  
 Moholy-Nagy, who was reading the Smyth Report in late 1945, around the time 
of his first radiological treatments, might have paid close attention to the few sections 
that evoked meaningful connections with the corporeal threat faced by the scientists. 
Smyth made no mention of what precautions were taken specifically at the University of 
87 Wickware, “Manhattan Project,” 87. 
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Chicago’s “Met Lab” to insure protection against radiation poisoning, though his 
comments were intended to address the issue of “health safety” broadly. In the laboratory 
culture of the Manhattan Project, he explained, the “white blood-corpuscle count was 
used as the principal criterion as to whether a person suffered from overexposure to 
radiation,”88 just as this blood test determined whether Moholy-Nagy had been exposed 
adequately enough to counteract his leukemia. While radiological overexposure led to 
low white-cell counts, leukemic blood contained high counts, which radiation treatments 
helped to reduce. At the time, no one understood the causes of leukemia, whereas Smyth 
could point to the “ingestion and inhalation of the various radioactive or toxic materials 
such as fission products” or any number of similar hazardous conditions that could cause 
radiation poisoning.89 Furthermore, scientists treated incidents of overexposure not as 
illnesses but temporary ailments—the equivalent of job-related injuries—by sending 
those who showed cellular abnormalities to other jobs within the laboratory or on brief 
vacations. Smyth concluded that “none has shown permanent ill effects,” nor had the 
method of testing blood counts proven effective at predicting overexposure; white blood 
cells were useful indicators of health only after the fact, when it was already too late for 
prevention.90 Moholy-Nagy knew this paradox all too well.  
 What he would not have known, for no one did then, was the more direct link 
between leukemia and overexposure to radiation, which researchers discovered after 
88 Smyth, Atomic Energy for Military Purposes, 150. 
89 Ibid., 148.  
90 Art historian Timothy Garvey also draws relevant comparisons between the study of radiation poisoning, 
as outlined in the Smyth Report, and the experiences Moholy-Nagy underwent to treat his disease.  Garvey, 
“László Moholy-Nagy and Atomic Ambivalence in Postwar Chicago,” 29–30. 
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many years of tracking the health of Japanese atomic-bomb survivors.91 In the immediate 
aftermath of the bombings, initial reports from Japan spoke of a mysterious phenomenon 
involving the survivors, many of whom grew suddenly ill and died within hours or even 
days later. One Chicago-based doctor, who had no apparent connection to wartime 
nuclear research, speculated that “blast or concussion pneumonia” were responsible for 
the delayed deaths. 92 In the same news report, a scientist gave what turned out to be a 
more accurate explanation, attributing the cause of death to the irradiation of white blood 
corpuscles by a “new type of ray,” in the form of a concentrated stream of neutrons.93 
These particles are both producers and products of fission, though not radioactive in 
themselves until they react with other atoms to form new isotopes and, in some cases, 
radiation that could further manifest into harmful permutations. Thus, the vague language 
used to describe the unknown illnesses in Japan was appropriately open-ended; it 
acknowledged that neutrons penetrated each body differently, sometimes inducing 
radioactivity in the atoms already present, and in other instances passing through 
corporeal tissues without leaving a significant radioactive footprint. The effect of neutron 
bombardment on blood cells, however, appeared to be relatively universal: the white cells 
dropped precipitously, at least as far as researchers could ascertain within a short period 
of study between the mid- and late 1940s. Signaling a complete reversal in the white-cell 
91 For later studies on cases of leukemia in atomic-bomb survivors, see Robert D. Lange, William C. 
Moloney, and Tokuso Yamawaki, “Leukemia in Atomic Bomb Survivors: I. General Observations,” Blood 
9 (1954), 574–585. See also Dale L. Preston et al., “Cancer Incidence in Atomic Bomb Survivors, Part III, 
Leukemia, Lymphoma and Multiple Myeloma, 1950–1987,” Radiation Research 137 (1994), 568–597.  
92 “Atom Victims’ Delayed Death Stirs Debate: Laid to Pneumonia and New Kind of Ray,” Chicago Daily 
Tribune, August 23, 1945.  
93 Ibid.  
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count, the first signs of leukemia in atomic-bomb survivors would emerge over time, 
mainly in bone marrow, where ionizing radiation tends to take hold.  
 The postwar public discourse on radiation consisted of assessing both the 
conditions of scientists of the American bomb project and atomic-bomb survivors, linked 
by their mutual contact with extremely radioactive materials, one primarily external in 
nature and the other, internal. In neither case did the issue of radiation-related illness raise 
serious alarm until a year after the destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, when the 
writer John Hersey invested the story of the bomb’s real consequences with a deeply 
humanizing dimension. Among the most popular of numerous “atom books” to enter 
public circulation after the bombings on Japan, Hersey’s narrative account, Hiroshima, 
personalized the stories of victims in terms that were even more pertinent to Moholy-
Nagy’s situation than the detached observations of Smyth. If Moholy-Nagy ever read 
Hiroshima, first published as a New Yorker article on August 31, 1946, and then as a 
book later that year, it would have complemented the tenor of “personal concern” and 
“intense inner struggle” that he experienced in grappling with the toxic manifestations of 
nuclear energy.94  
 Hersey devoted several pages of his book to detailing the symptoms of radiation 
sickness and its subsequent transmutation into a still-unknown disease, later determined 
to be leukemia. The earlier reports of mysterious deaths, such as those reported in the 
Chicago Daily Tribune, were what Hersey was able to characterize a year later as the first 
of three stages in the evolution of the disease. The second stage involved hair loss, fever, 
94 Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 229. 
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and other malaise, which could relate to any number of serious conditions, but anyone 
who read the Smyth Report would have recognized that the next major phase of this 
second stage—a sharp drop in white blood cells—was a result of people having absorbed 
lethal amounts of radiation. Signs of leukemia arose in the third stage, defined by a 
period in which the “body struggled to compensate for its ills—when, for instance, the 
white count not only returned to normal but increased to much higher than normal 
levels.”95 Only one known blood disease exhibited this distinctive quality, as Moholy-
Nagy would have come to understand through his experience. In Japan, doctors treated it 
with natural remedies and blood transfusions, not radiotherapy, since the victims’ 
symptoms “resembled the effects of overdoses of X-ray.”96 That doctors could attribute 
an initial cause to the disease in Japan constituted another difference between their 
patients and Moholy-Nagy, in addition to the types of treatment they received. There was 
still room for speculation about how and why the disease progressed in the bodies of 
Japanese victims. Unaware that the doctors’ predictions would prove mostly accurate, 
Hersey relayed the general hypothesis:   
They thought that perhaps gamma rays, entering the body at the time of the 
explosion, made the phosphorus in the victims’ bones radioactive, and that they in 
turn emitted beta particles, which, though they could not penetrate far through 
flesh, could enter the bone marrow, where blood is manufactured, and gradually 
tear it down.97 
 
The slow destruction of bone marrow defined a latent period in the development of the 
disease, which was, as it turned out, a different type of marrow-based leukemia than the 
95 John Hersey, Hiroshima rev. ed. (1946; repr., New York: Vintage Books, 1985), 77.   
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid., 85. 
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more common “chronic” disease of the vascular system and sometimes the spleen—the 
type from which Moholy-Nagy likely suffered. 
 
Rejecting Radioisotopes  
 If Moholy-Nagy read Hersey’s sketch of the atomic-bomb victims’ radiation 
disease, it may have struck a chord, particularly with its reference to the concept of 
radioactive phosphorus—by that time, a subject invoked not to describe a symptom of 
leukemia (as indicated in the Hiroshima account above) but a revolutionary form of 
cancer treatment. Its basic premise was to exploit the high absorption rate of phosphorus 
in leukemic tissues by injecting such a potent concentration of radioactive phosphorus 
into cancerous cells that they absorbed enough to poison themselves.98 This novel 
treatment, called “isotope therapy” (fig. 1.21), could be administered precisely, without 
causing much damage to surrounding tissues. Isotope therapy was much discussed and 
lauded in relation to leukemia research in the U.S., particularly among the “Met Lab” 
scientists in Chicago, who campaigned aggressively after the war to acquire cyclotrons 
(atom-smashers) for the production of radioisotopes to be used in cancer research.99 The 
Chicago Daily Tribune covered the story, further raising awareness about “harnessing the 
98 For a thorough explanation on early experiments with radioisotopes in cancer treatment, see C. P. 
Rhoads, “The Medical Uses of Atomic Energy,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 2, no. 7, 22–24. In his 
evocative description of radiophosphorus acting on white blood cells, he writes, “A high concentration of 
radioactive phosphorus can be set up in the cancer cell, which thereby poisons itself and commits suicide 
very handily for us.”  
99 See Stuart M. Feffer, “Atoms, Cancer, and Politics: Supporting Atomic Science at the University of 
Chicago, 1944–1950,” Historical Studies in Physical and Biological Science 22, no. 2 (1992), 233–61. 
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energy.”100 Outlining the medical applications of each element—including iron, iodine, 
sodium, and phosphorous—the commentary cautiously endorsed radiophosphorus for the 
treatment of leukemia. According to Dr. Theodore Van Dellen, writing in 1945, 
preliminary studies of isotope therapy showed that the “white blood count was lowered. 
The effect is similar to that of roentgen [x-ray] therapy. Time will tell if it is better, for 
the treatment has been given for only a relatively short period.”101  
These by-products from nuclear reactors, built to produce atomic-bomb materials, 
became the focus of the U.S. government’s postwar project to promote peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. Initially managed under the auspices of the Manhattan Project, a remnant 
of the wartime scientific operation led by the Army, the new radioisotope program 
employed the same graphite piles that had been constructed during the war at the Oak 
Ridge nuclear facility to convert uranium isotopes into plutonium, which was then 
shipped to Los Alamos for incorporation into the first atomic bombs. In the postwar, as 
the government searched for ways to re-brand its nuclear research, the Oak Ridge facility 
seemed like a logical and symbolic site for repurposing bomb materials. When a foreign 
element was inserted into the graphite pile, neutron bombardment was used to generate 
the specific radioisotopes of greatest therapeutic application. By mid-1946, the Atomic 
Energy Act made it possible for medical and research institutions throughout the country 
to apply for clearance to use radioisotopes from the Oak Ridge nuclear plant.102   
Curiously, Moholy-Nagy chose not to follow the progressive path of phosphorous 
100 Dr. Theodore R. Van Dellen, “Will Atomic Rays Supersede Others?” Chicago Daily Tribune, 
November 8, 1945.  
101 Ibid.  
102 Angela N. H. Creager, “Nuclear Energy in the Service of Biomedicine: The U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission’s Radioisotope Program, 1946–1950,” Journal of the History of Biology 39 (2006), 662. 
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therapy despite its availability through the University of Chicago, which was awarded a 
substantial supply of radioisotopes around the same time that Moholy-Nagy began his 
second round of x-ray treatments.103  
That x-rays kept a steady grip on Moholy-Nagy’s imagination in spite of their 
ultimate failing, leading to his death in November 1946, was all the more incredible in 
light of the fact that a less invasive treatment than radiotherapy may have been available 
to him. From a practical standpoint, Moholy-Nagy might have heeded the caution of 
those doctors who claimed that the injection of artificially produced radioactive elements 
yielded modest results in cancer patients. As of fall 1946, the very point at which 
Moholy-Nagy’s health seemed irreversibly failing, radiophosphorus had prolonged the 
lives of leukemia patients on average of only two or three months.104 But other 
considerations might have entered Moholy-Nagy’s mind, not the least of which was the 
moral dilemma that radioisotopes presented in their unambiguous connection to nuclear 
weapons.105 As one Chicago reporter crudely put it, the radioactive by-products were 
“produced in the same chain-reacting uranium ovens used in developing the A-bomb,”106 
with the word “ovens” evoking an especially unsettling image of the recent war. To 
visualize the isotopes’ cellular ingestion would have brought violence to mind, as well: 
radiophosphorus would be shot into his blood stream and, like all radioactive substances, 
103 Roy Gibbons, “Look to Atomic Energy for Aid in Cancer Fight,” Chicago Daily Tribune, April 26, 
1946. 
104 Rhoads, “The Medical Uses of Atomic Energy,” 24. For a similarly cautious opinion from the inventor 
of the cyclotron, whose technology was being used in the medical distribution of radioisotopes, see also J. 
H. Lawrence, “Therapeutic Use of Artificial Radioactivity,” Journal of the American Medical Association 
129, no. 1 (September 1, 1945), 91.   
105 Here, it is worth noting that his wife, Sibyl, used the term “amoral precedent” to describe Moholy-
Nagy’s evaluation of the dark side of the bomb, as he considered both sides carefully in order to reach an 
opinion. Sibyl Moholy-Nagy, Moholy-Nagy, 229. 
106 “A-Bomb Factory Turns out First Peace Products,” Chicago Daily Tribune, August 3, 1946.  
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lodge itself inside it as a corporeal presence, changing the actual molecular make-up of 
his cells—permanently rendering those cells more “atomic” than his conscience might 
accept.    
Although radioisotopes could be cheaply and easily produced, and therefore 
theoretically made available to any research laboratory or hospital that found a need for 
these materials, the government severely restricted access to these materials. In this first 
year of the isotope program, the relatively low number of shipments could be attributed 
to the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, which came into law in August, prohibiting the export 
of “fissionable” products to other countries.107 Technically, radioisotopes were not 
fissionable; nonetheless, there was an unspoken rule not to share any information, even in 
raw material form, that could provide clues about the production of atomic weapons, still 
thought to be a state secret exclusively known by a select group of U.S. scientists.  
The policy to restrict radioisotope distribution to only domestic researchers was seen by 
many as autocratic, for it privileged the ideology of national security at the expense of 
international cooperation in scientific research, and some scientists who had participated 
in the secret Manhattan Project as part of the war effort now vocally opposed this 
absolute power over nuclear energy.108 “Only a full understanding of the new situation 
will enable the members of congress and the citizens of this country to solve intelligently 
107 Angela N. H. Creager, “Nuclear Energy in the Service of Biomedicine: The U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission’s Radioisotope Program, 1946–1950,” Journal of the History of Biology 39 (2006), 676. See 
also Creager, “Phosphorus-32 in the Phage Group: Radioisotopes as Historical Tracers of Molecular 
Biology,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 40 (2009), 29–42.  
108 Creager, “Nuclear Energy in the Service of Biomedicine,” 661. See also Byron S. Miller, “A Law Is 
Passed: The Atomic Energy Act of 1946,” University of Chicago Law Review 15, no. 4 (Summer 1948), 
799–821. 
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the problems which now face us,”109 read part of the statement issued by the Atomic 
Scientists of Chicago, in the hope that they could help to thwart the enactment of strict 
legislative controls on atomic energy. With the passing of the 1946 act that limited 
radioisotope distribution to a small percentage of applicants, affecting the number of 
cancer patients who could potentially benefit from the new therapy, radioisotopes 
represented what could be considered all that was stiflingly anti-democratic in postwar 
Chicago, the center of the struggle between scientists and the governmental agencies that 
had under wartime circumstances supported scientific research.   
Moholy-Nagy made clear his postwar allegiances to scientific internationalism 
over isolationism when he hired University of Chicago professor John Nef to teach a 
course on “Modern Man” at Moholy-Nagy’s Institute of Design. Nef was an outspoken 
proponent for world government, a movement that centered on the hypothetical question 
of how to manage nuclear energy across national borders. Moholy-Nagy’s views also 
aligned him with Szilard, one of the few leading physicists who remained in Chicago 
after the war, who famously reversed course to advocate for civilian control of atomic 
science and for the dismantlement of the U.S. monopoly on nuclear research. The 
University of Chicago, where Szilard worked, embarked on a bold and very public 
campaign to raise money for a cancer research institute that, at first, was able to achieve 
its goal of operating independently of governmental patronage.110 The tug-of-war 
between government and science practically took place on Moholy-Nagy’s doorstep, all 
while he was about to undergo a second round of cancer treatment, and ultimately 
109 “Atomic Experts Urge Full Quiz before Control,” Chicago Daily Tribune, October 11, 1945.  
110 Feffer, “Atoms, Cancer, and Politics,” 235–42. 
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deciding to remain faithful to the x-ray. His conscience might have steered him in that 
direction, if not entirely for reasons relating to x-ray imagery or to the mass-availability 
of x-ray technology in medical practices, then at least partly for the ethical and political 
arguments against the ways in which radioisotopes were questionably manufactured and 
sparingly distributed. Still, radioisotopes were there—in Chicago—almost ready for the 
taking. Three of the city’s hospitals had already been awarded these materials for both 
therapy and research.111 All that would have been necessary to acquire them for Moholy-
Nagy’s use was an application and a brief waiting period.   
Like the splitting atoms, his conscience was divided over the applications of 
nuclear technology in warfare and medicine. These competing voices are particularly in 
conversation in Nuclear II. Simultaneously at play in this image are two spatial 
relationships involving the context in which nuclear energy will be released at any 
moment—a moment symbolically anticipated by the faint fissure that runs down the 
center of the orb. On the one hand, the literal division of the canvas structures the 
painting’s conceptual framework on fission, calling to mind the chain reaction that causes 
atomic explosions and externally imposes radiation upon the body. And yet the cellular 
environment in which the atom is set implies that a force has come into the body and is 
irradiating it from within. In the days before his radiation treatments, Moholy-Nagy 
developed this method of conflation when he equated his photograms with x-ray 
photographs, erasing the distinction between the two photographic processes to highlight 
111 “Memorandum from Paul C. Aebersold, Secretary to Oak Ridge Interim Advisory Committee on 
Isotope Distribution Policy to Committee Members,” July 11, 1946, 
http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/radiation/dir/mstreet/commeet/meet5/brief5/tab_f/br5f3i.txt (accessed 
April 3, 2013).  
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the similarities between the final products. Here, in Nuclear II, he emphasizes the process 
of arriving at a result, not the result itself. Nuclear II therefore registers his shifting 
phenomenological relation to x-rays, which dovetailed with his routine creative practice 
in occupational therapy. X-ray treatments engaged all his senses, except vision—the one 
that he otherwise relied on the most; in response, he trained himself to channel the absent 
sense into an “internal vision” expressed in his atomic paintings and drawings. In the end, 
while therapeutic x-rays denied him visual evidence in the form that he had previously 
grown accustomed to, his withdrawal from a familiar approach proved highly productive. 
It forced Moholy-Nagy into a therapeutic mode of corporeal self-awareness about the 
way his body felt in its exposure to the violently penetrating, radically stimulating forces 
of radiation. 
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Fig. 1.1 László Moholy-Nagy, Nuclear II, 1946. Oil on canvas. Milwaukee Art Museum. 
 
Fig. 1.2 László Moholy-Nagy, Nuclear I, CH, 1946. Oil on canvas. Art Institute of 
Chicago. 
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Fig. 1.3 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1941. Photogram on developing paper. Art 
Institute of Chicago.  
 
Fig. 1.4 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1941. Photogram on developing paper. [current 
location unknown]  
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Fig. 1.5 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1943. Cliché verre on developing paper. Art 
Institute of Chicago. 
 
Fig. 1.6 Thomas Wilfred, Vertical Sequence I, Opus 136, 1940. Metal, glass, electrical 
and lighting elements, screen, and oak cabinet. Private collection.   
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Fig. 1.7 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1946. Oil on Plexiglas. Whitney Museum of 
American Art. 
 
Fig. 1.8 “Power Puzzle,” photograph of an atomic model. Published in László Moholy-
Nagy, Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1947), 267.  
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Fig. 1.9 Advertisement for the Westinghouse Quadrocondex D x-ray machine. Published 
in Radiology 33, no. 2 (August 1939), xv. 
 
Fig. 1.10 Illustration of the Inverse Square Law. Published in “Inverse Square Law,” 
Wikimedia, last accessed April 10, 2014, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Inverse_square_law.svg. 
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Fig. 1.11 Advertisement for Institute of Design. Published in Chicago Daily Tribune, 
February 5, 1946, 6. 
 
Fig. 1.12 László Moholy-Nagy, Female Hand, 1926. Photogram, gelatin silver print. Yale 
University Art Gallery. 
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Fig. 1.13 Left: First x-ray by Wilhelm Röntgen of his wife Anna Bertha Ludwig 
Röntgen’s hand. Right: “Boy’s Hand Is Studied by X-ray” and “Girl’s Hand Has No Soft 
Caps at 15 .” Published in Life, November 4, 1946, 63.  
 
Fig. 1.14 L. F. Ehrke and Dr. C. M. Slack, Man Shaving, 1941. X-ray photograph. 
Published in in László Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1947), 
253.  
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Fig. 1.15 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1946. Pencil and crayon on paper. Collection of 
Hattula Moholy-Nagy.  
 
Fig. 1.16 László Moholy-Nagy, Untitled, 1946. Pencil and crayon on paper. Collection of 
Hattula Moholy-Nagy.  
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Fig. 1.17 “The beginnings of the three natural radioactive series and the new transuranic 
elements, neptunium and plutonium.” Published in Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic Energy 
for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic Bomb 
under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940–1945 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1945), 8 
 
Fig. 1.18 “How Bomb May Work.” Published in Life, August 20, 1945, 87. 
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Fig. 1.19 “Atomic Fission Begins” and “Nucleus Has Split.” Published in Life, August 
20, 1945, 87. 
 
Fig. 1.20 Illustration of fission of uranium. Published in Henry DeWolf Smyth, Atomic 
Energy for Military Purposes: The Official Report on the Development of the Atomic 
Bomb under the Auspices of the United States Government, 1940–1945 (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1945), 25. 
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Fig. 1.21 Doctor injects a radioisotope into a patient’s arm. Published in “Donner 
Laboratory: The Birthplace of Nuclear Medicine,” Journal of Nuclear Medicine 40, no. 1 
(January 1999), 16.  
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CHAPTER 2: Ralston Crawford: The “Bikini Pictures” and Amateur Explorations 
in Radiological Science 
In their brief period of correspondence in mid-1946, Moholy-Nagy and his younger 
contemporary, the abstract painter Ralston Crawford, nearly came to work together in 
Chicago at a time when cartography and science occupied both artists—perhaps what 
could have been the seed for a potential collaboration.1 Crawford was searching for a 
way to redirect and reenergize his artistic practice after the war, in which he had served 
as chief of the U.S. Army Air Force’s Visual Presentation Unit for the Weather Division, 
primarily making charts about whether phenomena, based on a very basic knowledge of 
meteorological concepts he had acquired through his interaction with meteorologists in 
his military unit. In the postwar, Crawford sought to apply these skills in a more artistic 
mode, whereas at that time Moholy-Nagy had just completed his painting Nuclear I, CH, 
featuring what has been interpreted as an aerial map of Chicago with a “nuclear” orb 
hovering above the city blocks. Although in the painting Moholy-Nagy may have 
incorporated the information he had learned from reading about the development of the 
atomic bomb, Nuclear I, CH, like his other major painting on nuclear energy, was a 
fantastical visualization, not a scientific model. Explicit as Moholy-Nagy was about his 
general subject—the “nuclear”—he never presumed to speak as anyone but an artist; he 
allowed the nuances of his personal experiences to take precedence over his general 
understanding of the sciences.  
1 Crawford inquired with Moholy-Nagy whether he could informally enroll in the Institute of Design to 
study still and motion photography. Moholy-Nagy responded with an offer for Crawford to teach summer 
courses at the Institute, but Crawford instead took a commission for Fortune magazine. See Barbara 
Haskell, Ralston Crawford exh. cat. (New York: Whitney Museum of American Art, 1985), 72, fn132.  
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If Crawford had accepted the invitation to come to Chicago, he may have 
benefited from observing another artist’s subtle blend of nuclear-related concepts and 
cartography, for he was about to embark on an assignment that would call for just that. 
Shortly after initiating contact with Moholy-Nagy, Crawford received notice that Fortune 
magazine had accepted his proposal to create visual impressions of the atomic-testing 
series Operation Crossroads at Bikini Atoll, scheduled for the summer of 1946. As 
outlined in his initial letter to the art editor, Deborah Calkins, he planned to consult with 
the government’s team of atomic scientists and meteorologists in Washington, D.C., to 
focus his field research on the effects of the explosions unobservable to the human eye, 
including the “composition of the cloud formation, the character of the water spout, and 
the force of the pressure wave in the air.”2 Tacitly agreeing to these research objectives, 
Fortune sent Crawford to the islands in late June. While there, he witnessed one of the 
two tests and stayed in the area to study its aftereffects, returning to Washington, D.C., 
afterwards to produce eight oil paintings and four gouaches about his experience.  
The abstract formal language with which Crawford chose to convey this subject 
matter initially suggests his conceptual approach may have also been “abstracted,” as in 
the manner of Moholy-Nagy, who loosely applied his scientific knowledge; however, 
Crawford deviated from this practice, seemingly because he had a false sense of 
confidence in his ability to translate hard data into a reductive yet legible language, based 
on his limited association with science during the war. When he was drafted in 1943, he 
2 Ralston Crawford, letter to Deborah Calkins, May 16, 1946, Ralston Crawford Estate., quoted in Denise 
Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb: American Artists Witness the Birth of the Atomic 
Age,” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2008), 163, fn206. 
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had no prior scientific training. In fact, initially, he hoped to serve as a Navy 
photographer, which would have allowed him to continue working in a medium that had 
in recent years become integral to his art-making, both as a distinct practice and as 
compositional material for his paintings, which shared the characteristic depictions of 
crisply delineated forms in his photographs. Instead, placed among a group of specially 
trained professionals in meteorology, he learned from them the basic concepts of the field 
and, through this process of absorbing knowledge, visualized this information in his 
weather charts. This experience apparently led him to believe he could navigate the more 
recondite territories of nuclear technology and physics. In the end, Crawford’s decision to 
lean too heavily on objective science over his subjective response appears to have cost 
him, among other things, not only the opportunity to reestablish the esteem he enjoyed as 
an artist in the prewar period but also to make a fully satisfying contribution to what he 
considered a world-changing historical event.  
In his statement submitted to the Downtown Gallery in preparation for an 
upcoming exhibition in December 1946, Crawford used a telling analogy to suggest the 
appropriate way to view his “Bikini pictures.” Anticipating that visitors to the exhibition 
would react dismissively to them, Crawford wrote: 
These pictures are identified with twenty years of study of the art of painting. This 
sustained mental effort has, I hope, sufficient depth to make their immediate 
acceptance or rejection an inappropriate procedure. It is demonstrable that 
numerous paintings have intellectual content and moving qualities comparable to 
a fine novel or symphony. It is equally demonstrable that such qualities are not to 
be absorbed at a glance. Perhaps we should have repeated two-hour sessions 
before an individual painting, with ten minute intermissions.3 
3 Ralston Crawford, “Statement on Bikini Pictures,” frame 253, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, 
Archives of American Art (AAA), Washington, D.C.   
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Crawford’s statement alluded to scientific methods in the related field of 
physics—specifically, to its branch of radiological science. In the study of radioactivity, 
prolonged exposure to ionizing radiation is equated with absorption, whereas less 
sustained contact means that those rays pass through whatever mass they encounter.4 
Similarly, for Crawford, when the subject of his paintings, the aftermath of a nuclear test, 
was hastily “absorbed at a glance,” the viewer was in turn deprived of something that 
“sustained mental effort” would otherwise enable him or her to acquire. This implies that 
the potency of his works would increase the longer one engaged with their “nuclear” 
content, just as the permeability of radioactivity depends on the length of time one is 
exposed to it. The rate at which inanimate and animate objects absorb radioactive 
particles correlates to (and, indeed, serves as a factor of) the amount of radioactivity 
present in the environment. In preparing his illustration of a fallout-cloud trajectory (fig. 
2.1), which was printed in Fortune’s feature article on the Crossroads tests, Crawford 
must have applied this same principle to evaluate how much radioactivity the airborne 
particles had absorbed at different distances and directions from ground zero. In Bikini’s 
radioactive environment, the concept of absorption was bound to linger in his mind.  
 Although Crawford took pains to prove that his paintings pictorially articulated 
scientific knowledge, critical reactions to his 1946 exhibition Paintings of Operation 
Crossroads at Bikini, at the Downtown Gallery in New York, reveal that he failed in this 
endeavor. The obstacles he faced may not have arisen from the art world so much as the 
4 For an intelligent and concise primer on radioactivity, see Marjorie C. Malley, Radioactivity: A History of 
a Mysterious Science (Cambridge: Oxford University Press, 2011).   
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nascent science that supplied the data for his Bikini works. Yet, Crawford seems to have 
been completely unaware of this major methodological issue. The exhibition text boldly 
proclaimed, “Meteorological information will undoubtedly be one of the most important 
parts of any future bombing teams” because nuclear explosions “can spread lingering 
death over a vast area.”5 With its telling usage of the future tense in reference to 
meteorology, implying that the current state of the field has not yet reached an 
“important” status, this primary claim of Crawford’s exhibition unwittingly undermined 
the contemporary relevance of the meteorological information about the “after-effects of 
the blast” communicated through his art.6 As it turned out, his actual experience during 
and after the nuclear test supported the implication in the catalogue text of a slight 
misalignment between the scientific ideal and the reality of Crawford’s situation.    
This chapter will show that the lack of technical sophistication in meteorology affected 
the degree of intellectual depth that Crawford was able to convey. That Crawford based 
his assessment of the nuclear tests on questionable data, whose accuracy was doubted by 
even the scientists making those calculations, limited him to a visual language for 
radioactivity that was inherently flawed. Insisting on his use of this methodological 
framework, he engaged with aspects of the science that had yet to be adequately 
understood.  
 
 
5 Ralston Crawford, draft of catalogue text for exhibition, frame 413, reel 5446, Downtown Gallery Papers, 
AAA.  
6 Ibid. 
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Weighing the Predictions for Crossroads 
 When taking a closer look at the events related to the tests at Operation 
Crossroads on July 1 and July 25, 1946, which occurred in the lagoon of Bikini Atoll in 
the South Pacific (fig. 2.2), some shortcomings of the mission come to light. The U.S. 
military had intended to carry out three shots at different atmospheric and oceanic 
levels—an airburst (Able), an underwater explosion (Baker), and a deepwater blast 
(Charlie)—but the third never happened. Due to an unforeseen shift in diplomatic 
relations with the USSR in the middle of the months-long operation, President Harry 
Truman felt it was necessary to free up for other use some one-hundred naval ships that 
had been anchored and manned with military personnel, scientists, civilian workers, and 
the press for observing the tests; Truman therefore abruptly decided to withdraw the ships 
from Bikini.7 Initially, they had been positioned at what was deemed a safe distance from 
ground zero, where there was a slightly smaller fleet of unmanned “target” ships. Given 
that the Able shot proved far less powerful than anticipated, for reasons I will examine 
later, the operation might have been considered a total failure if Baker had not met the 
objective to destroy many of the targets. As it happened, Baker did more to raise public 
awareness about the dangerously high radioactivity that a bomb could produce than to 
establish its war-fighting capabilities.8  
7 James J. Farrell, “The Crossroads of Bikini,” Journal of American Culture 10, no.  2 (Summer 1987), 62.   
8 The primary goal of Operation Crossroads, in the words of Commander Admiral William “Spike” Blandy, 
was to prove that the U.S. not only possessed the technology to create another atomic bomb but that the 
nation was “ready to use it, and to defend against it, in case we should be forced to do either.” Speech by 
Vice Admiral W.H.P. Blandy, U.S.N., Commander Joint Task Force Number One, Before the American 
Red Cross Chapter at the Bellevue-Stratford Hotel, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, February 21, 1946,” 4, 
quoted in Farrell, “The Crossroads of Bikini,” 55.  
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 The authorities gave the participants in the Bikini tests assurances that they would 
be exposed to limited and non-toxic levels of radioactivity. A specially trained radiation-
safety team was to monitor every area of the blast site and enforce the official standards 
of exposure that scientists, in cooperation with the U.S. government and military, set 
beforehand.9 Instead, overriding the protocol, the commanding officers required many 
crew members to re-board highly contaminated ships only three days after Baker. The 
American press reported this breach of safety to the public, explaining that the scientists 
who had been present “found the government ‘grossly negligent’ for failing to adequately 
safeguard participants in the Bikini tests, raising the possibility that ‘large numbers of 
personnel were exposed to very high levels of radiation.’”10 To compensate for the 
unfavorable attention that the issue of radioactivity received, representing a major public 
relations failure for the U.S. government, it attempted to show that radiological hazards in 
themselves could serve as deterrents against foreign enemies. In other words, the threat of 
radioactivity was said to aid in national defense.11  
9 Given the focus on the missteps of Operation Crossroads in this chapter, it is worth noting here that many 
personnel on the radiation-safety staff, known as the “Radsafe Group,” were woefully undertrained. One of 
the more experienced radiation monitors characterized the group as “older men, some . . . well-known 
scientists. Some have worked with radiation in the Manhattan District, but the majority come with little 
more than a scientific background. Test ABLE is only one month away. Since this group is to have the 
responsibility for protecting task force personnel from the invisible dangers of radioactivity, the problem of 
briefing them on the fundamentals and the practical aspects of radiation is acute.” Novices were given a 
month to learn these basic principles of radiation, which they received in lectures aboard one of the ships 
bound for Bikini. See L. Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946: United States Nuclear Weapons 
Tests, Nuclear Test Personnel Review (Washington: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1984), 54. Now declassified.  
10 Philip H. Melanson, “The Human Guinea Pigs at Bikini,” Nation 237, no. 2 (July 9, 1983), 48.   
11 For postwar commentary on the potential to use radioactivity as a weapon, see Samuel Glasstone, ed., 
Effects of Atomic Weapons (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1950). For the best recent analysis 
on this subject, see Paul Boyer, “Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory,” Diplomatic History 
19, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 297–318.    
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 This justification for safety could not have been used effectively on scientists, 
who as a community were more concerned about whether nuclear testing would actually 
benefit or hinder the sciences. From the outset, the U.S. government’s orders to keep 
secret all scientific findings upset many who had formerly worked on the Manhattan 
Project and later, in the postwar period, advocated international cooperation on atomic 
issues. While the government maintained that isolation was the best policy for scientific 
advancement, it quickly became apparent that the interests of the scientists were not a 
real priority. 12 Their group voiced collective opposition to the Bikini tests, for 
Crossroads would effectively send the message that the U.S. was not interested in 
yielding its monopoly on nuclear weapons. By going forward with the operation in spite 
of protestations, the government undermined those who had just given it the Bomb. 
 Knowing the stance of their most respected and influential leaders, other scientists 
reluctantly agreed to participate in Crossroads in the hope that it would set a precedent 
for federal patronage. They believed it would be in the best interest of their respective 
fields to take advantage of the government’s continued funding of the research and 
development of nuclear weapons, as it had during wartime, even if those postwar 
activities took place under military supervision. Provided with the resources they needed 
to conduct complex experiments, these scientists hoped their findings would ultimately 
contribute to a better understanding of the aftereffects on tropical ecosystems and the 
12 As historian Paul Forman later observed, “The enormously increased resources . . . in the fifteen years 
following the Second World War, were primarily intended not to increase the physicists’ knowledge, but to 
increase the physical security of the United States.” See Forman, "Into quantum electronics: The Maser as 
'Gadget' of Cold-War America," Paul Forman and J.M Sanchez Ron, eds., National Military 
Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology (New York: Springer, 1996), 261. 
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atmosphere.13 Still, skepticism pervaded their attitudes towards the government’s actual 
motives. “It has been stated in the Senate and elsewhere that the atom bomb tests at 
Bikini are being held to furnish scientific information. . . This is not true,” declared the 
Federation of American Scientists, speaking on behalf of its constituency. “The tests are 
purely military not scientific. . . Scientists are cooperating in these tests at the request of 
the country’s armed forces, although they do so with heavy hearts and without 
enthusiasm.”14 The conflicted conscience of these scientists was mostly discussed behind 
the scenes, but it was still telling of the more widespread resignation about the future 
existence of nuclear weapons.  
Meteorologists and experts in related fields, such as physics, openly debated 
predictions about what would happen before and after Operation Crossroads, whereas 
others remained silent on the issues. For example, Karl Compton, the former head of 
President Roosevelt’s meteorological advisory committee and a prominent physicist, did 
not even have enough confidence in his forecasts to publicize them, judging by this report 
in the Christian Science Monitor: “Despite assertions that atomic scientists could predict 
in advance almost everything that will happen at Bikini, it so happens that Dr. Karl T. 
Compton, president of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, has written down his 
advance ‘guesses’ of what the instruments will show. . . Dr. Compton doesn’t expect to 
score too high on his guesses. So much for justification of the tests.”15 If the most 
preeminent scientists could not agree on the extent to which the blasts at Bikini would 
13 Ronald Rainger, “Science at the Crossroads: The Navy, Bikini Atoll, and American Oceanography in the 
1940s,” Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences 30, no. 2 (2000), 367. 
14 John K. Jacobs, “The Scientist and Military Research,” Science and Society 11, no. 1 (Winter 1947), 77. 
15 William H. Stringer, “Bikini: What Will It Prove?” Christian Science Monitor, June 15, 1946.  
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contaminate the environment both regionally and worldwide—nor on what direction the 
winds would carry the fallout—how, then, could the public be persuaded of the validity 
of Crawford’s “scientifically” contingent paintings? The inconclusive experiments of 
Test Able, the first and only nuclear test that Crawford witnessed during the two-part 
series of Operation Crossroads, put him at a significant disadvantage before he had even 
completed his project.   
 Although Crawford was not a scientist himself, he appeared to feel similarly 
skeptical about what purposes the results of Bikini would serve. At first projecting 
optimism that Crossroads would give rise to scientific advancements, he later shared the 
scientists’ sense of defeatism—albeit inwardly, for the most part—by the time he 
completed his Bikini paintings.16 But if his experience as a participant was eventually 
tainted by doubts, this shift must have occurred only after the tests. Unlike the scientists 
who had been called to serve and did so begrudgingly, Crawford actively campaigned to 
be given an assignment at Bikini. In his correspondences with the editors of Fortune, the 
popular magazine that would eventually offer him a contract to illustrate the tests, he 
expressed confidence not only that he would make a significant contribution but that his 
counterparts in the field of meteorology—some of whom he might have met during the 
war—would do the same. “There is also the matter of considering certain phenomena that 
will not be directly observed at Bikini,” Crawford wrote to one of Fortune’s art editors. 
“The character of the radioactive particles carried aloft in the atmosphere and moving 
16 Crawford revealed his doubts about the scientific aspects of his paintings to his dealer, Edith Halpert, as 
will be discussed later in this chapter. See Ralston Crawford, letter to Edith Halpert, August 18, 1946, 
frame 410, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA. 
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with air currents will give new concrete information concerning globular movements of 
air currents.”17 In expressing this ambitious prediction—a prediction that, unfortunately 
for meteorologists, did not come to pass until several decades later—Crawford revealed 
how high his hopes had been for the groundbreaking meteorological research that the 
postwar nuclear tests might bring to bear. In other ways, to be discussed later in this 
chapter, Crossroads unwittingly exposed the inadequacies of the meteorology unit. 
 The extent to which Crawford wished to test out his newly acquired knowledge 
from wartime is apparent in one of his two “Bikini” paintings reproduced in Fortune. 
Illustrated in full color, Test Able (fig. 2.3) depicts the blast cloud and the debris of 
demolished ships, seen from an aerial perspective that Crawford would have drawn from 
photographs by others rather than direct observations of his own. This objective approach 
to the subject matter marked a break from his usual method of painting that he had 
practiced since the mid-1930s and continued throughout the war, including the one-year 
period of his military service for the Weather Division. Despite subscribing to a style of 
hard-edged abstraction, with its angular geometries, clean lines, and smooth application 
of paint, he insisted on deriving his aesthetic responses to a subject from real experiences. 
Similar to his contemporary Stuart Davis’s playing with the boundaries between 
representational and abstract modes of painting, Crawford’s sustained contact with his 
surroundings in the natural world yielded many works about the industrial landscape—
the types of structures he encountered during his frequent road travels, for example—
often captured from low perspectives, as if here were looking up from the ground or 
17 Ralston Crawford to Deborah Calkins of Fortune magazine, May 14, 1946, quoted in Haskell, Ralston 
Crawford, 141, fn120.  
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through a camera lens at a close-up detail. It was not until his service in the Visual 
Presentation Unit, beginning in late 1942, that he embraced the topographical and aerial 
vantage points.   
Crawford’s contemporaries surely would have recognized the view of the 
explosion he replicates in Test Able: photographs taken from above the cloud (see fig. 
2.2) showed it from a skewed angle, reflecting the position of the airplane on which the 
camera was mounted, at a safe distance from the detonation. Crawford portrays the 
fireball, a circular shape comprised of bright yellow and pinkish-orange sections and 
surrounded by patches of blue to signify the ocean water, in a more advanced stage of 
ascension than it appears as small but brilliant form in the comparative black-and-white 
image. In Test Able, jagged shapes colored in various shades of gray, representing torn 
pieces of the ships anchored in Bikini harbor, intrude upon the circular area of the burst—
here, a radically flattened shape, but in reality, a voluminous form that gradually bubbled 
up from the center of the ringed formation of wispier clouds. Given Crawford’s lack of 
focus on the real character of the mushroom cloud, not to mention a different viewpoint 
from which he had actually observed it, other representational objectives must have 
concerned him. He emphasizes the force of the explosion, as demonstrated by the sharp 
metal projectiles that had been shot into the air, and highlights the wreckage itself, which 
after the test would be tested for radioactivity once the pieces had fallen back into the 
ocean.     
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Miscalculating the Fallout Cloud 
Crawford’s struggle to process what he saw at Bikini might partly be attributed to 
the general difficulties that arose after Test Able, when embarrassment set in as the result 
of some erroneous predictions. One of the most egregious involved the meteorologists’ 
calculation about the direction in which winds would carry the fallout cloud. From chief 
officer Admiral Blandy to Crawford himself, Bikini participants acknowledged that 
Crossroads’ success largely rested on the accuracy of this forecast for Able Day, the date 
on which the first bomb was to be detonated. If the wind turned in the wrong direction, 
the contingency plan was to evacuate the entire fleet of manned ships; however, there 
were no guarantees that they could retreat quickly enough to escape the “all too possible 
nightmare . . . of radium floating loose in the atmosphere in deadly concentrations,”18 as 
a participating captain from the Navy recalled a year later. Seemingly aware of their 
limited knowledge regarding Bikini’s weather patterns,19 the meteorology unit 
nonetheless convinced Admiral Blandy to trust the accuracy of their final prediction: they 
told him that winds would carry the fallout cloud southwest. Thus, the task force set the 
“radiation exclusion sector,” also known as “radex,”20 where meteorologists believed 
18 A. A. Cumberlege, “Aerological Aspects of the Bikini Bomb Test,” Scientific Monthly 64, no. 2 
(February 1947), 137. 
19 According to the official governmental report on Crossroads, “Tropical meteorology was not well 
developed at that time, and detailed data of past weather patterns at Bikini were lacking. The exacting 
forecasting requirements for CROSSROADS posed a major challenge.” See Berkhouse et al., Operation 
Crossroads—1946, 59.  
20 Barton C. Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1987), 131. According to Hacker, the “radiation exclusion sector” denoted 
that the area was off-limits to the task force crew. In the official text on Crossroads by Berkhouse, this area 
is called the “radiation danger sector,” or “radex.” See Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 87. 
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they would find the highest concentrations of radioactivity after the blast, in the area 
ranging between 180 and 350 degrees clockwise from ground zero.21  
 Although the fallout cloud moved directly northwest and not at all southward, 
Crawford’s depiction in Test Able suggests the forecasted, rather than the actual, 
radiological situation. A diagram of the blast zone (fig. 2.4), bound by two concentric 
circles around the estimated point of detonation, defines the “radex” sector with lines that 
project “downwind” from ground zero; the dashed lines mark the area of extremely 
intense radiation, closely corresponding to the orange area in Crawford’s painting.   
He may have painted this area in a pink-orange hue to match what he and others actually 
observed in viewing the multi-color spectacle, described as the color of “salmon,”22 and 
he even hinted at the direction in which the cloud travelled, as confirmed with post-test 
tracking, by pointing the thickest and most prominent jagged lines in the painting toward 
the northwest.23 Like the rest of his Bikini series, Test Able is imbedded with 
contradictory scientific information—a blend of debunked predictions and proven 
results—that reflects the mixed messages he received from Crossroads’ various scientific 
units in the process of making his work. By extension, as his postwar picture unwittingly 
confirms, the methods of meteorology could not withstand scrutiny when tested under 
weather-related circumstances that had not been faced during the war.    
 Unable to foresee such obstacles, Crawford believed his original goal to map the 
movement of radioactive fallout still seemed possible when he began his preparatory 
21 Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 91.  
22 United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record (New York: 
W.H. Wise and Co., Inc., 1946), 146.  
23 Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 59.  
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sketches shortly after Test Able. In August of 1946, he enthusiastically reported on his 
good progress to Edith Halpert, the owner of New York’s Downtown Gallery, where an 
exhibition of his latest series was being planned for late December of that year. He wrote, 
“The Bikini pictures go ahead well. Studies are in the hands of Fortune and have been 
well received. Completion of work is contingent upon certain spectrographic and 
radiological data which has not yet been computed.”24 Here the word “contingent” is 
crucial to understanding the importance that Crawford initially placed on the scientific 
content of his paintings. That is, he believed the success of the entire Bikini project, 
including his assignment for Fortune and his exhibition at the Downtown Gallery, rested 
on what types of radioactive particles were found in the atmosphere—and, equally 
crucial, where they were found. It was reasonable for him to hinge so much on 
“spectrographic and radiological data,” for these sets of information correlated well to 
meteorology, and they therefore represented a logical means by which Crawford could 
showcase his meteorological background. But his task did not end there. The challenge of 
translating scientific concepts—concepts about invisible phenomena, no less—into visual 
form, and communicating the meanings of those forms to an uninformed audience, 
dampened his initial excitement over the Bikini commission. 
 While still on assignment in the Pacific, Crawford began to show signs of 
doubting the legibility of the factual information in his paintings. He confessed in an 
undated letter to his wife, “It seems I have to coin so many new ‘words,’ i.e. shapes. It 
24 Crawford to Edith Halpert, June 23, 1946, frame 410, reel 5446, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.  
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has never been so difficult.”25 Pressured by fast-approaching deadlines for Fortune and 
the Downtown Gallery exhibition, he grew increasingly uneasy about how to formulate a 
visual language for fallout, as evidenced by a draft of an exhibition statement he privately 
sent to Halpert. Crawford wrote, “It would be futile to look for the illustrative values in 
each detailed area,” referring to the colors and shapes that allude to the explosion and its 
aftereffects. “If this reference is not clear,” he further noted, “it indicates that the 
individual looking at the pictures may not have looked long enough.”26 His tone was 
unmistakably defensive. By placing the burden of understanding on the audience, 
Crawford absolved himself of the responsibility to clarify some of the obscure subject 
matter that his works inherently contained.  
   At the time of their exhibition, the works’ meanings seemed to have been lost on 
critics; they sensed restraint of emotion on the part of the artist, though the reason for it 
perplexed them. Perhaps it was Crawford’s attempt to lend scientific objectivity to the art 
that, at least for the critic for Art News, translated into a “certain coldness, a certain 
refusal of the artist to commit himself in these undeniably handsome paintings.”27 
Crawford’s biographer Richard Freeman, who wrote an analysis of the Bikini works 
about five years after their production (and also fairly close in time to the tests), 
suggested that the aloofness had intentionally been part of Crawford’s strategy to convey 
a sense of the unfamiliar, though the American public had missed the point:  
His drawings and paintings were in abstract terms that disappointed those who 
had looked for the visual features of an atomic explosion which were already 
25 Crawford to Peggy Crawford, undated, 1946, cited in Haskell, Ralston Crawford, 67, fn141.  
26 Crawford, “Statement on Bikini Pictures,” frame 254, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.   
27 “Reviews & Previews: Ralston Crawford,” Art News 45 (December 1946), 42. 
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familiar to them through press and magazine descriptions and photographs. In 
general people like the comfortable feeling of being told what they already 
know.28  
 
As Freeman correctly implied, the crux of the disconnect between artist and audience 
centered on the expectations of the latter to recognize in these works “familiar” and thus 
identifiable “visual features” of the Bomb, whereas Crawford sought to teach people 
something new by focusing on the subject of invisible radiation engendered by the 
explosion; however, Freeman and Crawford failed to see both how infrequently 
Americans would have read or heard radiological fallout discussed in depth, and how 
even less frequently they would have seen visual precedents to illustrate this concept. His 
audience scarcely stood a chance to comprehend the deeper meanings of his Bikini 
works. At this moment in the early history of the Cold War, popular news sources were 
ill-equipped to provide ordinary citizens with visualizations of nuclear phenomena. 
Physicists themselves had just begun to explore this branch of research to develop 
radiological instruments, such as Geiger counters and film badges, to make very primitive 
visual records of radioactivity. Without a clear and accurate graphical paradigm to guide 
him, Crawford should hardly have expected to render the concept of radioactivity 
comprehensible to an audience that possessed even less specialized knowledge than he. 
In short, the breakdown in communication about the subject of his Bikini series occurred 
even before Crawford put paint onto his canvases.  
 During the recent war, Crawford may have lost touch with the average 
American’s familiarity with the sciences. He proved a quick study in the intricacies of 
28 Richard Freeman, Ralston Crawford (Tuscaloosa, AL: University of Alabama Press, 1953), 25.  
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weather cartography, learning on the job at the U.S. Weather Division to create symbols 
for use in maps and charts. Through a friend, he was hired to design meteorological maps 
for military personnel, illustrating past weather-related accidents, such as plane crashes, 
and forecasts provided by climatologists knowledgeable about the varying conditions in 
the regions of war.29 By November of the following year, his methods of representing 
atmospheric conditions in the European battle zones were already being showcased in 
Fortune. The magazine dedicated a four-page spread to his cartographic depictions of a 
no less crucial moment in wartime than the Allied invasion known as “D-Day,” which 
occurred on June 6, 1944. Decorating one of the pages, two black-and-white maps (fig. 
2.5) charted how the weather conditions that originated along the eastern seaboard of the 
United States affected the invasion of Normandy. The maps showed transatlantic weather 
patterns with all the pictorial elements that foreshadowed those Crawford would later 
include in his graphical documentation of a nuclear test: irregular flat shapes to 
symbolize land masses, fields of color (in Fortune, printed in gray tones) for the ocean, 
directional lines for air flow, and modeled forms for clouds. Having no such precedent in 
his work before 1944, these cross-sectional and aerial views, along with their symbolic 
features, were specifically developed for his wartime forays into map-making for the U.S. 
Army Air Forces. Given the immediate impact of this scientific content on his postwar 
art, without much time in between to reflect on what he had just learned about 
meteorology, he may have formed unrealistic expectations about the extent to which 
others could learn to decipher his analogous maps and paintings of fallout.  
29 Haskell, Ralston Crawford, 62.  
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 Crawford’s issue with miscalculations was not just a matter of the public’s lack of 
knowledge about fallout, but also of the lingering sense that people were still being told 
half-truths about everything related to the Bomb, which had been the world’s best-kept 
secret until recently. For several years of nuclear testing afterward, information about the 
radiological threat was often conveyed in confusing, contradictory, and inconclusive 
terms. Nonetheless, one message remained clear throughout: Americans should embrace 
the nuclear age as their new reality. The December 1946 article in Fortune, which 
accompanied the reproductions of two Bikini–themed paintings and a fallout map by 
Crawford, attempted to reinforce the ideology, in part by encouraging the acceptance of 
Crawford’s pictorial idiom for depicting the “compulsion to disintegration” of all 
physical matter.30  Art historian Serge Guilbaut has described this Fortune piece as 
“coldly detached” in its insidious agenda to persuade readers that “only abstract art could 
communicate the new meaning of human experience”—and by using the term “abstract 
art,” Guilbaut was specifically implicating Crawford in the scheme:  
The same public that was reading about the importance of abstract art and modern 
art in magazines like Fortune, the same people who were being told of the new 
art’s attempts to represent the unrepresentable and to illustrate the unthinkable . . . 
were thereby made ready to accept the unthinkable in their everyday lives.31 
 
To Guilbault’s mind, Crawford’s “attempts to represent the unrepresentable” in his 
“abstract” and “modern” style of art made him complicit in the U.S. militaristic agenda. 
Indeed, as someone who not only participated in the first postwar test, but specifically 
requested to take part in it, Crawford explicitly aligned his personal beliefs with those 
30 Crawford quoted in “Bikini: Documentary Photographs, Abstract Paintings, and Meteorological Charts,” 
Fortune (December 1946), 159. 
31 Serge Guilbaut, How New York Stole the Idea of Modern Art (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
1985), 96.   
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promoted by the Truman administration. 32 Official accounts of Crossroads, conveyed 
with the cool detachment of raw data, found parallels in Crawford’s equally even-handed 
and dispassionate interpretation, which neither literally nor figuratively showed any trace 
of humanity. 
 
Adopting the Color Code 
 In Crawford’s visual records of Operation Crossroads, he adopted the color 
symbolism that the U.S. Army itself employed to denote radioactivity. In preparation for 
Test Able, to be detonated on July 1, 1946, military personnel gathered a small fleet of 
decommissioned battleships and painted the target ship U.S.S. Nevada in garish red-
orange paint, in an attempt to render it visible from the B-29 bomber that would drop the 
weapon from the air.33 The other, unspoken purpose of using a bright color was to help 
identify what the Operation’s officials anticipated would be the most radioactively 
contaminated ship after the detonation, after the entire mock-flotilla had been tossed 
asunder or even sunk at the bottom of the ocean (as some predictions had it).34 
32 Joseph Masco has argued that the laboratory culture of nuclear-weapons production and testing cultivated 
a common means by which scientists and other professionals could experiment with the bomb “at the level 
of sense perception”—what Masco terms “nuclear technoaesthetics.” Crawford actively sought to share this 
kind of sensory- and pleasure-based experience at Bikini, to adopt the scientists’ mode of interacting with 
the nuclear technologies on display there. See “Nuclear Technoaesthetics: Sensory Politics from Trinity to 
the Virtual Bomb in Los Alamos,” American Ethnologist 31, no. 3 (August 2004), esp. 349–54.  
33 Several accounts of Operation Crossroads note this detail about how and why red-orange paint was 
applied to the ship. For official reports, see J. J. Fee, Radiological Decontamination of Target and Non-
Target Vessels, Volume I (Washington: Joint Task Force One, 1946), 7. Unofficial descriptions of the ship 
U.S.S. Nevada include: Farrell, “The Crossroads of Bikini,” 57, and Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the 
Hydrogen Bomb,” 177.   
34 Historian Paul Boyer’s seminal study of nuclear culture in the postwar, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 
includes many examples of the most apocalyptic predictions that were made before the Bikini tests. See By 
the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 8, “The Mixed Messages of Bikini,” 82–92.   
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Accordingly, Crawford chose to code his depiction of the target ship with the same color. 
His painting U.S.S. Nevada (fig. 2.6), subtitled “Center of Chaos” in Fortune’s 
reproduction of it, uses red-orange to mix background and foreground into a tangle of 
jagged, overlapping, and torn forms. Counterbalanced by a horizontal row of circles that 
could represent nautical windows or the openings of guns on the ship’s turret (fig. 2.7), 
the left side of the canvas features a black arrow pointing upward toward a vertical row of 
dash marks. These two elements, the arrow and dashes, were ubiquitous on the Geiger 
counters and other radiological instruments, such as ionization meters, commonly used to 
measure post-blast radioactivity aboard the target ships, including the U.S.S. Nevada, at 
Bikini (fig. 2.8). The personnel who operated the instruments needed to read the arrow in 
relation to the dashes in order to make an assessment.35 Crawford’s painting displays 
these figures in complete misalignment, with the arrow pointing directly at the marks, 
which are turned in the wrong direction; the five dashes look as though they may 
continue to run past the top of the canvas, perhaps alluding to an “off the charts” reading 
and also evidence of inaccurate, even non-functional, instrumentation. To anyone who 
knew the full story about what happened on Able Day,36 the test that the painting U.S.S. 
Nevada is meant to represent, Crawford’s possible reference to the broken radiation 
35 The official record on radiological safety during the nuclear tests reported that “each monitor unit or 
monitor-advisor was equipped with a Geiger-Mueller counter (X-263 Survey Meter) and an ionization 
meter (Model 247 Survey Meter), as well as other equipment, depending on the nature of the mission. The 
total number of Geiger counters used on the mission—275—was apparently insufficient, due to the fact 
that “requirements for radsafe instruments turned out to be far greater than had been expected when 
planning for the operation began.” Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 49, 77.  
36 Ironically, despite Crawford’s intentions to reveal the truth about the tests through his depictions, the 
anonymous author(s) of the article in Fortune did not address any shortcomings. Other news sources did 
immediately comment on the letdown, however, including the New York Times and Time magazine. See, 
for example, “Bomb Ridiculed in Argentina,” New York Times, July 2, 1946, and “The Broken Mirror,” 
Time, July 15, 1946.  
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detector reveals less about the destruction of the ship—which, as it turned out, was still 
intact enough to be recycled for the second Bikini test—than it does the inoperative 
nature of so many aspects of the Operation. As historian Paul Boyer succinctly put it, 
after all the “publicity, ballyhoo, and sensationalism. . . Test Able was a letdown. The air-
dropped bomb fell about two miles off target, and on-the scene observers saw and heard 
little.”37 Hearing nothing but static, radio listeners in America were also denied the 
sensorial excitement that they had been promised.   
 Crawford’s painting U.S.S. Nevada, I would argue, should be seen along a 
continuum of unremarkable results at Bikini—that is, as a byproduct and a representation 
of these failed outcomes.38 Indeed, the painting’s dominant color palette serves as a 
reminder of the failure that occurred on Able Day. When the bomber “Dave’s Dream” 
dropped the bomb, it missed the U.S.S. Nevada by a considerable margin of nearly 
12,000 feet. Following the Able test, the ship’s color ultimately did not serve its 
secondary purpose of signifying a “hot” state of radioactivity.39 David Bradley, one of 
the medical officers assigned to the mission of radiological reconnaissance, noted in his 
memoir of Operation Crossroads that the centrally positioned battleship “turned out to be 
37 Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light, 83.  
38 Previous discussions of the painting have addressed its color symbolism. They argue that Crawford’s use 
of fiery red correlates with his feeling of intensity at supposedly having been present amidst the terrible 
wreckage and hazardous radioactivity. For example, Rompilla writes, “No doubt Crawford used the 
intensity of the color red to alert the viewer to the concentrated dose of radiation, thereby visualizing a 
deadly but unseen threat to human existence.” Art historian Stephen Petersen has similarly noted that the 
“caption accompanying the second image [of Crawford’s painting U.S.S. Nevada] explained that the 
disjunctive shapes and inharmonious colors of the painting did not so much illustrate the scene as reflect 
the artist’s own feelings about war (and indeed the style of the painting follows that of earlier war scenes by 
Crawford that predated the atomic blasts).” Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” 178, and 
Stephen Peterson, “Explosive Propositions: Artists React to the Atomic Age,” Science in Context 17, no. 4 
(2004), 584.    
39 Rompilla points out the connection between the color of the ship and the designation of “hotness” as 
military code for radioactivity. Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” 177.  
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some distance from the most intense radiation.”40 In fact, the U.S.S. Nevada was deemed 
safe to board only six hours after detonation, refuting predictions that the waiting time 
would be far longer.41  
 Yet, in Crawford’s painted record of this test, the all-over field of red-orange 
misleadingly suggests the presence of intense radioactivity. It seems that Crawford felt 
compelled to embellish the story to match the hyperbole of Fortune’s article, particularly 
the caption accompanying his painting: “For this painting he went to the heart of the 
chaos, the target ship, U.S.S. Nevada.”42 Deviating from the reality of the situation, both 
in terms of the state of “chaos” and the implied danger to Crawford’s personal safety, 
such commentary advanced an aggrandizing mythology that fell squarely in line with the 
authoritative ideology. After all, it was in the U.S. military’s interest for the tests to create 
a highly radioactive environment: the more destructive their weapons were, the better.43 
Crawford’s use of the military’s color coding supported this illusion that a successful 
outcome was achieved, that the target ship, U.S.S. Nevada, was more radioactive than it 
actually had been. If before the tests Crawford believed radioactivity was his most 
promising subject matter for this series of work, as his earlier correspondence with 
Fortune editors imply,44 afterward he could not ignore that the scientific predictions, 
40 David Bradley, No Place to Hide (Boston: Little Brown, 1948), 58.   
41 Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, 131. 
42 “Bikini,” Fortune, 159.  
43 Joseph Masco has shown that the radioactive threat of nuclear fallout was integrated into U.S. 
geopolitical strategy. He writes, “Civil defense theorists argued that citizens could only achieve this 
contradictory state of productive fear (simultaneously mobilized and normalized) by gaining intimacy with 
nuclear warfare itself, by becoming familiar with language of nuclear effects from blast, heat, and fire to 
radioactive fallout.” See “‘Survival is Your Business’: Engineering Ruins and Affect in Nuclear America,” 
Cultural Anthropology 23, no. 2 (2008), 368.   
44 See fn. 17, Crawford to Calkins, May 14, 1946.  
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which had initially undergirded his confidence in his chosen subject, had ultimately 
proven less helpful than he had hoped.     
   Other paintings in Crawford’s Bikini series appear to conform to the agenda of 
Joint Task Force One (the official name given to the military servicemen that conducted 
Operation Crossroads) by reinforcing its visual vocabulary. In U.S.S. Pensacola (fig. 2.9), 
the predominant red, yellow, blue, and white colors echo those that the JTF-1 crew 
painted on the data-collecting “drone planes”—early models of the unmanned, remote-
controlled small aircraft that have become ubiquitous in present-day warfare—before 
they were flown through the radioactive cloud.45 But the palette that Crawford adopted 
for his artistic purposes seems to have extended beyond such literal transcriptions. The 
deep purple cloud at the center in Test Able (fig. 2.10, detail), for example, perhaps 
alludes to the obscure military terminology that incorporated this color into the code. 
Apparently used in everyday language on the Bikini testing site, the term “purple 
conditions” was defined in the glossary of one Operation Crossroads handbook as a 
“shipboard warning system used in radiological defense. Various numbered conditions 
were sounded when radioactive fallout was to be encountered. . . The higher the Purple 
condition number, the more severe the radiological situation.”46 Crawford actively sought 
this kind of insider knowledge, from maps and charts to the scientific perspectives of 
others—anything that would stimulate ideas about making the subject of radioactivity 
translatable to his work. According to Denise Rompilla, who has interviewed Crawford’s 
family regarding his experiences at Bikini, “He worked tirelessly, gathering statistical 
45 Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 195.   
46 Ibid., 526. 
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information, [and] interviewing scientists and medical professionals on the potential risks 
of radioactive exposure.”47 Such personal interactions could have sensitized Crawford to 
visual cues in the military vocabulary, specifically to terminology that highlighted the 
significance of color within that subculture.  
 Purple was also the color that manifested when radioactive particles permeated 
the film in film badges, a type of instrument attached outside the clothing of test 
personnel to measure individual gamma radiation exposure. Although Crawford probably 
was not issued a film badge—as he would not have fit the criteria of being among the 
fifteen percent considered “at greatest radiological risk”—the scientists and medical 
professionals he consulted for his research were likely “badged” for safety.48 
Conspicuously displayed and fitted with the same brand of film that Crawford would 
have known well from his work with photography,49 the Kodak badges might have 
prompted him to think in visual terms about experiencing the absorption of gamma-ray 
radiation. For self-reading dosimeters, another type of device used in both the Able and 
Baker tests, purple denoted minimal exposure to radiation (the purple dye turned yellow 
47 Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” 174.  
48 Statistics suggest that Crawford would not have been among those “non-essential” test participants 
required to wear a film badge. Approximately 4,000 film badges were issued for the first test, the only one 
of the two explosions that Crawford witnessed. According to the official report on the radiation exposure of 
Bikini participants, only “about 15 percent of the JTF-1 personnel was issued at least one of the 18,875 
film-badge dosimeters during Crossroads. . . 6,596 personnel were on islands or ships that had no potential 
for radiation exposure. Personnel anticipated to be at greatest radiological risk were badged, and a 
percentage of each group working in less contaminated areas was badged.” See Hacker, The Dragon’s Tail, 
122, and Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 3. 
49 Crawford began to make photographs around 1937 and continued to do so throughout the rest of his 
career. While it would be nearly impossible to prove that Crawford used Kodak film, he was known to have 
used “36 exposure roll of 35mm film,” a type of film that Kodak popularized in the 1930s. The Eastman 
Kodak company had few competitors in the 35mm market, and none of them could match the Kodak film 
quality in the early years of its use. See Joseph A. Bailey and Kalton C. Lahue, Glass, Brass, and Chrome: 
The American 35mm Miniature Camera (Tulsa: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), 59–64. For the 
reference to the photographic film Crawford used, see William C. Agee, Ralston Crawford (Santa Fe, 
N.M.: Twelvetrees Press, 1983), 94.    
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when exposed to radioactive energy), reversing the meaning of the color in the official 
definition of “purple conditions.” Without such radiation-safety instruments, the 
Operation Crossroads participants would have had no other means by which to see a 
visual artifact documenting their level of radiation exposure.50 After the tests, the 
radiation-safety team would analyze the badges to determine the dose of radiation each 
individual had received. A simple principle guided their reading of the badges: the more 
saturated the color of the film, the greater was one’s exposure to harmful gamma rays.51  
 In codifying purple as the color of radioactivity, Crawford’s official sources of 
information offered him a logical reference to incorporate in Test Able, the only picture 
he made of the blast itself. When the radiation-safety instruments registered unexpectedly 
low levels of radiation in the fallout cloud (which, as it turned out, was due to the bomb 
having been detonated in the air rather than underwater), Crawford, too, recorded in his 
painting only a small and concentrated area of purple to mark the area of “purple 
conditions.” In retrospect, it was ironic that the military provided a guide for personnel to 
map their visual experiences by using color, in light of the other guidelines that limited 
50 As David Bradley recalls in his memoir on the Bikini tests, the equipment that the flight crew members 
were required to wear, in preparation for the Able drop, actually hindered the men’s ability to see. 
Furthermore, even if they had been able to see the badges, none of them understood how to read the films 
for information. Bradley notes, “There were the film badges, protective goggles, and gas masks to pass out 
to all hands. . . The little films, worn in the pocket, were sheer mystery to [the crew]; the goggles meant 
total darkness during the actual flash; but the gas masks they understood.” Bradley, No Place to Hide, 50–
1. 
51 Contemporaneously written as a summary of the first postwar nuclear tests, the book Bombs at Bikini 
provides a basic outline on the function of the film badge and the procedure for gathering data on radiation 
exposure: “The commonest device used for measuring gamma radiation consisted merely of a small piece 
of unexposed photographic film wrapped so as to exclude all light. . . When gamma rays strike the badge, 
they penetrate the wrapping and produce a slight change in the photographic emulsion. When the badge’s 
message is to be read, the badge is placed in photographic developing solution, and the emulsion becomes 
darkened. The degree of darkening indicates the total amount of gamma radiation which struck the badge.” 
See William A. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads (New York: W. 
H. Wise, 1947), 82–3. 
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the nuclear-test participants’ visibility. In the interest of safety, the Task Force attempted 
to enforce the rule that all observers wear goggles throughout the test by downplaying 
expectations about the spectacle. Even without the use of goggles, the military argued, 
the blinding flash “will prevent the Individual from seeing the beautiful display of colors 
in the Incandescent column of cloud and the gigantic clouds that follow the explosion.”52 
Crawford decided not to take a chance on impeding his vision.53 This choice to observe 
the test without goggles enabled him to view the full spectrum of hues once the initial 
flash of the explosion quickly disappeared, and in Test Able he incorporated the most 
notable—salmon—into his depiction of the mushroom cloud, pictured from an aerial 
viewpoint.54 Barely noticeable by comparison, the tiny purple cloud of radioactivity 
hovers above the mushrooming explosion. Two levels of color symbolism are therefore 
imbedded in the painting. Color is used to represent the visible and the invisible, together 
conveying a more complete representation of the bomb’s effects than direct observation 
could provide alone. In allowing the scientific empiricism of others to dictate where in 
his picture he should indicate the “purple conditions,” Crawford showed that he was 
equally committed to reporting the radiological phenomena as the observable at Bikini. 
 
Visualizing Weather as a Weapon  
 In its resemblance to his earlier renderings of dark, bulbous, almost pictographic 
thunderstorm clouds (fig. 2.11) that he produced for a 1945 article in Fortune, the 
52 Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 468. 
53 Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” 168.  
54 The “salmon” color of Able’s mushroom cloud is mentioned in at least one primary source. See Joint 
Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record, 146.  
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painting’s purple fallout cloud points to a period-specific preoccupation in the postwar 
period with creating and controlling atmospheric effects. The basic theory held that a 
mixture of preexisting moisture in the tropical air and new conditions resulting from the 
atomic burst, such as the high concentration of ionized particles or evaporation of large 
quantities of contaminated water, would lead to exceptionally violent storms.55 In 
Crawford’s painting of Able’s airborne burst, the purple cloud-symbol may allude to the 
harbinger of a storm that never fully came into being. According to one account of the 
event, for a moment it appeared as if the “large connective cloud similar in appearance to 
the cauliflower structure of the cloud of a thunderstorm” might continue to lift the air 
mass higher and higher, simulating the natural formation of a full-fledged storm. Instead, 
the cloud morphed into a “narrow, towering cumulus cloud” above the main mushroom 
cloud, just as Crawford’s painting appears to depict from an aerial vantage point.56 The 
narrowing effect was a sure sign that Test Able would prove not quite powerful enough 
to produce a thunderstorm, though it did give rise to radioactive rainclouds. By 
comparison, the second test, Baker, actually caused so much radioactive precipitation that 
a lingering “death mist” blanketed the Bikini islands for several days afterward.57  
 Through the U.S. Weather Bureau in Washington, where he presumably 
maintained some contacts with his former colleagues at the related military agency that 
55 See Ben Holzman, “The Effect of Atomic Bomb Explosions on Weather,” Weatherwise 4, no. 1 
(February 1951), 4. According to Holzman, who in 1951 reflected on the prevailing hypothesis regarding 
the 1946 atomic tests and their potential to modify the weather, several scientists admonished that an 
“atomic bomb exploded in these tropical air masses [at Bikini] would really start something in the 
atmosphere—either a vigorous thunderstorm or an incipient typhoon. The substance of these arguments 
was that the large amounts of moisture in the tropical air, in addition to the large quantities of water 
expected to be evaporated from the immediate water areas, would be extremely conducive to storm 
formation.”   
56 Cumberlege, “Aerological Aspects of Bikini Bomb Tests,” 146.  
57 Aubrey O. Cookman, Jr., “Death Fog at Bikini,” Popular Mechanics 86, no. 3 (September 1946), 86–7.  
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had employed Crawford during the war, he may have received privileged access to the 
exchanges among meteorologists about the possibility of weather creation. In his text for 
the Bikini exhibition catalogue, Crawford, an aspiring weather expert, aligned himself 
with the meteorologists of his time who believed in the power of nuclear explosions to 
alter the paths of precipitation.58 Essentially describing in hypothetical terms what some 
predictions said could have happened on Baker Day if there had been enough 
atmospheric instability, he wrote:  
Detonated in air in fair weather, the bomb’s radioactivity may be rapidly 
dispersed by wind currents. But detonated under water or in moist atmosphere the 
poisonous radioelements are concentrated in water droplets and held in the area 
for days. Thus by accurate use of weather and wind, the bomb might literally be 
made to rain death upon a sizable portion of any country.59 
 
These words are revealing not only in the interest he shows in the more atmospherically 
toxic of the two tests (Baker), which he did not record in paint, but in his view that 
weather had the potential to serve as a weapon of destruction. A “compulsion to 
disintegration,”60 as Crawford put it, was already present among all humanity, but the 
ultimate judgment about whether to manipulate the explosive power of nuclear bombs 
rested solely, and disturbingly, in American hands.61 If the destructive impulse made him 
uncomfortable with the ethics of nuclear testing, he nonetheless made no attempt to hide 
58 For discussions of the relationship between nuclear explosions and weather, see Cumberlege, 
“Aerological Aspects of Bikini Bomb Tests,” 145; Paul N. Edwards, “Entangled Histories: Climate Science 
and Nuclear Weapons Research,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 4 (July 2012), 28–40; E. K. 
Fedorov, “The Influence of Atomic Explosions on Meteorological Processes,” 5 Nuclear Energy II  (1957), 
135–145; Lester Machta, “Meteorological Benefits from Atmospheric Nuclear Tests,” Health Physics 82, 
no. 5 (2002), 635– 643.  
59 Crawford, draft of catalogue text for exhibition, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.  
60 “Bikini,” Fortune, 159.  
61 Crawford characterized his view of the destruction as at once “moral and physical,” adding that the 
situation signaled a “coming moral breakdown.” See Crawford, interview by Jack Coward, “The 
Collections; Recent Acquisition: Coal Elevators, by Ralston Crawford,” St. Louis Art Museum Bulletin 
(January–March 1978), 10.  
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his fascination with the potential to combine natural and manmade forces of energy. 
Having returned home before the Baker test, Crawford missed the opportunity to witness 
the first evidence of artificially created weather phenomena, though his escape from this 
dangerous situation allowed him to avoid exposure to hazardous levels of radioactivity, 
unlike those who stayed at the testing site. Rather than falsifying the radiological 
information he would translate into visual form for Test Able, which may have made for a 
more compelling picture about atmospheric effects such as those achieved by Baker, he 
settled for showing the “purple conditions” of the radioactive raincloud as virtually 
undetectable and inconspicuous as they were after the Able test.  
 A significant problem with Crawford’s choice to include the less spectacular 
details of the first test, mockingly characterized as “Nothing Atoll,” 62 was that his 
painting seemed also to assimilate the anticlimactic effects. While expectations had been 
high for Crawford’s exhibition of Bikini works, it ultimately was met with criticism that 
seemed to mirror the artist’s own veiled sense of disappointment. “His Test Able was a 
pat, flat imitation of chaos,” complained a reporter for Time magazine,63 while a critic for 
the New York Herald Tribune detected Crawford’s “startling indifference to the drama of 
the events depicted.”64 Though representative of the opinions expressed in other reviews, 
neither comment gave any consideration to the fact that the Able test itself had shared the 
unexciting qualities that one identified in Test Able, or that Crawford might have been 
justified to feel underwhelmed by the “drama” of his experience.   
62 “Test for Mankind,” Time, July 8, 1946, 20. 
63 “Pat Chaos,” Time, December 9, 1946, 61.  
64 Ben Wolf, “Crawford Interprets the Bikini Blast,” Art Digest (December 1, 1946), 28. 
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 Privately, the artist had undergone a similar emotional trajectory, from feelings of 
eager expectation to bitter discontent. His assignment in the Pacific islands began 
auspiciously, as evidenced by a letter he sent to Downtown Gallery owner Edith Halpert 
on June 23, 1946, just over a week before the test: “The beauty of these atolls [Eniwetok 
and Bikini] is verbally indescribable, but I know that I can say something about them in 
paint. Yes, the whole project is more exciting than I can possibly tell you.”65 The 
optimism of this note had dissipated considerably by late August, when Crawford faced 
an impending deadline to submit his final works and text to Halpert. “I have felt curiously 
inarticulate about the Bikini sequence,”66 he wrote with a hint of panic, and later added, 
“I have had a hectic time producing the paintings.”67 Still, he couched these obstacles in 
personal terms, rather than attributing his struggle to external, uncontrollable factors, and 
he took it entirely upon himself to educate his audience. Where he initially thought there 
would be a logical way to assert his meteorological knowledge on the canvases, that logic 
was foreclosed by the brief role that meteorology played in tracking Able’s relatively 
benign fallout cloud. His only option was to convey his understanding of atmospheric 
motion in an illustration of a hypothetical fallout cloud (see fig. 2.1) that he imagined to 
be bigger and more threatening than the one produced by Able. Even when he was able to 
incorporate a telling sign of radioactivity in the small area of Test Able—and to suggest 
65 Crawford to Halpert, June 23, 1946, frame 407, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.  
66 Crawford to Halpert, Aug 18, 1946, frame 410, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.  
67 Crawford to Halpert, October 26, 1946, frame 416, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA. 
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the awe-inspiring possibility that clouds could be made to “rain death”68—he failed to see 
that his audience was simply not prepared to understand the symbolism. 
  
Facing the Limitations of Meteorology 
 In reality, as much as the discrepancy between public and personal awareness of 
nuclear science frustrated Crawford, it might have hindered him less than his reliance on 
the underdeveloped science of meteorology. For both the artist and the meteorologists, 
lack of preparatory time presented a major challenge, and the meteorologists’ inability to 
help Crawford overcome the temporal constraints made the situation worse. While 
Fortune and the Downtown Gallery waited to receive Crawford’s Bikini works, pressing 
him to meet their deadlines, he in turn awaited official meteorological reports on “certain 
spectrographic and radiological data,” as mentioned above, to complete his project. These 
predictions simply could not have been carried out any faster.69 Without the aid of 
sophisticated technology, meteorologists lacked the means to calculate mathematical 
variables and apply them quickly enough to make the forecasts or the findings useful. 
One contemporary historian of meteorology has bluntly characterized the conundrum that 
made postwar meteorologists appear amateurish: “In 1945, theories defining the 
atmosphere’s general circulation were very weak. Forecasting techniques remained 
68 Crawford, draft of Bikini catalogue text, October 10, 1946, frame 413, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery 
Papers, AAA. 
69 For a thorough explanation about why the field of meteorology was in need of technological progress, 
see George Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral: The Origins of the Digital Universe (New York: Pantheon Press, 
2012), 163. 
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primitive.”70 The temporal lag that perpetually plagued the field, especially in urgent 
wartime scenarios, became all the more apparent and a source of humiliation after the 
war, when advancements that had occurred in the associated science of physics came to 
light. For the Bikini tests in 1946, the meteorological team performed better than 
expected in supplying accurate forecasts, partly because the physicists at Los Alamos 
Laboratory (the birthplace of the atomic bomb) assisted with these weather calculations.71 
Surely those who had a vested interest in improving the reputation of meteorology, 
including Crawford, saw the collaborative efforts at Bikini as an opportunity for the field 
to gain respect in the broader scientific community. Nonetheless, if meteorology hoped to 
keep pace with other sciences as the U.S. accelerated its nuclear testing program, it 
clearly needed to take more drastic measures to overhaul its methodologies.  
 My intention in pointing to this concomitant weakness in Crawford’s 
methodological approach is not to undermine the real innovation that he made in the 
field. The credit he has received for devising pictorial symbols for weather forecasts 
during his wartime service is justified, and curator Barbara Haskell has invoked his 
accomplishment to lend redeeming praise to his Bikini series.72 But the laudatory nature 
of these analyses has meant that the sizable and widely recognized problems of 
meteorology in this period have been overlooked in an art-historical context. Haskell has 
rightly acknowledged the limited extent to which Crawford engaged with actual 
70 Kristine C. Harper, Weather by the Numbers: The Genesis of Modern Meteorology (Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press, 2008), 92.  
71 A group of Los Alamos scientists prepared a report on what to expect from the nuclear tests, including a 
section entitled “Meteorological Considerations,” and submitted it for use by Joint Task Force One. Report 
by “Los Alamos Group B-15” [S. T. Cohen et al.], “Cross-roads Handbook of Explosion Phenomena,” 
April 9, 1946, now declassified.   
72 Haskell, Ralston Crawford, 62.  
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meteorological practices, noting that his renderings of “such predictions were based not 
on information about existing weather conditions, but on an analysis of such variables as 
topography, seasons, pressure centers, and normal air flow of a given region. . . Crawford 
merely pictorialized the climatologists’ information.”73 As a window into Crawford’s 
process for map-making, Haskell’s point is significant on two levels: first, it inadvertently 
refers to a weakness of postwar meteorology in its focus on the factors driving weather, 
versus predictions about what the weather will do; second, it acknowledges that Crawford 
worked for weather professionals, not as one himself.  
 Although Crawford needed to comprehend only the most basic principles to make 
pictographic maps, he was compelled to prove to the art world that he comprehended 
complex weather phenomena. Previously, in 1944, when he had explored the theme of 
meteorology in paintings, drawings, and photographs transposed from a selection of his 
cartographical work, he was able to persuade the public of both the artistic and scientific 
merits of his maps. Two years before he exhibited his Bikini series, these weather-related 
works went on view at Wesleyan University in Connecticut and the Downtown Gallery in 
New York, where he received praise from the New Yorker art critic Robert Coates for the 
works’ artistic innovation through “using the same abstract method that characterized his 
painting” and for their seemingly quick intelligibility “even to the hard-pressed pilot of a 
bomber.” 74 All the artworks retained their technical titles, such as the paintings 
Intertropical Front and Air Flow and Cloud Coverage and Air Flow, to convey their 
73 Ibid., 63.  
74 Robert M. Coates, “The Art World,” New Yorker, January 15, 1944, 52.  
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original purpose: the communication of crucial information to bomber pilots on domestic 
and intercontinental military missions.  
Viewers recognized this utilitarian value at the same time that they admired 
Crawford’s ability to translate the raw data he had been given into an aesthetically 
pleasing composition. Curiously, while critics noted that Crawford drew upon the 
abstract idiom of his pre-war paintings for this new project, their comments suggest that 
what lent the maps their visual appeal had nothing in common with Crawford’s former 
style of hard-edged abstraction.  A Plane Accident in Relation to Storm Structure (fig. 
2.12), for example, was among this group of charts demonstrating Crawford’s more 
refined aesthetic, according to a reviewer for Newsweek:  
Most handsome of the charts are the four illustrating domestic plane accidents. . . 
Puffy white clouds indicate the storm area; broad black stripes mean precipitation; 
delicate white stars are for snow; and the ominous black silhouette of the plane 
marks the spot of the crash.75  
 
There was no mention of the stylistic discontinuity between past and present, but the 
novel appearance of soft and sinewy forms was a conspicuous change. In the chart, 
Crawford slightly blurs the edges of the billowy clouds to create the impression of hazy 
conditions and draws elongated, curved arrows that swoop into the picture. These delicate 
touches would starkly contrast with Crawford’s later Bikini works, perhaps partly due to 
certain diametrical distinctions he drew between illustration and abstract painting. 
Consider the rigid arcs that comprise the clouds in Test Able and the blunt and blocky 
arrow in U.S.S. Nevada, a straightforward transcription of the crudely drawn arrow that 
had marked the actual ship’s target. In the earlier exhibitions of Crawford’s weather 
75 “Art: Abstractions and Weather,” Newsweek, January 17, 1944.  
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maps, the depiction of a plane crash was seen not as disturbing, but as a “symbol of 
destruction,” in concert with the symbols of weather phenomena, both of which portrayed 
the types of newsworthy events to which Americans were already accustomed. Owing to 
this predetermined familiarity with the subjects and to the perceived smoothness of the 
style, the acceptance of Crawford’s wartime weather maps as convincing conduits of a 
scientific language could be attributed to their easy legibility, as though information 
flowed, unobstructed, in a direct line from the meteorologist to Crawford.  
Key to this successful reception was the testimonial of an expert who could vouch 
for Crawford’s skill in the translation of scientific concepts. The New York Times art 
critic Edward Alden Jewell, declaring the exhibition to be “novel and altogether 
fascinating,” quoted, in full, the statement that Colonel D. N. Yates, Crawford’s 
commanding officer, prepared for the Downtown Gallery.76 In effect, it served as a 
certificate of authenticity for Crawford, validating that he had every right to claim 
intellectual mastery over the content of his weather pictures:   
For the purpose of conveying these complex ideas [about weather] quickly and 
clearly, it has been necessary to develop new methods of presentation. These 
resulting illustrations [by Crawford] are not charts in the conventional sense nor 
are they naturalistic pictures of weather elements. They are graphic presentations 
which must . . . convey an idea in clear-cut logical symbols through which the 
irrelevant is eliminated and emphasis is placed on that which is important. The 
modern painter’s knowledge of colour, tone, distortion, and emphasis is used to 
this end.77 
 
76 Edward Alden Jewell, “Weather Pictures Make Novel Show,” New York Times, January 7, 1944. For 
another positive review, see “Artist and the Meteorologist: Work of R. Crawford at Downtown Galleries.” 
Art Digest 18 (January 15, 1944), 9.   
77 Colonel D. N. Yates, Chief of the Weather Information Branch of the Air Corps, to Halpert, December 
18, 1943, frame 281, reel 5546, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.  
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According to Yates, a foundational knowledge of meteorology was essential to the 
artist’s ability to determine what information to include or discard. Without 
understanding such “complex ideas,” the otherwise skillful “Master Sergeant Crawford” 
would be ineffectual in the Weather Division. Claiming that Crawford’s illustrations were 
“not charts in the conventional sense” added an ambivalent subtext: was Yates 
complimenting the illustrations’ ingenuity or undermining their meteorological merit? As 
if to put to rest any doubt of his meaning, Yates concludes, “Each illustration represents 
the combined efforts of a meteorologist and the artist. Each has had to understand the 
problems of the other.” That Crawford exchanged expertise with a true scientist was just 
the affirmation he sought in establishing his “command of the technique belonging to the 
subject,” in the words of Jewell, who was thoroughly persuaded by the validity of the 
scientific concepts in these “highly abstract works.”78    
 While Yates’s comments benefited Crawford in the exhibition of his weather 
maps, they also revealed that the Weather Division based its general operations to some 
degree on the work of an amateur in the field of meteorology. In actual practice, the 
relative amateurism of the military weathermen extended well beyond just Crawford.   
Even if Yates exaggerated how much a meteorologist could learn about methods of visual 
presentation from Crawford, it would nonetheless be fair to assume that the 
meteorological officers of the Weather Division were somewhat amateurish in 
comparison to their academic counterparts. Kristine Harper has studied the roots of this 
arrested development in American meteorology, particularly focusing on the crucial 
78 Jewell, “Weather Pictures Make Novel Show,” New York Times.    
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wartime and postwar years when important shifts in the discipline engendered permanent 
changes. In anticipation of the United States’ entry into the Second World War, the top 
meteorology programs at five universities began to offer intensive nine-month training 
courses to address a shortage of such professionals in the Army and Navy. Given this 
high demand for training, almost all of those meteorologists who conducted the courses 
remained in teaching rather than in active practice throughout the war, precluding them 
from directly participating in military operations and policies. Related to this issue, “The 
Army protested that it was receiving the most immature graduates,” Harper observes, 
“because the university programs were keeping their best students on as instructors 
instead of sending them out to field activities.”79 The actual practitioners in the U.S. 
Army Air Forces numbered 4,500 by 1945,80 contributing to a twenty-percent overall 
increase in meteorologists since the beginning of the war.81 Crawford was not among that 
group of expeditiously educated meteorologists, entirely new to the field; however, 
everything he understood about the weather he learned from them.  
 The specific subjects that Crawford struggled to articulate visually, not only in 
relation to his weather illustrations but also to his nuclear-themed paintings, mirrored the 
gaps in his colleagues’ meteorological training. Conversely, the successful aspects in 
both bodies of work appear to have had a direct correlation to the wartime 
79 Harper, Weather by the Numbers, 80.  
80 Ibid., 75. 
81 Ibid., 76. For a contemporaneous report on this wartime influx of weathermen, see “Weather Utilized in 
This War by Allies as Strong Weapon: Plotting Weather Maps for Allied Fliers,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, October 30, 1943. The article states that in the prewar era “five years was needed to train a 
weather forecaster. Now it is done in eight months, here at New York University and four other centers in 
other parts of the country. The flying forecasters start with two years of engineering college mathematics, 
or are given the equivalent, in which case the training takes no longer than eight months.”  
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meteorologists’ strengths, based on the core curricula in their training. The areas of 
emphasis in the early years of the wartime meteorological programs, including 
geography, “analysis/atlas” (the study of weather charts), and upper-air patterns, tended 
to inform the themes of Crawford’s own “visual presentations.” In a 1944 issue of 
Fortune, full-color reproductions of his maps Profile of an Eastbound Flight over a North 
Atlantic Route, Transatlantic Round Trips Follow the Pattern of the Weather, and Profile 
of a Westbound Flight over the Middle Atlantic Route (fig. 2.13),82 describe elementary 
concepts—such as the general air flow across geographic region’s other patterns—that 
could apply to any number of different combat scenarios. All three of Crawford’s charts 
depict large expanses of land, covering the topography of an entire country or ocean. 
They also include the type of information available to meteorologists well before the war; 
that is, the terrain across the Atlantic Ocean and the basic structure of storms, though new 
subjects for Crawford, represented pre-existing findings accumulated over several years 
of observation. Many veteran meteorologists criticized the training programs for using 
old material, called “canned” data, of this very kind, which severely limited the students’ 
opportunities to conduct real-time and on-site analysis. The programs themselves saw no 
other choice but to work with these outdated models, due to the fact that the military 
considered all current, non-local weather information to be classified.83  
 By this authoritative logic, weather—not just its associated concepts and 
methodologies—could be seen as a vulnerability writ large, for it was feared that the 
82 These paintings were included in the successful exhibition of twelve weather works at the Downtown 
Gallery in 1944. In Peace and In War: Ralston Crawford, Exhibition of Paintings, January 4 to 29, 1944, 
at the Downtown Gallery, New York, frames 288–291, reel 5546, exhibition brochure, Downtown Gallery 
Papers, AAA. 
83 Harper, Weather by the Numbers, 79–80.  
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broadcast or publication of forecasts could aid an enemy in plans to attack the United 
States. Even after the government lifted certain parts of the ban in late 1943, the 
distribution of weather maps remained prohibited. A principal meteorologist in the 
Weather Bureau told the New York Times that the “publication of maps would make it 
altogether too useful for the submarine campaign.”84 This suspicious attitude might have 
negatively influenced cultural notions about the weather map as a subversive tool. For 
Crawford, who publicly predicated his qualification to participate in a nuclear test on his 
experience working with weather maps, this association with a recent object of 
censorship would have deepened suspicions about his allusions to the science. Critics, in 
perceiving a “refusal of the artist to commit himself,”85 implied that he was withholding 
some crucial piece of information, that the abstractions in his Bikini pictures represented, 
in a sense, a compromised realism.  
 
Grappling with New Physical Concepts 
 Crawford’s background in the Army Air Forces taught him to simplify, not to 
fabricate, his depictions of atmospheric phenomena. Under the mentorship of newly 
minted weather professionals, he learned to conceive of the global landscape in terms of 
geography, the study of land masses and other physical formations.86 Translated into 
pictorial analogues in his art, geographic concepts visually manifested the emphasis on 
mass, in representations of heavy materials, massive structures, color fields, formal 
84 “Easing of Weather Bans Seen as a Sign of Confidence in Safety from Air Attacks,” New York Times, 
October 13, 1943. See also John D. Leonard, “Censorship: Weatherman’s Job Still Goes on but War 
Taboos Many of His Findings,” Wall Street Journal, February 7, 1942.  
85 See fn. 27, “Reviews & Previews: Ralston Crawford,” Art News, 42. 
86 Harper, Weather by the Numbers, 78. 
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assemblages—all elements that dominate the compositions of Crawford’s Bikini 
paintings. Such a large-scale, weighty aesthetic was not new to his work: in prewar 
paintings, he had already shifted away from the gently modeled forms of his signature 
“Precisionist” style to feature arrangements of big, colored geometric shapes, brought 
into close-up view. By the postwar, however, the flat planes of color carried a certain 
conceptual weight that the earlier forms never did.  
 Crawford understood the concept of mass differently than he had before, perhaps 
not only because of his exposure to the principles of geography but also because he had 
become aware of how bodies of matter functioned in the atmosphere. Take, for example, 
ships—one of his favorite subjects both before and after the war: At the Dock #2 (fig. 
2.14) delineates the towering hull as a solid and unbroken shape, its heaviness bearing 
down on the unseen water below, whereas Test Able shows parts of the ship’s bulky form 
freed from gravity. No longer grounded, the metal gives way to the power of atmospheric 
forces, which contort and suspend the floating pieces. The color of these grey-blue scraps 
seems to be in play with the blue-gray air, where the visual difference between heavy 
mass and intangible gas is almost indistinguishable.   
 On a cultural level, weather maps of this period had also transformed the ways in 
which people viewed the relationship between color and geography. Less encumbered by 
strict regulations at the end of the war, the Army released a novel version of the world 
map, in which flat areas of color symbolized the climates of entire regions. The Science 
News-Letter, which serviced major American daily newspapers, appreciated that the 
visual cues made clear how countries vastly apart in distance were connected by weather: 
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“Each kind of climate is shown by a distinctive color, so all you need to do is find a 
matching color on the map of North America or other familiar region, and plan 
accordingly. Thus, Timbuktu in June is colored up like western Texas in July.”87 
Although Crawford used color less symbolically in his wartime weather maps, they 
similarly conveyed the concept that flat areas of color stood for land masses. By 
repeating this idea in the many maps he made between 1943 and 1945, Crawford left 
military service with the skills to portray all things large, but with little experience in 
observing and recording the small-scale phenomena of meteorology. A wartime 
introduction to these notions of the microscopic might have better equipped him with the 
intellectual tools to visualize the bomb’s imperceptible effects.  
 For the Bikini pictures, Crawford’s first major project after the war, what seemed 
missing from his training was greater exposure to the aspects of meteorology that related 
to physics and calculus, which focused on the invisible and the infinitesimal. Typically, 
in the prewar era, these subjects were the foundation of a meteorological education; 
however, when it was discovered that most of the applicants to the nine-week training 
programs for military service lacked adequate preparation in sciences or mathematics, the 
normal curriculum had to be changed to offer introductory-level physics and calculus. 
This shift in pedagogy slowed the rate of the students’ academic progress and entry into 
active duty, and it also altered the shape of meteorology as Crawford came to know it, 
through his adaptation of its methodology. While the field had increasingly been moving 
toward the practice of dynamic meteorology, it failed to develop with the new wartime 
87 “Maps of World Climates,” Science News Letter 45, no. 13 (March 25, 1944), 204.  
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meteorologists unable to do the necessary dynamic equations and vector analysis, derived 
from physics and calculus. Thus, the type of meteorological knowledge that Crawford 
inherited from his fellow servicemen was what some pejoratively called the “empirical 
tradition,” which referred to the practice of observing the weather and then inferring the 
likelihood of certain conditions based on statistical averages.88 Without recourse to 
alternative models, Crawford absorbed the intellectual deficiencies of empirical 
meteorology and then, unconscious of the error in his ways, set out to apply the same 
faulty principles to his renderings of the material and atmospheric fallout at Bikini.  
 That Crawford took an empirical approach toward assessing and visualizing the 
unseen effects of the nuclear test is most apparent in the single map he created for the 
article in Fortune. The map, captioned “If Bikini Atoll Had Been New York Harbor” (see 
fig. 2.1), shows his projection for the path that fallout would take, gradually drifting 
upward along the eastern coast of North America and into the Atlantic. It curves slightly, 
as if just enough to align itself with the gentle curvature of one of the longitudinal axes. 
Although the map shows that some fallout would disperse on the margins of the cloud 
path, the dispersal does not deviate from the dotted center line and remains neatly 
contained within the borders of a ribbon-like stream. In the left corner of the map, a small 
pop-out window contains Crawford’s illustration of the “Bikini Cloud Trajectory,” which 
follows the subtle zigzag pattern that the fallout actually made after Test Able.89 
88 Amy Dahan Dalmedico, “History and Epistemology of Models: Meteorology (1946–1963) as a Case 
Study,” Archive for History of Exact Sciences 55 (2001), 396.  
89 One member of the radiation-safety team described the pattern that the Able fallout cloud made thusly: 
“For minutes the cloud stood solid and impressive, like some gigantic monument over Bikini. Then finally 
the shearing of the winds at different altitudes began to tear it up into a weird zigzag pattern. Winds high up 
were from the west and so the head tended to move out over us and menace the live fleet, while shreds of 
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Acknowledging the hard data in this way substantiates Crawford’s claim about his 
turning to official military resources and reports for guidance, just as he had treated 
meteorological information in the war years.  
 Crawford clearly plotted both fallout trajectories on single vectors, indicating that 
he took into account only estimated averages for each map. Indeed, even in imagining the 
direction that a radioactive cloud might move beyond New York, he adopted the 
simplified theoretical model that scientists had actually used to predict the fallout of 
nuclear tests Able and Baker. Conducting their analysis from afar, physicists at Los 
Alamos Laboratory in New Mexico assisted with the statistical calculations for Operation 
Crossroads at Bikini. In the official report, “Meteorological Trajectory Analysis,” a 
summary of their theories to chart fallout paths, the Los Alamos scientists explain how 
they constructed two formulas—one for the upward movement of radioactive particles, 
and the other for downward movement. They considered factors solely in relation to the 
wind—velocity, height, direction, and distance from ground zero—and maintained that 
this single data-point was all they needed to make an accurate prediction, under any given 
conditions. “If a rough initial distribution of the active material is assumed at time t=0,” 
they hypothesized, “these equations suffice to map out the trail.”90 Significantly, the 
the torn column beneath could be seen moving slowly westward.” Quoted in Berkhouse et al., Operation 
Crossroads—1946, 87.    
90 The text goes on to argue, “Calculations for a series of points on the surface of the cylinder [the assumed 
shape of radioactive material in the atmosphere] and a series of assumed times of the fall, t, will suffice to 
rough out the fall-out trail and the time of the arrival of activity [on the ground].” Written in 1950, the 
report concludes that “this kind of analysis has been used successfully at Alamogordo and Bikini in 
connection with the experimental bomb tests,” thereby confirming that the basic meteorological 
methodologies were still considered effective even four years after Operation Crossroads. Glasstone, ed., 
Effects of Atomic Weapons The Effects of Atomic Weapons, 488.  See also William R. Kennedy, Jr., 
“Fallout Forecasting, 1945–1962,” unpublished report submitted to Los Alamos Laboratory, now 
declassified, 1–39, esp. 4–5, which includes an analysis on Operation Crossroads.  
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military relied on the skills of these physicists, not meteorologists, to provide crucial 
atmospheric forecasting. Nonetheless, the scientists’ were likeminded in assessing 
radioactive fallout in terms of statistical (non-mathematical) analysis, as reinforced by 
their use of the metaphorical term “trail.” The trajectory in Crawford’s fallout map 
evokes this mono-directional image of a neatly defined path.  
 For Crawford to translate the scientific concept of empiricism into an 
iconographic symbol was to expose, albeit unknowingly, a flaw in his intellectual 
approach to his artistic abstractions. Although the real deficiencies in the methodologies 
of atmospheric physics and meteorology were known only to insiders, a number of these 
men publicly voiced their doubts that the nuclear experiments at Bikini would yield 
anything useful. On the day before Test Able, for example, a reporter wondered aloud, 
“What will Bikini prove? Some experts have predicted that the outcome will be 
inconclusive. . . Some fear that inconclusive results from the test will commit the nation 
to a long and costly reconstruction of its naval arm,”91 a remarkably accurate prediction 
about what would come to pass in the imminent Cold War. Thus, the public 
pronouncements of uncertainty surrounding the tests gave the detractors of Crawford’s 
Bikini works a natural opening to express concerns. The critics perceived, yet could not 
pinpoint, something inarticulate, vague, and reductive—even inaccurate—in spite of the 
fact that Crawford’s representations of atmospheric effects were not very different 
conceptually than the ones he depicted in his widely praised weather pictures.   
 
91 U.S. Army Air Force, “Crossroads: For Arms and Man the Bikini Test Impact on Military Thought,” 
New York Times, June 30, 1946 (emphasis added).  
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Forecasting Methods  
 Crawford may have failed to grasp fully the unique climate of radioactivity 
brought into being by the nuclear tests at Bikini at least partly because climatology, as a 
subject, was poorly understood in wartime meteorology.92 Climatology, the study of how 
weather conditions (temperature, precipitation, winds, clouds, etc.) vary among specific 
regions, could have provided a useful conceptual framework for analogizing the 
atmospheric effects at Bikini, since nuclear tests affected all major aspects of the climate. 
The radioactive rain that fell around the Bikini islands after the Baker test, as discussed 
earlier, was a prime example of climactic change that Crawford was inadequately 
prepared to convey. It was not just the radioactivity of the rain that represented a new 
weather condition; rather, that the rain fell in a tropical region, where the type of climate 
was least known of all the global climates to meteorologists, meant that insufficient data 
had been gathered in advance of the tests—data that would have helped make sense of 
how the normal tropical conditions responded to radioactivity.  
 What scant observations in tropical zones were made during the war typically 
required meteorologists to learn about these climates on location, with little or no 
resources to aid them.93 This on-the-spot training might have applied when Crawford’s 
colleagues in the Army Air Forces Weather Division apparently requested him to furnish 
a chart about intertropical air currents, later shown at the Downtown Gallery, according 
92 During the war years, far less was known about the climates in far-off regions than those near home. See 
C. E. Palmer, “Reviews of Modern Meteorology: Tropical Meteorology,” Quarterly Journal of the Royal 
Meteorological Society 78, no. 336 (April 1952), 126.  
93 Harper has written about the lack of meteorological sophistication in the war period, specifically in 
relation to tropical weather. She observes, “The Pacific campaign was being waged in tropical areas, about 
which little was known meteorologically and for which few training materials were available.” Harper, 
Weather by the Numbers, 78.  
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to their record of the exhibition.94 While stationed in the tropics, his meteorological team 
no doubt made real-time weather observations that contributed to a better understanding 
of the climate. Yet, as other field stations sprang up throughout the tropics, the 
cumulative body of empirical data eventually revealed inconsistencies in the theory of an 
“intertropical front,” the idea that trade winds from both poles meet along the equator.95 
Before the end of the war, the very concept that Crawford had brought into visual reality, 
sometime between 1943 and 1944, came to be viewed as an unreality, and even the 
alternative theories to the intertropical front were being called into question by late 
1945.96 The rate at which meteorologists disproved their own hypotheses revealed just 
how underdeveloped the field was at the time, while physics, its counterpart in the hard 
sciences, quietly rose to prominence through government-funded research on atomic 
weapons. 
 No single development positively altered meteorological forecasting in the 
twentieth century so much as nuclear testing. Unfortunately for Crawford, for whom such 
advancements could have augmented his understanding of the atmosphere (especially its 
imperceptible qualities) and therefore the content of his Bikini works, the first accurate 
calculations to quantify airborne radioactive particles in relation to a nuclear test took 
94 The exhibition checklist lists the painting as Intertropical Front and Air Flow, which is not reproduced in 
any of the primary or secondary literature on Crawford. Ralston Crawford, Ralston Crawford: In Peace and 
In War (New York: Downtown Gallery, 1944), np.  
95 In his article, meteorologist Tim Vasquez provides a historiography of intertropical theories. See Tim 
Vasquez, “The Intertropical Convergence Zone,” Weatherwise Magazine 62, no. 6 (November /December 
2009), 27.  
96 The theory that replaced the “intertropical front” was the “intertropical convergence zone.” It was argued 
that even this alternative theory was too simplistic and should be modified to include the concept of 
“equatorial westerlies,” an aspect of atmospheric circulation that had previously been unaccounted for. See 
Robert D. Fletcher, “The General Circulation of the Tropical and Equatorial Atmosphere,” Journal of 
Meteorology 2, no. 3 (September 1945), 167. 
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place during Operative Ranger in 1951, five years after tests Able and Baker in Operation 
Crossroads.  Prior to 1951, scientists did not know how to use radioactive materials as 
tracers in the atmosphere to confirm trajectory forecasts. “The meteorologist rarely knew 
how good his trajectories were, even using after-the-fact rather than forecast weather 
data,” recalled atmospheric chemist Lester Machta, a contemporary specialist in 
meteorological and environmental aspects of nuclear activities, speaking of the early 
postwar years.97  
The shift toward greater accuracy in forecasting occurred as a result of upgrading 
the equipment in the aircraft that tested the weather conditions and gathered radioactive 
particles in reconnaissance missions. Crawford made reference to one of these activities 
in another Bikini painting, entitled Weather Reconnaissance Plane (fig. 2.15), in which 
he represents the aircraft simply with a tail fin against a two-toned blue backdrop. Some 
details, such as the tail marking with the letter “W” to denote the plane’s specific use for 
weather missions, impart a touch of realism, particularly in Crawford’s imitation of the 
hand-drawn quality of the yellow letter, set inside a similarly askew black rectangle. 
Other aspects of the painting appear to connote his subjective responses to the essence of 
the object of his observation—for example, the two abstract yellow shapes that playfully 
suggest the reflection of sunlight off the metal surface of the plane. The blue shapes that 
comprise the background clearly allude to the ocean, indicating that the plane is airborne, 
whereas the more ambiguous inclusion of a broken white line appears to demarcate a 
conceptual boundary of some kind, as in a weather map. As a subject, made explicit in 
97 Lester Machta, “Meteorological Benefits of Nuclear Tests,” Health Physics, 82, no. 5 (May 2002), 635.  
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the painting’s title, weather reconnaissance referred to the missions deployed for 
forecasting purposes in advance of the nuclear detonations, including the three flights on 
the day of Test Able.98 Crawford understood the role of reconnaissance from his 
experience with the Weather Division, which routinely employed B-29 bombers (also 
marked with identifiers similar to the example depicted in Crawford’s painting) to scout 
the conditions prior to sending the planes that actually carried bombs into war zones.99  
In technological terms as well, weather reconnaissance planes were holdovers 
from World War II, when data-gathering flights collected airborne particles with gummed 
filters, like catching flies on tacky paper. This primitive technique became almost 
obsolete with the increasing use of sophisticated weather balloons, called rasondes, a 
version of which was used in Operation Crossroads. For these tests, scientists equipped 
the bottom of radiological reconnaissance planes—a separate set of aircraft from those 
reserved for pre-test weather missions—with large bags, which would open in the upper 
air for fifteen seconds to capture whole air samples that included huge quantities of 
radioactive particles.100 Although Crawford apparently was aware of the new balloon 
technology, even reverentially commenting on it in the catalogue for his Bikini 
98 United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record, 121. 
99 Crawford also surely understood the symbolic significance of the weather reconnaissance plane in its 
association with nuclear weapons. During the war, the sight of this kind of plane over war zones was so 
common that the Enola Gay, the first aircraft to drop an atomic bomb, was mistaken by the Japanese for 
being another weather scout, as frequently recounted in historical narratives about the Enola Gay mission. 
Ibid., 7. See also Charles Pellegrino, The Last Train from Hiroshima: The Survivors Look Back (New York: 
Macmillan, 2010), 70.  
100 Brig. Gen. Roger M. Ramey, “Phantom Fortresses vs. the Atom Bomb,” Saturday Evening Post, June 
22, 1946, 84. See also Paul N. Edwards, “Entangled Histories: Climate Science and Nuclear Weapons 
Research,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 68, no. 4 (2012) 30–32. 
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exhibition,101 he instead decided to remain artistically faithful to the older scientific 
method associated with the weather plane. Crawford’s constant reaffirmation of his 
background in wartime meteorology may have made paintings like Weather 
Reconnaissance Plane seem to convey slightly antiquated information, or at least nothing 
that specifically spoke to advancements in nuclear technology, even though the slightest 
adjustment in this case could have couched his work in a more illuminating context.   
 
Assessing the Radioactive Wreckage 
 Thus far, this chapter has focused on only two of Crawford’s Bikini paintings—
the ones ultimately reproduced in Fortune—but he created two others that appeared in 
the 1946 Downtown Gallery exhibition. As with the previous examples, in these 
paintings Crawford continued to grapple with the limited information available following 
Test Able. Tour of Inspection, Bikini (fig. 2.16), as the title implies,102 shows the kind of 
radioactive debris that task-force personnel encountered upon examining the blast area. 
From a birds-eye view, the painting pictures an assemblage of variously colored junk that 
has floated ashore on the sandy beach but still partially lies in the blue ocean. Standing 
out from the rather abstract forms distinguished only by their bright colors and crooked 
lines that denote damage, a gray, fin-shaped piece of wreckage, at far right, closely 
resembles the black silhouette of a tail wing depicted in Crawford’s untitled wartime 
101 Crawford’s text reads: “To track these streams, an elaborate meteorological apparatus was set up on four 
islands within an 800-mile radius of Bikini and on three ships nearby. Two new radar and electronic 
devices, called rawin and rasonde, now aid in the accurate prediction of weather conditions up to the 
stratosphere.” Crawford, draft of catalogue text, frame 413, reel 5446, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.   
102 In titling this painting, Crawford invoked the official terminology of Crossroads, which referred to the 
simultaneous flight of the drone planes as a “tour of inspection.” Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—
1946, 195.  
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drawing of a downed plane (fig. 2.17, left) and in the postwar painting Plane Production 
(fig. 2.17, right). If the remnant is indeed that of a destroyed aircraft, it could refer to just 
one incident—the only plane-related accident during Operation Crossroads: now 
notoriously known as the equipment failure that “marred a perfect test” (according to one 
historian’s recollection of the event), one of the four remotely-guided, radar-controlled 
drone airplanes, all of which were flown directly into the fallout cloud column to collect 
radiological samples, crashed into the sea during its mission following Test Able.103 The 
color palette of the debris depicted in Tour of Inspection, Bikini, with the exception of the 
brown form behind the fin shape, corresponds to the four “color-coded” drone flights 
designated red, white, blue, and yellow.104 These scraps might easily be interpreted as 
miscellaneous to a viewer less informed than Crawford about the details of Test Able, but 
to him—half-insider, half-outsider—the drone planes, being the most contaminated 
materials to survive the test, may have represented just the kind of radioactive relic he 
had hoped to find on his own mission and then share with the public. Non-specialist 
military personnel and press observers, like Crawford, would have entered the blast area 
for their “tour of inspection” several hours after the radiation-safety team had assessed 
such samples, deeming their radioactivity levels low enough for the artist and other 
casual observers to take a look.  
 On his tour of inspection, Crawford may have come across the cruiser ship U.S.S. 
Pensacola and decided to make it the subject of another painting. The Pensacola was one 
of the three ships, including the previously mentioned U.S.S. Nevada, positioned within a 
103 Hacker, Dragon’s Tail, 136.  
104 Berkhouse et al., Operation Crossroads—1946, 192.  
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half-mile radius of ground zero, as well as one of the first to be boarded by observers less 
than a day after the blast. Recounting this tour, the sole purpose of which was to survey 
the destruction, the authors of Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record made 
a special note of the damage to those of the Pensacola’s “superstructures” that could be 
seen, however underwhelming the sight was in comparison to what had been predicted 
would happen to the infrastructure.105 In Crawford’s U.S.S. Pensacola (see fig. 2.9), the 
jagged shapes that fill most of the composition—a blasted smokestack, toppled over and 
shredded, along with cracked pieces of metal and bent antennae—simply seem to 
illustrate the official description in an abstract idiom, possibly difficult to read by the 
uninformed viewer.  
 Given Crawford’s mission to represent “more than meets the camera’s eye in 
atomic bombing,”106 a mere transcription of the actual scene would not have satisfied 
him. Adding a hint of the “radiological data” that he explicitly sought to incorporate into 
his work, the thin white band at center may represent the paper on which radiation 
measurements were recorded. When radsafe crewmembers inspected a potentially 
contaminated area, they carried portable Geiger counters to take radiation measurements. 
Fitted with high-frequency transmitters, the counters broadcast their readings to ships 
positioned miles away, where the “moving fingers” of automatic devices recorded linear 
markings on rolls of paper (fig. 2.18). In Crawford’s painting, the paper is devoid of 
evidence that would suggest radiological “activity.” Rather, a series of regularly spaced 
lines mimic the even time intervals on the ticker tape, shown at the top of the recording 
105 United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record, 153. 
106 Crawford, draft of catalogue text, frame 413, reel 5446, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA.   
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device in the photograph, as though these marks serve as the visual equivalents of the 
metronomic “tick-tick-tick” noise of a Geiger counter receiving a reading of low 
radioactivity.107 Such were the radiological conditions when the radsafe crew gave 
Crawford and his fellow press-mates permission to board the U.S.S. Pensacola.  
 Just as the scientists who participated in Operation Crossroads had prepared for 
the opposite scenario—anticipating the copious and elucidating data that could be 
gleaned from studying areas of intense radioactivity—Crawford also set the stakes on 
radiological data too high. It is likely that almost no one viewing his painting, U.S.S. 
Pensacola, would have interpreted the striated white line as anything but another 
fragment of the destroyed ship, let alone as a symbol of the official radiological record. 
Yet, the significance of this detail—whatever it represents—lies in the way that it 
intentionally portrays something unfinished. The tick marks abruptly end in the middle of 
the band of white, and its outline runs slightly over the edge where the white stops, as 
though it were trailing off indefinitely. Thus, as much as the band represents an object, 
clearly it also alludes to a meaning beyond the object, related to the state of 
incompleteness. Based on Crawford’s correspondences after the nuclear test, there is no 
doubt that he felt that his project was unfinished, as he struggled to reconcile his and 
others’ expectations about the spectacle they thought he would witness at Bikini, versus 
the less spectacular reality of the scientific results he had committed to depict for 
Fortune. If we then take the white band in his U.S.S. Pensacola to be a reference to 
“radiological data,” as was his explicit focus for the commission, this representation of an 
107 United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads, 178. 
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incomplete radiological record speaks volumes about the intellectual outcome of 
Crawford’s project.  
 When Crawford stated that he was awaiting radiological data to finish his Bikini 
paintings, he concurrently mentioned “spectrographic” results. Typically, these analyses 
were of concern only to physicists. For Test Able, their duties entailed constructing two 
spectrographs, a device that uses specially coated photographic film to capture the range 
of wavelengths of radiation present in the atmosphere. The team of just two physicists at 
Operation Crossroads, John Formwalt and W. H. Christie, also established appropriate 
sites for the spectrographs within the atoll, installed the devices, calibrated them, and, 
finally, returned to the site (located closer to ground zero than the ships from which the 
scientists observed the explosion) to gather results. The data permitted the physicists to 
determine the characteristics of each radioisotope, particularly its half-life, which was 
important information to help ascertain the length of time that Bikini Atoll would remain 
radioactive. In this case, some unforeseen obstacles prevented Formwalt and Christie 
from achieving optimal conditions for their experiments: due to lack of time, they were 
able to make just two spectrographs instead of the three that had been planned. They had 
to reposition the equipment two miles farther from ground zero than the original site and, 
once there, spend precious time preparing the dark room for the photographic materials 
rather than conducting several trial tests. While the devices satisfactorily took readings 
from the actual blast, in a postmortem narrative of his experience Formwalt felt inclined 
to acknowledge that the “public had been led to expect too much” of the nuclear tests. He 
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made no mention of spectrographic results, downplaying whatever role they had played 
in the overall mission.108  
 Assuming that Crawford had greater access to spectrographic data than those 
Formwalt shared with the public, it is difficult to see how this type of information would 
have served any useful purpose for him. Spectrographic photographs recorded the 
presence of radioisotopes in the form of dark vertical bands that ran across the surface of 
the fogged film, which had a slightly granular appearance (fig. 2.19).109 This represented 
the extent of the visual evidence that the physicists were able to glean from their 
experiments, and it seems unlikely that Crawford was able to have direct contact with the 
photographs anyway. Nonetheless, if he had hoped that knowing what radioisotopes were 
in the air would affect how he visualized radioactivity, this type of content is not at all 
apparent in the final paintings. Their subtle allusions to radiological instrumentation, such 
as the dash marks and arrow in U.S.S. Nevada or the ticker tape in U.S.S. Pensacola, 
become evident upon close study, and with specialized knowledge. But in the massive 
forms he depicted in each work, there is no hint of the minute detail or the grainy texture 
that would suggest the influence of spectrography. This area of physics dealt with 
matter—the atomic components of energy—on a far smaller scale than Crawford had 
grown accustomed to in his dealings with meteorology as it was practiced during the 
Second World War, which had inculcated him to a “macro” way of analyzing his 
immediate environment.  
108 John Formwalt, “A Physicist at Bikini,” School Science and Mathematics 47, no. 1 (January 1947), 62. 
109 For a period-specific example of spectrographic tests, see J. E. Edwards and M. L. Pool, “Characteristic 
X-rays Excited by Beta Particles,” Physical Review 69, no. 11 (June 1, 1946), 549–555.  
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 This historical moment in the sciences also worked to Crawford’s disadvantage. 
He was not only attempting to visualize a largely unknown phenomenon at that time, 
even to experts in physics, but also doing so on the cusp of major advancements in 
meteorology. By January 1946, a few months before Operation Crossroads, the press had 
announced that such changes were imminent, but had not yet been implemented. To 
underscore the need for a new direction in meteorology, the New York Times explained 
that the situation was desperate:  
According to Navy meteorologists, the great problem in weather forecasting at 
present is the lack of any means to work out all the mathematical variables within 
the time that such knowledge would be useful. In other words, meteorologists say 
they believe they know in theory what should be done about correlating all the 
complex factors that would shed light on what the weather would be one month or 
two months hence, but that they were hopelessly bogged down by inability to 
solve the mathematical equations quickly enough.110 
 
Of all the factors that had plagued the field in recent years, time posed the largest 
obstacle. Crawford faced a similar problem at Bikini. He shared a conundrum in common 
with the meteorologists involved in the tests: all believed that they could create a clear 
and detailed picture of the changing atmospheric conditions, but none of them was 
capable of working at the accelerated rate that the circumstances demanded. As a result, 
they were forced to rely on oversimplified theories, necessarily drawn from past rather 
than real-time observations. Although it seems that he was aware of the possibilities for 
faster and more accurate forecasting models on the horizon, Crawford had no choice but 
to continue working within the highly subjective and inexact framework of the past.  
 
110 Sidney Shallet, “Electronics to Aid Weather Figuring,” New York Times, January 11, 1946.  
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Lagging behind with Radar Technology  
Meteorological methodologies improved in great measure shortly after the Bikini tests. It 
took the outside perspective of a mathematician, John von Neumann, employed by the 
Manhattan Project during the war, to formulate a plan that would combine mathematics, 
hydrodynamics, and computers to achieve objective analysis in meteorology. Headed by 
von Neumann, the “Meteorology Project” officially began at the Institute for Advanced 
Study at Princeton University in the fall of 1946. The first task of the project team was to 
build the first electronic computer, which up to this point existed only in von Neumann’s 
imagination, and then input the basic equations of atmospheric flow to yield numerical 
calculations. While one group focused on developing the computing functions, another 
addressed the problem of simplifying the equations. They eliminated all non-
meteorological factors, leaving just one cohesive set of data to compute. From this 
process a new methodology emerged, as one of the meteorologists aptly expressed in 
metaphorical terms: “The atmosphere is the transmitter. The computing machine is the 
receiver. Now there are two ways to eliminate noise in the output. The first is to make 
sure that the input is free from objectionable noises, or the second is to employ a filtering 
system in the receiver.”111 Anyone conversant with aviation, as were many Americans 
through World War II-era reportage on modern warfare, would have recognized this 
metaphor to be, more precisely, an analogy to radar technology.  
 In a 1944 issue of Fortune magazine, Crawford contributed to the reportage that 
helped introduce Americans to the radar, particularly to the visual capabilities it 
111 Letter Jules Charney to Philip Thompson, quoted in William Aspray, John Von Neumann and the 
Origins of Modern Computing (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990), 300, fn73.  
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developed during the war. Deriving symbols from the weather charts, his map “Spotting 
Stormy Weather” (see fig. 2.11) illustrates how this novel system of communication 
would work in a hypothetical military maneuver, prior to an air attack. Fitted into an 
airplane that patrols for stormy conditions, the transmitter of the radar scans for 
interference from “targets,” such as thunderclouds, and “translates the returning pulses 
into visual readings of the distance and direction of the targets.”112 Only a pilot on the 
reconnaissance plane could theoretically see the resulting image of the cloud, pictured in 
a separate photograph of a radar scope (fig. 2.11, detail), below Crawford’s map. What 
Crawford shows instead is the network of radio-signals that pass between weather plane 
and ground station, and then between ground station and bomber plane, which is diverted 
away from the storm. As the accompanying Fortune article and illustrations implied, the 
signals are a facet of the new technology to be celebrated, for they produce the input that 
leads to the creation of the radar image.   
 Just two years after Crawford’s illustration of radar technology appeared in 
Fortune, the Princeton meteorologists clearly saw the radar’s signals and input—what the 
Princeton meteorologist referred to as “noise” in his metaphor—more as a problem than 
an asset. Indeed, the primary objective of the Meteorological Project was to take the input 
down to the level of a whisper, so that the image on the computer screen would 
communicate visual information about a focused aspect of the weather. By 1950, the 
Princeton group had devised an algorithm to run on the only computer then available—
the Electronic Numerical Integrator and Computer (ENIAC)—and predict atmospheric 
112 “Radar – The Industry: A Clandestine Business in the Billions Was Built on the Work of the Physicists,” 
Fortune 32 (October 1945), 144.  
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air-flow within a 24-hour period. For the first time in history, an “electronic brain” 
allowed meteorologists to keep pace with changes in the weather.113 Shifting the method 
of meteorological analysis to one image at a time, the ENIAC and subsequent early 
computers shaded in areas on maps that corresponded to a single category of information 
(fig. 2.20)—all air pressures within a certain range, for example. This approach made 
maps easier to read than earlier models, including those rendered by Crawford, which 
pictured multiple atmospheric effects all at once.    
 A direct comparison between a mid-1950s computer rendering of fallout and 
Crawford’s earlier painting on the subject illustrates the relative clarity of the newer, 
advanced methodology. Basic weather information provided input for the mechanical 
“fallout predictor” (fig. 2.21), as it was called in the pages of Popular Science, generating 
a “glowing picture of the fallout pattern, brightest where radioactivity will be most 
intense,” on a TV-like screen, overlaid with a transparent geographical map (not 
shown).114 The glowing fallout pattern portrays a radioactive cloud in a familiar way. The 
wispy quality of the pattern ensures that it will be interpreted as a cloud, just as it would 
be seen in the sky or even on a radar screen. By contrast, the cloud in Crawford’s Test 
Able (see fig. 2.3) does not conjure up the notion of a gaseous volume, even though it 
takes an oblique and bending shape. Because there is no distinction between the forms of 
solids and gases in Crawford’s picture, these two kinds of visual information blend 
113 “Electronic Computer to Make Weather Charts,” The Science News-Letter 62, no. 8 (August 23, 1952), 
117.  
114 “Fallout Predictor Maps Danger Zone,” Popular Science (July 1956), 72.  
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together. With the advent of computer modeling a decade later, such categories would be 
treated separately for greater legibility.   
 Crawford embarked on his assignment at Bikini with the mindset that the layered 
method of weather mapping—also known as synoptic meteorology—would be the only 
available model for picturing radioactive fallout conditions. Unaided by computers, 
followers of this model could only make real-time forecasts with the help of the radar, 
producing murky visual information that was nonetheless considered the height of 
atmospheric imaging at the time. While the Meteorology Project at Princeton actively 
sought to replace the current visual technology with a simpler model, Crawford and the 
scientists who supplied him with data about the nuclear test were already familiar with 
the convoluted, older system. They processed all the data available to them and filtered 
out very little. That Crawford followed this method is revealed in his own description of 
how he parsed out, combined, and superimposed onto one another his various 
impressions of the tests: “These pictures constitute my comment on the spectacle: the 
beautiful parts of the sequence (i.e. the positive and constructive), and the negative-
destructive. Some of the pictures are almost completely in one category, some in the 
other. Some, perhaps all, contain in a message, both elements.”115 Translated into visual 
terms in his pictures, these overlapping categories confused the everyday viewer, who 
had been uninitiated to the skill of reading synoptic maps ever since the ban on weather 
maps in wartime. The representation of multiple sets of data also complicated the artist’s 
own vision of the pictorial form that radioactivity should take. 
115 Letter from Crawford to Halpert, frame 418, reel 5446, Downtown Gallery Papers, AAA (underline in 
the original).  
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Failing to Recalibrate 
 If wartime meteorology had trained Crawford to think of atmospheric phenomena 
in broad, sweeping terms, this experience ultimately proved inhibitive to his ability to 
perceive the related phenomena of nuclear fallout through the microscopic lens of 
physics. Similarly, meteorology taught him to conceive of the atmosphere in pluralistic 
terms, shaping his approach just months before it would have been possible for him to 
embrace the emphasis on singularity in the “Princeton method.” Given his confidence in 
the expertise he had gained in the Weather Division, he may not have absorbed new 
scientific ideas at Bikini after all. As I argued at the beginning of this chapter, Crawford 
expected his audience to learn through the process of absorption, whereas, after some 
analysis of his methods, it seems as though he was not up to the task himself. In his 
“Statement on the Bikini Pictures,” the method that he outlined for viewers of his work 
involved extemporaneous training (just as he had received in meteorology) by engaging 
in “repeated two-hour sessions before a single painting.” It also required discipline, for 
the pictorial equivalents of scientific data were “not to be absorbed at a glance.” Yet, 
Crawford’s attempt to grapple with the subject of Bikini showed that sustained interest 
alone could not imbue one with the knowledge to grasp certain concepts, as much as he 
clung to the belief that his past had prepared him. The weeks he spent gathering 
information about the test turned out to be equally unfruitful. In the end, he found himself 
lacking both the knowledge and the time required to recalibrate his mind to the 
complexities of radioactive fallout.  
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Crawford was not the only American civilian, or even the only artist, to witness 
Operation Crossroads, yet he enjoyed privileged information about the tests that most 
average citizens could not have accessed elsewhere. In taking advantage of this 
opportunity, he employed the few visual precedents for fallout models that scientists 
made available to his disposal. By the mid-1950s, new methods by which to portray 
atmospheric radioactivity began to appear in popular printed sources, leading to a general 
civic education on these mapping techniques, particularly on the “ellipsis-pattern” model 
that came to be accepted as the visual standard. Social-realist artist Ben Shahn, the 
subject of the following chapter, imbued his depictions of nuclear fallout with a fluid 
linearity that echoed the new aesthetic of fallout. Due in part to their resemblance to these 
graphically intricate and familiar models, Shahn’s delicate renderings of radioactive 
clouds struck a chord with viewers in ways that Crawford’s Bikini paintings never 
achieved, despite his superior command of the scientific meanings underlying the map 
symbols. Moreover, perhaps contributing to the positive reception of his own Bikini 
works in contrast to Crawford’s, Shahn made no claims to engage scientifically with the 
subject. To him, the more important focus was the human perpetrators of bad science and 
its victims.    
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Fig. 2.1 Ralston Crawford, If Bikini Atoll Had Been New York Harbor. Meteorological 
chart illustrating the hypothetical path of radioactive fallout. Published in “Bikini: With 
Documentary Photographs, Abstract Paintings, and Meteorological Charts Ralston 
Crawford Here Depicts the New Scale of Destruction,” Fortune (December 1946), 156. 
 
 
Fig. 2.2 Aerial photograph of nuclear test “Able,” Operation Crossroads, June 30, 1946. 
Declassified photograph, Los Alamos National Laboratory.
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Fig. 2.3 Ralston Crawford, Test Able, 1946. Oil on canvas. Published in “Bikini: With 
Documentary Photographs, Abstract Paintings, and Meteorological Charts Ralston 
Crawford Here Depicts the New Scale of Destruction,” Fortune (December 1946), 157. 
  
Fig. 2.4 Diagram of “Radiation Exclusion Sector” for Operation Crossroads. Published in 
R. Weitz et al., Analysis of Radiation Exposure for Naval Units of Operation Crossroads 
(Washington, D.C.: Defense Nuclear Agency, 1982), 26. 
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Fig. 2.5 Ralston Crawford, D-Day Minus One. Meteorological charts illustrating weather 
patterns on D-Day. Published in “Thunder over the Atlantic,” Fortune (November 1944), 
157. 
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Fig. 2.6 Ralston Crawford, U.S.S. Nevada, 1946. Oil on canvas. Published in “Bikini: 
With Documentary Photographs, Abstract Paintings, and Meteorological Charts Ralston 
Crawford Here Depicts the New Scale of Destruction,” Fortune (December 1946), 159. 
 
Fig 2.7 “General Damage on Stern Deck, Nevada.” Black-and-white photograph. 
Published in in United States Joint Task Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official 
Pictorial Record (New York: W.H. Wise and Co., 1946), 167. 
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Fig. 2.8 Left: Victoreen Model 263 Geiger-Mueller counter, a primary survey instrument 
for Operation Crossroads. Right: Detail of meter, with arrow and dash marks. 
 
 
Fig. 2.9 Ralston Crawford, U.S.S. Pensacola, 1946. Gouache on paperboard. [current 
location unknown] 
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Fig. 2.10 Ralston Crawford, detail of purple cloud in Test Able, 1946. Oil on canvas. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.11 Left: Ralston Crawford, Spotting Stormy Weather. Meteorological chart 
illustrating a weather reconnaissance mission. Right: Photograph of a radar scope. Both 
published in “Thunder over the Atlantic,” Fortune (October 1945), 145.  
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Fig. 2.12 Ralston Crawford, A Plane Accident in Relation to Storm Structure, 1943. 
Visual weather presentation for the Army Air Forces Weather Division. Ralston 
Crawford Estate. Published in Barbara Haskell, Ralston Crawford (New York: Whitney 
Museum of American Art, 1985), 59. 
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Fig. 2.13 Ralston Crawford, Profile of an Eastbound Flight over a North Atlantic Route, 
Transatlantic Round Trips Follow the Pattern of the Weather, and Profile of a Westbound 
Flight over the Middle Atlantic Route. Series of illustrated meteorological charts 
illustrating weather patterns. Published in “Thunder over the Atlantic,” Fortune 
(November 1944), 159. 
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Fig. 2.14 Ralston Crawford, At the Dock #2, 1941–42. Oil on canvas. Published on 
cover of Fortune (November 1944). 
 
 
Fig. 2.15 Ralston Crawford, Weather Reconnaissance Plane, 1946. Oil on canvas. 
[current location unknown] 
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Fig. 2.16 Ralston Crawford, Tour of Inspection, Bikini, 1946. Oil on canvas. [current 
location unknown] 
   
Fig. 2.17 Left: Ralston Crawford, Untitled (Downed Plane), ca. 1944. Drawing. Right: 
Ralston Crawford, Plane Production, 1946. Oil on canvas.  
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Fig. 2.18 “The Moving Finger Writes.” Photograph of a recording instrument that 
received radio-transmitted readings of radiation levels from Geiger counters located near 
ground zero of nuclear-test site at Bikini Atoll. Published in United States Joint Task 
Force One, Operation Crossroads: The Official Pictorial Record (New York: W.H. Wise 
and Co., 1946), 178. 
     
Fig. 2.19 Left: Spectrographic photograph showing 16-hour exposure. Right: 
Spectrographic photograph showing 8-day exposure. Both published in J. E. Edwards et 
al., “The Adaptation of the Cauchois Spectrograph to Artificial Radioactive Sources,” 
Physical Review 67, no. 5 (March 1, 1945), 152, 153. 
 
 
157 
 
Fig. 2.20 Weather map printed by the ENIAC computer. Published in Ann Ewing, 
“Computing the Weather,” Science News Letter (December 3, 1955), 362.  
 
Fig. 2.21 Photograph of electronic “fallout predictor.” Published in Popular Science 
(July 1956), 72.
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CHAPTER 3: Ben Shahn: The Human-Fallout Cases of J. Robert Oppenheimer 
and the Lucky Dragon  
 
Radiation therapy had kept Moholy-Nagy alive through the summer of 1946, overlapping 
with the period in which two atomic tests at Bikini demonstrated in rather dramatic 
fashion, at least in the case of Test Baker, the process of atomic fission he had learned 
from reading the Smyth Report less than a year earlier. For Crawford, this nuclear-testing 
event presented a prime opportunity to apply his meteorological knowledge to 
radiological phenomena, some of which he gleaned from firsthand experience and some 
directly from scientific experts, much in the same manner as Moholy-Nagy. What might 
be characterized as fascination or even awe was the driving force behind their intellectual 
engagement, leading them to identify some redeeming qualities in nuclear technology.  
But their contemporary, the social-activist artist Ben Shahn, found nothing of the sort.  
Investigating the subject of fallout over a decade later, Shahn turned a far more critical 
eye toward the claims of scientific intelligence.  
From Shahn’s perspective, nuclear science was a force of absolute destruction. 
The 1950s saw the scientific advancements in nuclear weapons displayed in the explosion 
of the first thermonuclear fusion device, also known as the hydrogen bomb, in a U.S. test 
in 1952; the first test of a deployable (that is, ready for military use) hydrogen bomb by 
the U.S. in 1954; the successful tests of hydrogen bombs by the Soviet Union and Great 
Britain in 1955 and 1957, respectively; and nearly 200 atomic tests at the Nevada Test 
Site, beginning in 1950. It was the test in 1954, which led to one of the worst radioactive 
fallout accidents in history, that prompted Shahn, three years later, to devote a two-part 
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series of drawings and paintings to the subject of human suffering caused by nuclear 
weapons.  
The Saga of the Lucky Dragon, the title of both series, has typically been 
considered in the literature on Shahn to represent his first engagement with the issue of 
“fallout.” In this chapter, I argue that his earlier project to portray the personal aftermath 
of the physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer, following a different but not entirely unrelated 
incident in 1954, first set Shahn on the course to grapple with the issues of fallout-
induced sickness. In this sense, I use the term “fallout” to refer to the incidental effects of 
a situation, which, for Oppenheimer, involved the revocation of his U.S. security 
clearance. This humiliating censure was the end result of the Atomic Energy 
Commission’s security hearing to investigate the charges that Oppenheimer had 
communist ties, which were said to influence his leadership at the AEC, for which he had 
served as the chairman of the advisory committee since 1947.    
Although Shahn seems to have disagreed with the commission’s decision to 
punish Oppenheimer, the artist nonetheless regarded him, the person primarily 
responsible for the development of the atomic bomb, as culpable in bringing about the 
domino reaction of nuclear events. This ambivalence towards Oppenheimer, as well as 
his place in the spectrum of accountability for the overall state of disaster, permeates the 
two portrait types of the physicist that Shahn produced in 1954 and 1955. Shahn added to 
the ambiguity of his treatment of Oppenheimer by drawing physical parallels between the 
physicist and the Japanese victims of radiation sickness depicted in the later Lucky 
Dragon series. Based on Oppenheimer’s frail and deformed physiognomy, which made 
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him appear as though he, too, were irreversibly weakened by the actions of the AEC, 
Shahn shows the physicist suffering the consequences of his involvement with the 
government’s nuclear-testing program.  
It is difficult to imagine that Shahn could have conveyed a clearer political stance 
on U.S. nuclear policy than he did in Stop H-Bomb Tests (fig. 3.1) of 1960, rendered 
three years after Shahn released the first set of works in the Lucky Dragon series. Unlike 
this previous attempt to deliver subtly the message about human tragedy, Stop H-Bomb 
Tests explicitly and emphatically states the directive “STOP” to jolt the viewer out of 
complacency. The confrontational message of Shahn’s poster mirrors the defiant grin on 
the face that emerges from a patch of blackness. With a menacing furrowed brow and a 
set of horns like antennae, the cloud creature resembles the monstrous mutants in science-
fiction films discussed in the later writings of fellow anti-nuclear activist Susan Sontag, 
who wrote about the “accidental awakening of the super-destructive monster” as being, 
“often, an obvious metaphor for the bomb.”1  
 Yet, as varied interpretations of this poster-print reveal, the exact meaning of the 
metaphor is not immediately obvious. Some scholars have seen Stop H-Bomb Tests, 
commissioned in 1960 by the National Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy (SANE), as 
an unequivocal expression of the “evil consequences of hydrogen-bomb tests.”2 Arguing 
for a more ambivalent reading, others have posited that Shahn took the “marginal, 
1 Susan Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster,” Commentary 39, no. 10 (October 1965), 46, reprinted 
version in Sontag, Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1966).  
2 Kenneth Prescott, Prints and Posters of Ben Shahn (New York: Dover, 1982), xxiv. 
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pacifist side” on the spectrum of anti-nuclear activism.3 According to this view, the 
“ambiguity of the visual language” in the poster casts doubt on whether Shahn believed 
that his actions or those of SANE could actually put an end to what at times appeared to 
be a relentless and inevitable path toward total nuclear destruction.4   
 Disembodied and de-contextualized, the face in Shahn’s Stop H-Bomb Tests 
seems intentionally to blur the distinction between creator and creation, human and beast. 
Constituted of a black “body” that evokes deadly radioactive fallout, a product both 
conceived by human minds and wrought into existence by human hands, the monstrous 
being turns out to be more knowable to us than a character based entirely on myth. Other 
interpretations of the poster assume that the consequences of nuclear testing were of 
primary concern to Shahn—that is, what happened after the fact—but his broad 
engagement with the subject of nuclear destructivity shows that he was equally interested 
in investigating its origins. Taking into account several of the scientifically oriented 
works in Shahn’s oeuvre—including the two portrait-types of Oppenheimer, four 
drawings and two paintings in the Lucky Dragon series, a generic portrait of a scientist, 
and a preparatory sketch for a mural of an atomic chart—I consider them in relation to 
the concept of what might be called “human fallout” to characterize the stakes of nuclear 
testing, as depicted by Shahn.  His representations of the nuclear subject ultimately link 
the inhumane actions of scientists and their government employers to the rise of a 
tragically universal condition: radiation-induced dehumanization. As in the low-budget, 
3 Laura Katzman, “Art in the Atomic Age: Ben Shahn’s Stop H-Bomb Tests,” Yale Journal of Criticism 11, 
no. 1 (1998), 143.  
4 Denise Rompilla, “From Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb: American Artists Witness the Birth of the 
Atomic Age,” (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2008), 265. Denise Rompilla concurs with Katzman’s 
assessment that Shahn was ambivalent about the outcome of his intervention.   
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sci-fi films that Sontag references in her text, in Shahn’s images the human is as much in 
the beast as the beast is in the human, in that both are trapped in the senseless situation of 
at once bringing about death and suffering their own slow demise. Sontag observes, 
“Radiation casualties—ultimately, the conception of the whole world as a casualty of 
nuclear testing and nuclear warfare—is the most ominous of all the notions with which 
science fiction films deal.”5 Similarly, Shahn’s work on fallout addresses its audiences as 
though every individual represents a human cost of the all-over radioactive contamination 
engendered by hydrogen bombs, hundreds of times more lethal than the two fission 
bombs dropped on Japan to end World War II in 1945.6  
 
The Tragic Oppenheimer  
 Reading Shahn in these terms is essential to understanding this body of nuclear 
work in its historical moment, from about 1954 to 1961, beginning with the haunting ink 
portrait of nuclear physicist J. Robert Oppenheimer (fig. 3.2) made for a magazine 
commission. On August 20, 1954, an editor at the Nation alerted Shahn to an upcoming 
article on J. Robert Oppenheimer that “should arouse a lot of comment” and wondered 
whether he would consider doing an illustration for it. The editor added, “I will send you 
proofs of the article, which I think you should see before you do the sketch, since there is 
5 Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster,” in Against Interpretation, 218–19.  
6 There are many sources of this figure that enumerate the relative power of fusion bombs in comparison to 
fission bombs. For this essay, I have consulted the following historical study, widely considered to be the 
authoritative source on the development of hydrogen bombs in the United States. Richard Rhodes, Dark 
Sun: The Making of the Hydrogen Bomb (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996) 510.   
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a paragraph in which Frank discusses Oppenheimer’s face and appearance.”7 Shahn 
appears to have followed this advice and drew the scientist’s facial features to mimic 
what the article’s author Waldo Frank described as something of a split personality. “The 
eyes command a half-face of sensibility, bland and open, and a half-face of tough analytic 
power,” Frank remarked, prompting Shahn to portray Oppenheimer with wild eyes that 
betray any sense of composure. In addition, wrote Frank, “In the mouth the division is 
horizontal; the upper lip tense and coldly resolved, the lower lip aggressively sensuous.”8 
Referring to this tension of opposites that had manifested in Oppenheimer’s face, Frank 
further noted, “Even his features, asymmetrical as Poe’s, reveal it.”9 The offhanded 
comment about Edgar Allan Poe might have conjured up visual precedents for Shahn, 
who likely was familiar with Henri Matisse’s well-known etching of Poe (fig. 3.3), with 
his crooked eyes, nose, and mouth, notoriously capturing the mental imbalance of the 
poet shortly after a failed suicide attempt. Frank attributed the distortion in 
Oppenheimer’s face to his attempt at “integrating chaos”—letting the chaos of the outside 
world intrude upon his inner calm—in a way that could be done only by the “work of 
genius.”10 Nonetheless, the phrase “integrating chaos” is telling, in that it implies 
Oppenheimer’s need to adjust to unnatural circumstances, to transform his natural self 
into a version suitable for his high-profile work on atomic energy and its attendant 
turbulent politics.  
7 Letter from Carey McWilliams to Shahn, August 20, 1954, frame 23, folder 19, box 19, Ben Shahn 
Papers, Archives of American Art (AAA), Washington, D.C.   
8 Waldo Frank, “An American Tragedy: The Oppenheimer Case,” Nation 179, no. 13 (September 25, 
1954), 248. 
9 Ibid.  
10 Ibid.  
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 Judging by the disfigurement of Oppenheimer in the portrait for the Nation 
article, Shahn seems to have interpreted Frank’s text concerning the mental and physical 
transformation of the scientist in terms of mutation, a timely concept in 1954. That 
year—the same year in which Oppenheimer was removed from his position as chairman 
of the AEC advisory board—marked the height of the debate between government-
supported scientists and academic scientists over nuclear research, namely, their findings 
about the effects of high-energy radiation on human beings who had been exposed to 
environments impacted by nuclear-weapons testing. As Scott Kirsch explains in his 
article on the relationship between radioactive fallout and environmental change, the 
scientists on the side of the AEC argued that nuclear testing posed no threat to public 
health, whereas most outside geneticists found what they considered to be indisputable 
evidence of cumulative and permanent genetic mutations due to nuclear fallout.11 The 
Smyth Report, as discussed in the first chapter, had confirmed several years earlier that 
the activities of the Manhattan Project forced scientists into continual contact with 
hazardous radioactive materials, such as uranium and plutonium, and certainly 
Oppenheimer himself had received significant radiation dosages when he guided those 
activities. 
  At this point, some clarification seems necessary to explain why Shahn, an 
avowed anti-nuclear activist, would accept a commission to portray the physicist who 
11 Scott Kirsch, “Harold Knapp and the Geography of Normal Controversy: Radioiodine in the Historical 
Environment,” OSIRIS 19 (2004), 171. For a contemporary source on the AEC’s official stance on fallout, 
see Warren Unna, “Blast at Norfolk Could Kill Persons on Edge of D.C. Strauss Indicates,” Washington 
Post, February 16, 1955. According to Lewis L. Strauss, the AEC chairman, the agency’s medical and 
biological advisers “believe that the small amount of additional exposure of the general population of the 
United States from our nuclear weapons testing program will not seriously affect the genetic constitution of 
human beings.” 
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was regarded as the “father” of the atomic bomb. Scholars have offered the reason of 
sympathy; like Oppenheimer, who had recently been maligned by his former colleagues 
in government, Shahn suspected that he was also under official investigation for his 
liberal politics, even though he had not yet been called to testify.12 Apart from this shared 
experience, however, a stronger impetus for Shahn to portray Oppenheimer may have 
been Shahn’s intellectual curiosity about scientists in general, stemming from the artist’s 
interest in the role of expertise in American society. Moreover, both Shahn and 
Oppenheimer were openly concerned about the dehumanizing effects of the Cold War, in 
which the common strategy for a nation to wield power was to claim that its stockpile of 
nuclear weapons could obliterate huge populations of an enemy state. As Shahn put it, the 
“scientifico-mechanical age” was “a time when civilization has become highly expert in 
the art of destroying human beings.”13 Five years earlier, Oppenheimer, who famously 
quoted from the Bhagavad-Gita to compare himself to “the destroyer of worlds,” had 
lamented the “increasingly expert destruction of man’s spirit.”14  
Drawing a correlation between expertise and destruction, Oppenheimer voiced 
these ideas in a series of essays published in 1954, the same year in which Shahn created 
his portrait for the Nation. Oppenheimer’s book, Science and the Common 
Understanding, reproduced the texts of four talks that he had delivered on London’s BBC 
12 Katzman, “Art in the Atomic Age,” 149. See also Patricia Hills, Modern Art in the USA: Issues and 
Controversies of the 20th century (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 2001), 195–197. Hills’s 
anthology reproduces two pages of the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s file on Ben Shahn, dated October 
3, 1951. It states, “SHAHN has definitely been identified with Pro-Communist activities,” though Shahn 
himself continually denied that he had been a member of the Communist Party.  
13 Shahn, “Art, Freedom and the Human Spirit in the Contemporary World,” New Leader 42, no. 13 (March 
30, 1959), 25.   
14 J. Robert Oppenheimer, “The Sciences and Man’s Community,” in Science and the Common 
Understanding (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 97. 
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radio in 1953. A recurring theme in these Reith Lectures was the obligation of scientific 
experts to accept their social responsibility within a global network, as discussed in this 
passage:   
The open society, the unrestricted access to knowledge, the unplanned and 
uninhibited association of men for its furtherance, these are what may make a 
vast, complex, ever-growing, ever-changing, ever more specialized and expert 
technological world nevertheless a world of human community.15 
 
Writing these words in early 1953, Oppenheimer might have had a vague suspicion that 
the “association of men” supporting the furtherance of his knowledge was about to 
collapse later that year, when his colleagues at the AEC initiated a hearing to determine 
whether he was abusing his power to supply secret information to the communist Soviet 
Union. The trial ultimately resulted in the humiliating revocation of Oppenheimer’s 
national security clearance.16 In the most recent and thorough of Oppenheimer’s many 
biographies, Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin note, “His call for an open society was, to be 
sure, connected to his concerns about the dangerous and stultifying effects of secrecy on 
American society.”17 The AEC protected state secrets through a system of security 
classifications that gave the highest authority to its hand-selected scientists, among them 
Oppenheimer.18 The same system was also used to revoke power from experts in certain 
cases where their knowledge was considered to be a threat to the nuclear testing program, 
15 Ibid., 105.  
16 For a full transcript of the security hearings, see U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer: Transcript of Hearing before Personnel Security Board, Washington D.C., April 12, 
1954, through May 6, 1954 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1954).   
17 Kai Bird and Martin J. Sherwin, American Prometheus: The Triumph and Tragedy of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer (New York: Random House, 2005), 475.     
18 Cultural geographer Scott Kirsch has termed this security system a “technocratic form of expertise.” See 
Kirsch, “Harold Knapp and the Geography of Normal Controversy,” 171.  
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which, in 1954, centered on twin policies with which Oppenheimer openly disagreed: the 
development of hydrogen bombs and the denial of radiological fallout hazards.19  
 By taking an ethical stance on these issues, Oppenheimer appeared to overstep the 
bounds of his position at the AEC, according to the author of the Nation article. Frank 
speculates that this perception, on the part of the panel of judges who oversaw the trial, 
also raised the question of expertise: if the witness is a specialist in his field, is he 
qualified to speak on matters outside the scope of professional practice? Testifying in 
Oppenheimer’s defense, several scientists empathized with his view that the U.S. acted 
too quickly in its pursuit of hydrogen-bomb development, without first approaching the 
Soviet Union about an agreement. But in this moralizing of the political situation, the 
AEC panel thought the scientists were out of their depth. As Frank explains, “The 
scientists are not expert in this ‘feeling,’ including Oppenheimer; but in him they [the 
panelists] sense their own preoccupation . . . [with] doubt as to the political, strategic, 
economic wisdom of a certain program for H-bombs.” For those who believed that the 
scientists’ non-expert opinion was nonetheless worthwhile to consider, Frank 
recommends that his readers “can taste the quality of Oppenheimer’s mind in his recently 
published volume of lectures, ‘Science and the Common Understanding.’”20 
 The book offers some clues why Oppenheimer and Shahn, both experts in their 
respective fields, independently reached the same conclusion about the obligation to 
share knowledge. They believed that an expert was meant to help other people gain 
19 See Oppenheimer, “Atomic Weapons and American Policy,” Foreign Affairs 31, no. 4 (July 1953), 525 –
535. 
20 Frank, “An American Tragedy,” 247.  
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mastery over the quantifiable aspects of their existence, but ironically, this systemization 
of knowledge led the qualitative side of humanity—what Oppenheimer and Shahn call 
“man’s spirit” or the “human spirit,” respectively—also to come under the scrutiny and 
eventually the exploitation of the state. In Science and the Common Understanding, 
Oppenheimer identifies the spirit of the scientific community, and indeed the spirit of all 
humanity, as the attainment of a harmonious and complementary relationship between 
individuals and the communities of which they are part. When this relationship falls out 
of balance, it can be attributed to “expecting too much knowledge from the individual 
and too much synthesis from the community,” a dangerous symptom of the “increased 
power which knowledge gives.”21  
For Shahn, who also theorizes in that same year about the overlapping spheres of 
knowledge and power, this conundrum of intellectual life fosters empathy, even a 
poignant kinship, among masters of various fields. He writes, “I want to point out that the 
practice of painting, like that of writing, or science, or philosophy, lies within the realm 
of ideas. The painter is engaged in a search for certain forms of truth; and it need hardly 
be pointed out here that, in such an exploration, freedom of mind is axiomatic.”22 That is, 
the individual is entitled to pursue whatever ideas might be of value, in the hope that this 
pursuit might yield some discoveries to inform other thinkers within, and perhaps outside, 
his community.  
21 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 93, 97.  
22 Shahn, “The Liberal of Today,” ca. 1953–54, unpublished essay, Ben Shahn Papers, frames 17–24, folder 
47, box 27, AAA.   
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Shahn’s “freedom of mind,” once exemplified by Oppenheimer and his style of 
leadership,23 was impermissible to the AEC. Compelled to explore the consequences of 
intellectual imprisonment in his drawing for the Nation, Shahn renders Oppenheimer as 
living proof of what happens when the mind of the expert is restricted, controlled, 
quarantined, and ultimately denied access to knowledge. Looking much like the creature 
of Frankenstein in Shahn’s portrait (see fig. 3.2), the scientist bears physical evidence of 
the psychological abuses to which he was subjected by the panel of AEC experts at his 
hearing, who believed they could not allow government-employed scientists to stray from 
the agency’s common cause. The panel required a strict focus on weapons development 
to secure Americans against the Russian threat. Both Oppenheimer and Shahn held the 
belief that any government’s failure to uphold free-thinking would create monsters of 
men, converting each one into a “helpless, iron-bound prisoner of a dying world,”24 as 
Oppenheimer imagined it. 
 In diametrical opposition to this “freedom of mind” credo, technocratic experts of 
the nuclear-weapons program were expected to persuade the American public of the 
scientific predictability of nuclear tests, effectively claiming that scientists could 
anticipate any potential dangers and plan accordingly, from the explosion to its aftermath. 
Oppenheimer explicitly rejected the notion of absolute scientific intelligence. He 
considered it antithetical to his conception of science as a process in which phenomena 
23 Questioned about Oppenheimer’s role as chairman of the AEC General Advisory Committee and his 
conduct in the meetings of the Committee, physicist Enrico Fermi testified that Oppenheimer “would 
naturally take a leading role. But certainly everybody had a perfect freedom to act with his own mind and 
according to his conscience on any issue” (emphasis added). See Richard Polenberg, ed., In the Matter of J. 
Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance Hearing (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002), 155.  
24 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 95.  
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are incrementally discovered and gradually understood. In his final Reith lecture, he 
reminds his fellow scientists, “Our progress is narrow; it takes a vast world unchallenged 
and for granted.” In short, he says, “We will have to accept the fact that no one of us 
really will ever know very much.”25 An excerpt from this lecture was read during 
Oppenheimer’s trial, highlighting his unfavorable views on “tyrannical” governments that 
attempted to convince their people of “total knowledge” in order for those governments 
to appear as though they were in total control.26 Although in his essay Oppenheimer did 
not outright accuse the U.S. government of such intellectual tyranny, he certainly 
suggested that an “open society,” which meant “unrestricted access to knowledge,”27 was 
“not yet a reality” in the United States—and, in truth, not a desirable option in terms of 
the present U.S. nuclear policy.28 Openness remained an ideal, momentarily foreclosed 
by hostile relations with the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, even under current 
circumstances, important information could be filtered down to the American public that 
candidly expressed the government’s large gaps in understanding of America’s own 
nuclear capabilities, let alone the enemy’s. Many people were instead under the false 
impression that scientists possessed almost complete cognitive command of the sciences 
on which the U.S. relied for its security.  
 Without much civic resistance, the U.S. nuclear program was able to thrive 
throughout the early 1950s largely because scientific experts portrayed the tests as 
measurable, calculable, and controlled events, not at all the indomitable kind that Shahn 
25 Ibid., 49, 50.  
26 U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 98.  
27 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 94. 
28 Ibid., 95.  
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imagined a decade later in his anti-H-bomb poster. Shahn was as attracted to scientific 
ideas as he was skeptical of them. In preparing his portrait of Oppenheimer in 1954, he 
would have recognized the analogous conundrum that the physicist faced as a leader in 
his intellectual community and a proponent of free-thinking: it was impossible for 
Oppenheimer to deny his complicity in building a façade of nuclear intelligence, despite 
his clear distrust of that very idea. By voicing contrary opinions about the limitations of 
scientific inquiry, Oppenheimer proved unwilling to help maintain the façade and, as a 
result, was made to self-destruct. Shahn’s portrait shows him as a fallen symbol, no 
longer willing or, with the outcome of the trial, legally able to represent the scientific 
mind behind nuclear weapons. Oppenheimer’s fingers hold open a book to a blank page, 
as if to mirror the erasure of his knowledge about all things he had worked to discover for 
the past decade, leaving him without a foundation. After the hearing before the AEC 
panel, which found him guilty of “loyalty to individual above loyalty or obligation to 
Government,”29 he was stripped of his leadership position.  
 If Shahn had not read Oppenheimer’s Science and the Common Understanding, 
evidence suggests that he at least obtained from the magazine publisher a copy of the 
photograph on the back cover (fig. 3.4), a like source for his magazine portrait.30 In the 
photograph, Oppenheimer appears much younger than in Shahn’s portrayal of him, yet 
the drawing retains Oppenheimer’s distinctive hand gestures: one hand makes the gesture 
of a teacher or lecturer, as if to emphasize a point, while the other grasps the pages of an 
29 Ibid., 993.  
30 On August 20, 1954, an editor at the Nation wrote to the artist, “I have asked Simon and Schuster to send 
you a glossy-print photograph of J. Robert Oppenheimer. Waldo Frank has done a piece for us about the 
case which should arouse a lot of comment. Will you be thinking about a sketch?” Ben Shahn Papers, 
frame 19, box 19, folder 23, AAA. 
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open book between two fingers. The teaching hand, which had provided the nexus of 
energy and authority in the photograph, has here gone limp and hovers over the open 
book. Enervated, Shahn’s version of Oppenheimer has lost more than the sense of joy, 
once conveyed in his expressive movements and subtle smile, but also the freedom of 
knowledge that had given purpose to his study of physics. Shahn aged the scientist 
considerably to reflect the eight years that had passed since the picture was taken by the 
Associated Press in 1946, on the heels of Oppenheimer’s success with the atomic 
bomb.31 But more than representing his actual older age, the drawing exaggerates his 
gaunt frailty, even though Frank’s article presents Oppenheimer as a pillar of strength.  
 These subtle changes from photograph to drawing are significant, because they 
provide visual markers of the extent to which Oppenheimer’s power had been depleted. 
Yet something about Oppenheimer—whether it was his frank expressions of self-doubt 
about his involvement in weapons development, or his bold position to distance himself 
from the hydrogen bomb—must have piqued the curiosity of Shahn, in spite of the 
artist’s unequivocal opposition to nuclear weapons. As he later proved in refusing a 
commission from Time magazine to do a portrait of nuclear physicist Edward Teller, a 
leading proponent of the hydrogen bomb, Shahn would only engage with a subject if it 
would square with his ethics.32 That Shahn not only accepted the Oppenheimer 
assignment but made several subsequent sketches in the following year, without 
31 The caption for the original press photograph reads: “Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, [proper] left, who was 
in charge of the atomic research laboratory in Los Alamos, N.M. and credited with contributing heavily to 
the development of the atomic bomb, chats with Dr. Robert Serber of the University of California's 
radiation laboratory at Berkeley, Calif., April 23, 1946.” In 1954 photograph for the book jacket, Serber is 
cropped out.   
32 Henry Brandon, “A Conversation with Ben Shahn: ‘They Begin to Make Too Much Money Too Soon,” 
New Republic 139, no. 1–2 (July 7, 1958), 18.  
 
 
                                                 
173 
commissions, suggests there was something more personal at stake for Shahn than a 
vague interest in the politics of the trial. 
 
The Fallible Oppenheimer     
 The pen-and-ink drawings of Oppenheimer that Shahn produced in 1955 (fig. 3.5 
and fig. 3.6) are candid portraits of human fallibility, particularly of the kind to which 
experts are prone. In treating his likenesses of the disgraced physicist with an even-
handed balance of critique and empathy, Shahn might have drawn feeling from his 
memory of meeting Oppenheimer in Princeton,33 if not directly from Oppenheimer’s 
words, written in 1955, which described “a sense of bond, a sense of analogy” between 
scientists and artists living in that age.34 To Oppenheimer, the limitations of being a 
specialist—what he described as “loneliness” for the artist and “narrowness” for the 
scientist—linked his community to the “men of art.” Both professions required a certain 
degree of intellectual myopia to survive: according to Oppenheimer, the world was now 
too vast, too unknowable for one to meander into another field of expertise, which in 
earlier days would have allowed for the fruitful cross-pollination of “accidents of 
friendship and association.”35 Yet the frustrations Oppenheimer felt under the present 
circumstances only reinforced his belief in the ideal of imperfection. If this approach 
meant he would sometimes lead himself astray or be misled, those missteps could still 
33 Shahn lived in Roosevelt, New Jersey, about 16 miles southeast of Princeton, where he participated in 
various organizations associated with the University, such as the local chapter of SANE.    
34 Oppenheimer, “Prospects in the Arts and Sciences,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (February 1955), 
42, 44. 
35 Ibid. 
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yield productive thoughts.36 Endorsing the “wonderful randomness suggestive of 
unending growth and improvisation,” he considered “his least rational actions and 
sentiments” as legitimate means by which to attain individual enlightenment.37  
Shahn also saw the exploration of irrational thoughts as a potential vehicle for 
intellectual stimulation. He advocated the study of scientific and mathematical principles, 
from which artists may derive ideas for visual elements, just as he encouraged the 
“physicist or mathematician . . . to accept into his hierarchy of calculable things that non-
measurable and extremely random human element which we commonly associate only 
with poetry or art.”38 This passage is drawn from the book in which Shahn published the 
series of lectures he had delivered as a visiting professor at Harvard University in the fall 
of 1956 and spring of 1957, much as Oppenheimer did with his 1953 lectureship. Both 
writings emphasized the need for improvisational freedom, which they believed would 
allow them to grow and learn, even assuming that errors would be made in the process. 
 In the more widely held view of the sciences, inconsistencies of any sort were 
shunned, especially when nuclear tests were involved. Take the example of the hydrogen-
bomb test “Castle Bravo” (often shortened simply to “Bravo”), among the worst fallout 
disasters in the history of atmospheric testing—and one that captured the attention of 
Oppenheimer and Shahn in far different ways. To begin with the physicist, it could be 
argued that he was indirectly complicit in the error that brought about a highly hazardous 
situation in the Marshall Islands, where the Bravo test was conducted. As director of the 
36 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 302.  
37 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 84, 86.    
38 Ben Shahn, The Shape of Content (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957), 6.  
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Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, from 1947 to 1966, Oppenheimer oversaw the 
highly regarded Meteorology Project, which supplied some of the most crucial 
calculations to the system of weather verification for nuclear tests. From the very 
beginning of the Project, shortly after the end of World War II, the goal was to use 
numerical methods in programming a computer to make short-range forecasts within a 
period of hours. Those forecasts were immediately understood to have implications not 
just for projecting the effects of nuclear explosions on the weather but also for pre-
determining the geographical distribution of fallout. The MANIAC (Mathematical and 
Numerical Integrator and Computer) at the Institute proved capable of mapping fallout 
patterns with sufficient accuracy when the U.S. detonated Ivy Mike, the first hydrogen 
bomb, in 1952. Two years later, when the IAS group input incorrect algorithms into the 
computer, not fully understanding the new type of thermonuclear device that was to be 
tested in the Bravo test, they miscalculated the yield of the explosion and therefore also 
misjudged the size of the fallout cloud, both of which were exponentially larger than 
predicted.39 As the leader of the Institute, Oppenheimer was technically accountable for 
this major oversight in the computation. Though the media made no mention of his 
involvement, he could have rightly assumed some responsibility for the ensuing disaster 
that befell the populations in the surrounding area of the Pacific islands.   
39 See George Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral: The Origins of the Digital Universe (New York: Random 
House, 2012), 7–8, 329. While other scholars have attributed the error to the Los Alamos team, which 
designed the bomb, Dyson suggests that the miscalculation was made on the computer at the IAS. 
According to Dyson, this incident constituted “perhaps the largest human error in history,” which resulted 
directly in the death of one of the Japanese fisherman who had been aboard the Lucky Dragon and an 
“unknown number of others indirectly over time.” He notes that four of the once-populated islands in the 
surrounding area and parts of Bikini Atoll “remain uninhabitable today.”   
 
 
                                                 
176 
 For others in the high-profile scientific community, however, the general response 
was to rationalize their decisions rather than admit culpability. Countering criticisms in 
alarming news reports that the test in March 1954 had exposed the inhabitants of the 
Marshall Islands to toxic levels of radioactive fallout, the esteemed radiation physicist 
Howard L. Andrews assured his readers (most of whom were undoubtedly his fellow 
scientists, in this case), while some aspects of the post-test data were not yet understood, 
the explosion took place under what scientists considered to be “well-controlled 
conditions” of the weather.40 Before the Bravo detonation, an advisory panel of 
specialists weighed a number of radiological and meteorological factors to determine 
whether the atmospheric conditions were favorable enough for a test to occur without 
incident—that is, without the threat of contaminating surrounding populations with 
fallout. Based on a series of briefings within 24 hours of the test, this system of “weather 
verification” allowed the government to claim a high rate of accuracy in their predictions. 
The only weather condition exempt from verification was wind, so “notoriously fickle” 
that “even with this careful study the radioactive debris may not go in the expected 
direction,” explained Andrews.41 Thus, due to this unmanageable variability, “each 
fallout pattern will present a unique situation.”42 In advance of the Bravo shot, the “light 
and variable winds,” which initially led the meteorological team to deem conditions 
“unfavorable,” posed not enough concern for the military task force to take more than the 
40 Howard L. Andrews, “Radioactive Fallout from Bomb Clouds,” Science 122, no. 1367 (September 9, 
1955), 453. 
41 Ibid.   
42 Ibid., 454.  
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routine precautionary measures.43 When the 15-megaton bomb blew a stream of airborne, 
toxic particles beyond the radioactive zone predicted by the scientists, winds could be 
blamed for the failure of the fallout prediction, saving the U.S. government from the 
embarrassment of being held accountable for the actual human error.   
 Shahn, for his part, spent the next eight years of his career grappling with the 
colossal error of this particular nuclear test and exploring the “who, what, and why” of 
the historical event. His drawing and painting series, Saga of the Lucky Dragon, which 
this chapter will address later on, has long been considered by scholars to represent 
Shahn’s body of work on the subject of Bravo.44 Yet his many portraits of Oppenheimer 
have received separate critical treatment, overlooking the important link between Bravo 
and the lead scientist of the IAS. In the spring of 1954, anyone who followed the news 
about the hydrogen-bomb test, as Shahn clearly did, would have noticed that 
Oppenheimer’s scandal was the other major story of the moment. In spite of the 
Commission publically distancing itself from Oppenheimer, he continued to be 
answerable to the government in his role at the Institute in Princeton. Just before he was 
named the director of the IAS, its meteorology group contracted with the navy to develop 
computer technology. Although John von Neumann, the lead mathematician on the 
Meteorology Project, initially questioned Oppenheimer’s support of military 
43 Barton C. Hacker, Elements of Controversy: The Atomic Energy Commission and Radiation Safety in 
Nuclear Weapons Testing, 1947–1974 (Berkeley:  University of California Press, 1994), 139. 
44 For example, Laura Katzman writes, “Shahn's most extensive, and profoundly far-reaching anti-nuclear 
statement, however, was The Saga of the Lucky Dragon.” Katzman, “Art in the Atomic Age,” 151. See also 
Frances K. Pohl, Ben Shahn (Rohnert Park, CA: Pomegranate, 1993), 140–149, and Rompilla, “From 
Hiroshima to the Hydrogen Bomb,” 268–280.  
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collaboration,45 by 1954 Oppenheimer was reporting to the national media on the 
expansion of their joint activities to establish a weather prediction unit in Washington 
D.C. that would employ the Project’s computational methods.46 When the IAS publicized 
Oppenheimer’s statement in early May of that year, the news about nuclear program still 
alternated between the Oppenheimer trial and the fallout poisoning of the fisherman 
aboard the fishing trawler Lucky Dragon. By late May, the AEC panel had reached its 
verdict to suspend Oppenheimer’s security clearance on the grounds that he had 
“exhibited a willful disregard” of his duties.47 Unable to get a clear read on 
Oppenheimer’s loyalty, the commissioners ultimately found him too unstable and 
unpredictable to be trusted, like the erratic winds judged responsible for the aftermath of 
Bravo.   
 To many liberal Americans, who objected to the anti-communist paranoia that put 
Oppenheimer on trial in the first place, he was a martyr.48 Shahn’s portraits of the 
physicist implied a more ambivalent view on the verdict: while the U.S. nuclear program 
may have rendered Oppenheimer one of its casualties of intellectual and psychological 
fallout, he remained in his semi-victimhood of someone whose actions had victimized 
others. In a widely cited quotation at the time, Oppenheimer himself had once admitted to 
harboring ill feelings about his role in nuclear science, even as he carried on with what he 
believed to be essential work: “In some sort of crude sense which no vulgarity, no humor, 
45 Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral, 166.  
46 “Physics Study Up Sharply: Theoretical Work Increase Reported at Princeton,” Sun, May 8, 1954. See 
also “Institute Issues Research Report: Oppenheim [sic] Covers Six Years of Its Work in Princeton on 
Mathematics and History,” New York Times, May 8, 1954.   
47 Polenberg, In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer, 382.   
48 Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 547.  
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no overstatement can quite extinguish, the physicists have known sin, and this is a 
knowledge they cannot lose.”49 In laying bare his fallibility, Oppenheimer also related his 
personal suffering to that of others who shared his experiences—and his oppressive 
knowledge.  
In 1955, the Nation commissioned Shahn to produce another portrait of 
Oppenheimer (fig. 3.7), who appears depersonalized and devoid of any empathetic 
qualities he displayed in the earlier version. The depiction of cool detachment on the face 
of this now-overexposed public figure, whose picture was so frequently reproduced in 
print media during and after the AEC trial that he approached the status of celebrity, 
verges on a caricature rather than a proper portrait of a fellow man. Reinforcing the 
element of the former over the latter, Oppenheimer’s eyes are now filled with atomic 
molecules instead of raw emotion. Under this hypnotic spell, he confidently smirks, no 
longer shrinking from his critics. Waldo Frank, who authored both the articles that Shahn 
illustrated, observed in the first text that “the eyes command” in the figure of 
Oppenheimer, whereas in the second text Frank considered Oppenheimer’s blindness. 
Like the tragic hero Oedipus, the physicist “becomes the principal victim of his own 
character,” which has “blinded and destroyed him.”50 Though gifted with unusual 
insights into the spiritual depths of mankind, he cannot see his own ability to awaken the 
consciences of others. And thus, he has concealed his vulnerabilities behind his scientific 
knowledge, behind the impassive eyes that also divest him of his individual character. 
49 Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding, 85. See also Bird and Sherwin, American 
Prometheus, 388.  
50 Waldo Frank, “Oppenheimer’s ‘Folly’: An Alsop Fable,” Nation (March 5, 1955), 194.  
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Caricature allows Shahn to convey the absence of character by replacing Oppenheimer’s 
most distinguishing facial feature—his piercing eyes—with a cartoonish symbol.  
 If Shahn was unable to grasp Oppenheimer’s role in the events that preceded 
Bravo, given that the press failed to elucidate this link, all his portraits of the physicist 
nonetheless show him bearing some semblance of the suffering experienced by the fallout 
victims of his time. Just as the 1954 and 1955 portraits for the Nation portray 
Oppenheimer as though he is visualizing his own state of being, the eyes do all the work 
to convey emotion on the faces of two Asian fallout victims in Shahn’s later illustration 
(fig. 3.8) for the CBS television program See It Now, hosted by Edward R. Murrow.51  
This particular episode, “Atomic Timetable,” investigated various scientific “conclusions 
on the effects of atomic radiation caused by nuclear explosions today and for future 
generations.”52 In the 1958 advertisement, the men’s sunken eyes with dark, furrowed 
brows closely mimic those of Oppenheimer in the earliest drawing, in which he is more 
of an empathetic figure. Gazing upward, the two figures strain their necks so far that the 
sinewy cords of muscle look as though they might snap. In the 1954 half-length portraits 
of Oppenheimer, appearing equally frail as the fallout victims, his hunched shoulders and 
oversized head entirely obscure his neck, like a turtle retracting into its shell.  
51 Oppenheimer’s interview with Ed Murrow for See It Now, broadcast on January 4, 1955, transformed the 
physicist’s reputation by shifting the focus to his duties as director of the Institute for Advanced Study. See 
Charles Thorpe, Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), 261–62. 
See also Bird and Sherwin, American Prometheus, 557, which provides the following description of 
Oppenheimer’s reply to an interview question: “Asked whether humanity now had the capability to destroy 
itself, Oppenheimer replied, ‘Not quite. Not quite. You can certainly destroy enough humanity so that only 
the greatest act of faith can persuade you that what’s left will be human.”    
52 For a reproduction of Shahn’s drawing for the advertisement, see the Ben Shahn Papers, frame 448, box 
14, AAA. 
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Shahn’s characterizations of Oppenheimer and the two anonymous victims 
constitute a new typology for the Nuclear Age, akin to the science-fiction trope of 
“humanoid” fallout experiments about which Sontag wrote in 1965. The focus of her 
essay was the 1957 film The Incredible Shrinking Man, which tracks the tragic adventure 
of a victim of radioactive poisoning who faces overpowering obstacles as his body 
decreases to the size of an insect. Oppenheimer’s frame, weakened by the political forces 
behind H-bomb testing, resembled that of a “thin, gray, shrunken ghost,” as one journalist 
described him.53 In keeping with the popular perception of the physical toll that the 
security trial had taken on Oppenheimer, the figure of Shahn’s imagination appears 
dramatically enfeebled in comparison to the earlier years captured in the book-jacket 
photograph (see fig. 3.4). These signs of malaise that manifest in both Oppenheimer and 
the film’s radiation victim beg the viewer to search for the root of each fallout problem. 
Around 1957, Shahn scribbled on a piece of stationary, “Science is but one sector of our 
culture,” suggesting that all products of the American scientific community, from the 
experts to their experiments, are bound up in the society’s behavioral and belief systems. 
In the same handwritten note, he made a list with two columns—one for positive cultural 
influences, one for negative—and categorized “nuclear energy” as the negative 
counterpart of penicillin.54 The kind of nuclear energy given off from a bomb was 
America’s culturally specific problem, yet one with global repercussions, and Shahn’s 
fallout victims (among whom he included Oppenheimer), evidenced the human costs. At 
53 Thorpe, Oppenheimer: The Tragic Intellect, 243.  
54 Miscellaneous note, undated, Shahn Papers, frame 10, folder 15, box 27, AAA (underline in the original).  
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once one of “us” and one of “them,” Oppenheimer signifies the new condition of 
humanity with which all people could now identify.   
 That Shahn wrote his note about science and nuclear energy on a piece of Harvard 
stationary, while he was there as Charles Eliot Norton Professor of Poetry in 1956 and 
1957, reveals his sustained engagement with these subjects after he drew his portraits of 
Oppenheimer.55 The short period of time that Shahn spent at Harvard nonetheless marked 
a discernable shift in his pictorial story of nuclear tragedy: as he continued to depict 
scientists, their identities became less connected to Oppenheimer’s personal trauma. Yet, 
as Oppenheimer himself turned to thinking more about the scientist’s place in the culture, 
Shahn continued to echo those broad concepts. At Harvard, it was the anonymous gift of 
a scientist that prompted Shahn to execute a work on the subject of this archetype. 
According to Kenneth Prescott, Shahn’s biographer, “He found one day that someone had 
left a lute lying in his studio beside a ‘marvelous model of a molecule’ lent to him by a 
scientist.”56 Intrigued by what Shahn called the “accidental juxtaposition”57—the 
intellectual kind of accident that he and Oppenheimer had individually encouraged in 
their writings about the importance of cross-disciplinary exchange—he imagined several 
scenes featuring one or both of those inanimate objects. The earliest of the works, made 
55 In the early postwar period, Harvard president James Conant played a key role in justifying the U.S. 
government’s use of the atomic bomb, putting the University itself at the center of the debate.  See Paul 
Boyer, “Exotic Resonances: Hiroshima in American Memory,” Diplomatic History 19, no. 2 (Spring 1995), 
299. See also James G. Hershberg, James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear 
Age (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993).  
56 Kenneth W. Prescott, The Complete Graphic Works of Ben Shahn (New York: Quadrangle Press, 1973), 
26. 
57 Shahn’s concept of the “accidental juxtaposition” calls to mind the “chance meeting on a dissecting table 
of a sewing-machine and an umbrella,” a famous line from the writings of the Comte de Lautréamont so 
admired by Andre Breton and the surrealists. For a brief discussion of the surrealists’ interest in 
Lautrémont’s phrase, see Aaron Cheak, Alchemic Traditions: From Antiquity to the Avant-Garde 
(Melbourne, Australia: Numen Books, 2013), 534.   
 
 
                                                 
183 
in 1957, is simply entitled Scientist (fig. 3.9). This screenprint depicts a half-length 
portrait of a thin, bald man, entangled in a network of lines and small colored orbs that 
project from the atomic model, resting on the table, to his bowed head; from his head to 
his folded hands; from his hands to the sheet of paper, on which his downturned eyes 
seem to be cast (though the irises of his eyes are also blank); and in all other possible 
combinations of these points. The densest web of lines and orbs converge around the 
scientist’s head, which connects to an impossibly contorted neck, its muscles stretched to 
their maximum length to reach his hunched shoulders. The paper is blank, just as in the 
book that Oppenheimer holds in his 1954 portrait.   
 Here, the obvious parallels to the Oppenheimer series point to the possibility that 
he still dominated Shahn’s concept of the quintessential nuclear scientist; yet, the original 
1954 magazine article, the catalyst for Shahn to take Oppenheimer as his subject, 
remained an influential touchstone. On the last page of this essay, “An American 
Tragedy,” where Frank’s visual description of the scientist appears, a political cartoon 
(fig. 3.10) dominates the bottom-right corner. In the cartoon, the figure of Oppenheimer 
and his attributes bear significant comparison to unidentified man in Shahn’s Scientist. 
The cartoon itself occupies more than double the space of Shahn’s portrait of 
Oppenheimer on the second page, and it is one of two cartoons in the article that the 
Nation commissioned from the Washington Post’s Pulitzer Prize-winning editorial 
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cartoonist Herbert Block, known as “Herblock.”58 In fact, Herblock had won the Prize 
that year—1954—for the second time in his career.  
 Given Herblock’s illustrious reputation, Shahn no doubt knew his satirical 
cartoons, which revealed an uncompromising political conscience. But, as the example of 
the Nation story on Oppenheimer makes clear, the two artists might have also viewed 
each other as competitors. Both relied on print journalism, particularly liberal magazines, 
like the Nation and the New Republic, to supplement their incomes from other kinds of 
creative activity. Although they generally focused on different genres—Shahn on the fine 
arts, and Herblock on cartoons—they were considered two of the great liberal satirists of 
their time. Shahn’s style of satire, in which the goal was to make a moral judgment,59 
often blended fantastical animals with humans as a way of critiquing the inhumanity of 
the public figure. For this human aspect of the satirical depiction, Shahn typically also 
relied on caricature, in its emphasis on exaggerated features of the face. Herblock’s 
characteristic satire remained attached to well-trodden cartoon symbols, such as the 
Republican elephant and the Democrat donkey (both inventions of the nineteenth-century 
American cartoonist Thomas Nast), which he pictured as distinct from the individual 
public figures who often served as his cartoonish characters, frequently labeled in the 
drawing to make the humor of his political barb as obvious as possible.  
In the 1950s, each artist took turns at caricaturing the anti-communist witch-
hunter Senator Joseph McCarthy; in March 1950, Herblock was the first to portray the 
58 For information on Herblock’s career, see Stephen E. Kercher, Revel with a Cause: Liberal Satire in 
Postwar America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010).  
59 See Constance C. McPhee, Infinite Jest: Caricature and Satire from Leonardo to Levine exh. cat. (New 
York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2011), 3. 
 
 
                                                 
185 
politician and credited for coining the term “McCarthyism” in the cartoon’s caption (fig. 
3.11).60 Shahn was still able to outdo Herblock in terms of the extent to which 
McCarthy’s physical appearance was absurdly disfigured and mutated in his caricature 
“Edward R. Murrow Slaying the Dragon of Joseph McCarthy” (fig. 3.12).61 The 
Washington Post published Herblock’s caricature of McCarthy numerous times, whereas 
Shahn’s was meant only as a private gift,  perhaps accounting for the relative tameness of 
Herblock’s “sinister, sleazy huckster with an unshaven face,” as scholar Stephen Kercher 
aptly described the character type. 62 This difference between their intended viewers also 
reveals a general distinction in their portraiture: Shahn produced a blend of both 
psychological portraits and caricatures, which holds true of portraits as individualized as 
those of Oppenheimer or as generic as Scientist. On nuclear politics, too, Shahn and 
Herblock were closely aligned. Crusading on behalf of the antinuclear cause, both 
invented his own anthropomorphic emblem of the Bomb, though Herblock established 
“Mr. Atom” just over a decade earlier than the cloud-beast that Shahn first depicted in the 
Saga of the Lucky Dragon series in 1957. 
 Apart from the fact that the work of Shahn and Herblock would be united in an 
article about Oppenheimer, the significance of these anecdotal connections—politics, 
McCarthy, nuclear weapons—is that they call attention to the biting commentary of 
Shahn’s Scientist, perhaps inspired by Herblock’s large cartoon. Herblock, rather than 
60 Kercher, Revel with a Cause, 41–2. 
61 According to art historian Frances Pohl, Shahn personally knew Murrow and was inspired by a program 
that Murrow had recently aired on McCarthy. Shahn personally sent this cartoon to Murrow. See Frances 
K. Pohl, “The Artist and the Politicians: Ben Shahn, 1947– 1954,” (Ph.D. diss., University of California-
Los Angeles, 1985), 329–30, fn. 392.   
62 Kercher, Revel with a Cause, 41.   
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picturing Oppenheimer as an isolated figure, re-contextualizes him in a position of 
alienation from his contemporaries. A large wall divides the physicist from President 
Dwight Eisenhower and the AEC Chairman Lewis Strauss, both of whom turn to a panic-
stricken Uncle Sam for solutions to the crisis they had perpetuated. In 1953, Eisenhower 
ordered Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. to place a “blank wall” between 
Oppenheimer and nuclear secrets, fueling the case that Strauss was building against 
Oppenheimer. The caption asks, “Who’s Being Walled Off from What?” And the answer 
is clearly that the U.S. government has made an irreparable mistake by denying itself 
access to Oppenheimer’s wealth of knowledge. Balancing an atomic orb in the palm of 
his hand, Oppenheimer assumes a look of defeat and a stooped pose similar to Auguste 
Rodin’s famous sculpture The Thinker.  
Shahn’s Scientist repeats this contemplative mood and, more significantly, the 
object of contemplation. In the political cartoon, the model molecule is rendered 
meaningless—or, rather, as a symbol of untapped knowledge, it has rendered the scientist 
meaningless. The kind of laboratory-based nuclear science that Oppenheimer directed at 
Los Alamos during World War II played no part in his present role as theorist at the 
Institute for Advanced Study, the only role he could claim after the security trial. If the 
atomic model could have once been treated as a gift, representing the power to uncover 
and know nuclear secrets, it is now a useless toy. In Shahn’s Scientist, the atomic model 
merely holds down the blank page like a paperweight. This allusion to a tabula rasa, 
much like the wordless book in Shahn’s first portrait of Oppenheimer, could be read here 
as an analogy to the “blank wall” of the cartoon. As such, the blankness of the paper is a 
 
 
187 
political statement. Taken together with the empty symbol of the molecule, they perform 
a critical function of parody: the ironic use of another cultural reference—in this case, the 
blank wall—against which the new work is understood as moral commentary.63  There 
also is irony in the contradiction between the expectation of new opportunities commonly 
associated with a clean slate, and the actual lack of opportunity available to scientists 
who wished to conduct laboratory experiments at the Institute for Advanced Study, 
nicknamed the “intellectual hotel.”64  
What would explain Shahn’s use of an editorial technique to comment on the 
condition of scientists in that particular historical moment, while he was teaching at 
Harvard?  Based on the speculation that he had Herblock’s incisive drawing in mind, 
what would account for Shahn’s choice to call attention back to Oppenheimer and make 
him represent an entire community of people, from whom he had effectively been 
excommunicated? Shahn continued to conceive of the scientific world through the eyes 
of Oppenheimer, even if he was not mentioned by name. Just as the chance encounter 
between objects inspired Shahn to envision the image of the Scientist during his time at 
Harvard, so too did the confluence of the lives of Oppenheimer and Shahn. During a 
period in which both men sought to elevate their profiles in the academic world, they held 
transitory affiliations with the same universities. While Shahn was serving as the Charles 
63 Linda Hutcheon provides a helpful discussion of parody in twentieth-century art. Regarding the function 
of irony in the parodic device of intertextuality, she writes, “Parody, then, in its ironic ‘trans-
contextualization’ and inversion, is repetition with difference.” This definition works particularly well with 
Shahn’s repetition of a blank surface (the paper) to point to the context in which that blankness first 
appeared in a slightly different form (the wall). See Linda Hutcheon, A Theory of Parody: The Teachings of 
Twentieth-Century Art Forms (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 32.  
64 Among the many historians who have cited this phrase Ray Monk provides a succinct summary of the 
interview in which Oppenheimer also revealed that he saw the IAS as a “place for transient thinkers to 
rest.” Ray Monk, Robert Oppenheimer: A Life Inside the Center (New York: Random House, 2013), 
unpaginated e-book.  
 
 
                                                 
188 
Eliot Norton Professor at Harvard in the academic year 1956 through 1957, Oppenheimer 
accepted an invitation from the university to give the prestigious William James Lectures. 
Before and after their short stays in Cambridge, they lived in the outlying area around 
Princeton University. Oppenheimer and his family were provided a home on the 
Institute’s grounds, outside the Princeton campus; Shahn, an acquaintance of IAS faculty 
member Albert Einstein and a frequent invitee for speaking and political engagements at 
Princeton University,65 resided with his wife, Bernarda, in nearby Roosevelt (formerly 
Jersey Homesteads, but later renamed in honor of President Franklin D. Roosevelt), New 
Jersey.  
At Harvard, it was another Roosevelt—Colonel Archibald B. Roosevelt, son of 
Theodore Roosevelt—who made Shahn and the entire campus aware, in the months 
leading up to Oppenheimer’s arrival, that the “highly questionable” scientist would be an 
unwelcome guest.66 In protest of his appointment, Roosevelt organized a group of fellow 
Harvard alumni to demand that the university rescind its invitation. Soon the intercession 
of Harvard’s more powerful leaders, President Nathan Pusey and Dean McGeorge 
Bundy, both of whom Shahn had come to know,67 would nearly bring the artist and 
Oppenheimer into contact. Despite the protestors’ efforts, including a petition circulated 
to 10,000 people, Oppenheimer delivered the first of eight lectures to a packed 
65 The IAS archives contain a drawing of Einstein by Shahn, providing concrete evidence that the two men 
were acquainted. See Institute for Advanced Study Digital Archive, http://cdm.itg.ias.edu (accessed 
December 8, 2013).  
66 “Harvard Men Seek Oppenheimer Ban,” New York Times, March 25, 1957.  
67  For examples of their correspondence during Shahn’s Harvard tenure, see letter from Nathan Pusey to 
Shahn regarding theme of his lectures, February 26, 1957, Shahn Papers, frame 39, folder 14, box 13, 
AAA; letter from McBundy George to Shahn, April 27, 1956, frame 12, folder 14, box 13; May 15, 1957, 
frame 59, folder 14, box 13.  
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auditorium on April 8, 1957.68 An overflow crowd of 800 listened to Oppenheimer’s talk 
through a public-address system in the New Lecture Hall, where Shahn would give a 
lecture on non-conformity to a “near-capacity audience” the following evening.69  
For the titles of their series—The Hope of Order and The Shape of Content, 
respectively—they used similar poetic turns of phrase, in the high-minded language of 
liberal intellectualism. Their talks might have superficially appeared unrelated, however, 
since each focused on the perspective of his own area of expertise. Oppenheimer clearly 
was most concerned with encouraging a better situation for the scientist in society to 
improve scientific understanding for all, whereas Shahn saw the artist as occupying a 
“unique position” to explore knowledge through “emotional involvement” with the 
subjects he studies. “Therein he differs from the scientist, who may observe passionately, 
collate, draw conclusions, and still remain uninvolved,” Shahn opined.70 Still, if there 
was any exception to the stereotype of the disinterested scientist, Oppenheimer fit the 
description; in the public transcript of his trial, he was even quoted characterizing himself 
as “emotionally involved” early in his career.  
That evening in April 1957, it was as though Shahn were engaging in an ongoing 
dialogue with Oppenheimer. A comparison between the two lectures reveals considerable 
parallels. In the opening line of his talk, Shahn observed, “The artist is likely to be looked 
upon with some uneasiness by the more conservative members of society. He seems a 
68 “First Oppenheimer Harvard Lecture Packs ‘Em in Despite Early Protest,” Daily Boston Globe, April 9, 
1957. See also Silvan S. Schweber, Einstein and Oppenheimer: The Meaning of Genius (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 2009), esp. 223–38.  
69 “Shahn Continues Lecture Series, Attacks Present Conformity in Art,” Harvard Crimson, April 10, 1957.  
70 Shahn, Shape of Content, 81.  
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little unpredictable.”71 Although Shahn was ostensibly referring to himself and others in 
the field of art, Oppenheimer would have immediately come to mind as the most 
notorious example of someone whom the conservative officials had deemed too 
behaviorally unstable to be trusted. Shahn found unpredictability to be a favorable sign of 
resistance to conformity, a common trait among those who have allowed their “visions of 
the future” to guide them toward “some intelligent opinion,” regardless of the obstacles 
put before them by people in power.72  
This nonconformist approach also comported with Oppenheimer’s belief that 
“there is no hieratic sorting out of different parts of knowledge, saying that some are 
unimportant or derivative,” but instead there are individuals who discern for themselves, 
without being made to follow constrictive directives, what avenues of thought hold the 
most potential.73 Rather than elaborating on Oppenheimer’s ideal, Shahn was more 
interested in addressing the actual state of intellectual life, where he felt a ruling of order 
over knowledge did indeed exist. In art, as in politics, academics, and journalism—“and 
in science, least of all,” Shahn lamented—the prescribed formulas and courses of action 
left little room in which a nonconformist could freely acquire knowledge.74 These 
conditions must change, he concluded, for “without the person of outspoken opinion . . . 
any society of whatever degree of perfection must fall into decay. Its habits (let us say its 
virtues) will inevitably become entrenched and tyrannical; its controls will become 
71 Draft of lecture (two copies), Shahn Papers, frames 1–26, folder 56, box 27, AAA. 
72 Shahn, Shape of Content, 79.  
73 Schweber, Einstein and Oppenheimer, 231.  
74 Shahn, Shape of Content, 84.  
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inaccessible to the ordinary citizen.”75 It was this emphasis on the “ordinary citizen”—
the real victim of a “tyrannical” system of government—that precisely echoed the crux of 
Oppenheimer’s argument of the previous night:  
We have permission, or it might be called a mandate, to know as much as 
possible. Knowledge is not the property of a small class of people . . . It is hard to 
imagine anything but the harshest tyranny will turn back the flood of knowledge 
and its availability.76 
 
With the eyes of the most powerful intellectual community in America on him, 
Oppenheimer presented a strong case for humanism and social responsibility to uphold 
the centrality of knowledge within the culture. If Oppenheimer had given his speech on a 
campaign trail, Shahn would have provided the partisan “closer” to rally the crowd 
behind their candidate, who remained controversial on a broad scale yet popular among 
liberal intellectuals.   
This humanistic view on knowledge significantly informed the work that Shahn 
made on the subject of atomic science around this time. For Oppenheimer, Shahn’s most 
salient point of reference to the scientific world, no kind of information was of greater 
consequence to the well-being and survival of cultures than the latest scientific findings 
on nuclear weapons.77 Where Shahn’s earlier portraits of Oppenheimer portray a scientist 
stripped of the privilege even to be privy to this knowledge, the Scientist depicts an 
75 Ibid.  
76 “First Oppenheimer Harvard Lecture Packs ‘Em in Despite Early Protest,” Daily Boston Globe, April 9, 
1957. 
77 According to a colleague of Oppenheimer at the IAS, Oppenheimer advocated tactical military use of 
atomic weapons because he was afraid of what hydrogen bombs might do to obliterate and poison entire 
populations. For thoughtful speculation on Oppenheimer’s IAS years, see Freeman Dyson, “Oppenheimer: 
The Shape of Genius,” review of Robert Oppenheimer: A Life in the Center, by Ray Monk, New York 
Review of Books, August 15, 2013.  
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anonymous figure whose mind is held captive by the knowledge he possesses, which 
society prevents him from recording on the empty page before him.  
To be prohibited from sharing knowledge was a poison to his social conscience. 
Oppenheimer had always felt this heavy burden, but now this feeling among scientists 
was becoming universal, as more of them were being brought into the fold of atomic 
secrecy. Although Oppenheimer was no longer in a position to speak as an expert about 
the U.S. government’s nuclear policy, it was the subtext of his first lecture at Harvard. It 
directly mined ideas from his well-known text “Atomic Weapons and American Policy,” 
published in 1953, when he was still the chairman of the advisory council to the Atomic 
Energy Commission. “We do not operate well when the important facts, the essential 
conditions, which limit and determine our choices, are unknown,” Oppenheimer warned, 
adding, “We do not operate well when they are known, in secrecy and in fear, only to a 
few men.”78 Such secrecy was toxic, not just to him personally, but to all people who 
were prevented from “knowledge of the characteristics and probable effects of our atomic 
weapons,” to use Oppenheimer’s euphemism for radioactive fallout.79 In citing the 
example of the fallout victims of Hiroshima, he employed stronger language to describe 
them as “casualties,” in contrast to those actually “killed” by the explosion. By the time 
he spoke in Cambridge twelve years after the Hiroshima bombing, the potential for many 
thousands of fallout casualties—those who would suffer internally from a chronic and 
terminal build-up of radioactive particles or burned skin from external radioactivity—was 
78 Oppenheimer, “Atomic Weapons and American Policy,” 530.  
79 Ibid., 532.  
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of more imminent concern than deaths, since there was no end in sight to the testing of 
increasingly powerful nuclear weapons.  
 
The Drawings of the Lucky Dragon Series  
The fallout casualties of the Bravo test of 1954 were the topic of the nuclear 
physicist Ralph Lapp’s major three-part article in Harper’s magazine in 1957, for which 
Shahn was commissioned to create several illustrations shortly after his position at 
Harvard had ended.80 The radiation sickness that befell the Japanese fishermen aboard 
their boat, Lucky Dragon, in the aftermath of Bravo exposed a glaring gap in scientific 
knowledge. The group who designed the thermonuclear bomb at Los Alamos had come 
to realize the error in their calculations regarding the explosive yield, but there was still 
no explanation for the inaccurate fallout prediction beyond what was said about the 
insufficient grasp of scientists to understand the effects of wind on megaton explosions. 
The New York Times article “Getting the Facts on Fallout” offered insights into the state 
of nuclear research as of 1957, except for the one piece of information that would affect 
the health of nearly everybody: 
Weapons with a megaton—or a million tons of force—drive much of the 
[radioactive] material into the stratosphere, where it can remain for years, 
gradually falling down over the surface of the world. It is the world-wide fallout 
that is the source of most international concern. It is also this fall-out about which 
scientists know the least.81  
 
80 Letter from Harper’s to Shahn regarding Lucky Dragon story, September 23, 1957, Shahn Papers, frame 
1, folder 11, box 13, AAA.  
81 John W. Finney, “Fall-Out Hearing Will Open Today,” New York Times, May 27, 1957.  
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As grim an outlook on fallout forecasts as this article reported, it still failed to mention 
the lack of understanding about regional fallout patterns, an oversight that endangered 
local populations and travelers in the surrounding areas of the Pacific proving grounds. In 
the case of nuclear testing, the notion of state intelligence was a fallacy. Without full 
comprehension about atmospheric conditions such as the wind, scientists had great 
difficulty determining if people would be “downwind”—the term for the path or area 
where fallout might move—since downwind could mean a location in any direction, 
within an indeterminably large radius of ground zero. 
 If the folly of prediction was a problem for scientists, it also constituted a crisis 
for humanists like Shahn. The U.S. military’s nuclear-testing task forces proved that they 
went ahead with their plans no matter what the possible human costs. The people were 
incidental to the experiments. This disregard for humanity was at its worst when the U.S. 
conducted the Bravo test in spite of the uncertain weather forecast, and this reckless 
attempt to control the uncontrollable, and in turn to exert power over the powerless, was 
the injustice that Shahn conveys in his series of drawings for Harper’s.  
Under the article’s title “The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” Shahn’s drawings 
underscore the accidental harmonies and ruptures of human existence— what Shahn 
called the “nonmeasurable and extremely random human element” in one of his Harvard 
lectures—by portraying moments that transcend measurable experience.82 Shahn depicts 
the lives of the Japanese fishermen in the days preceding and following that fateful event 
on March 1, 1954, when they inadvertently drifted downwind from the Bravo test. The 
82 Shahn, Shape of Content, 6.   
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scenes follow a linear narrative that begins aboard the boat on which the men had spent 
two full months trawling for tuna near the Midway and Marshall Islands in the South 
Pacific. The first illustration (fig. 13.13) pictures only the fishermen’s hands, clustered 
together, each pinching between two fingers a fishing line that leads to a collective net, 
resembling a distant kite in the sky. “The Japanese ‘long lines’ fishermen practice a real 
art,”83 the corresponding sentence reads, immediately signaling an innate connection 
between these men and the artist. This momentary syncopation, which Shahn celebrates, 
occurs unexpectedly in the text, after it tells about the past several days of turmoil, 
arguments, and disunity among the fishermen. Their sudden display of cooperation 
represents exactly the kind of “random human element we commonly associate only with 
poetry or art,” but could be found in everyday experiences. The Japanese fisherman 
initially shared only a livelihood, but an unforeseen incident would later deeply entrench 
their bond.  
From the first illustration, Shahn’s emphasis on unpredictability mimicked the 
recurring theme of variable weather throughout the article. Lapp described how the forces 
of nature dictated all of the fishermen’s decision-making. Unlike the U.S. nuclear-testing 
task forces, who perpetuated the myth of “weather control” and thus the illusion of 
certainty about all things weather-related,84 the fishermen accepted that they were at the 
mercy of the winds and the storms that blew through the open seas without warning. In 
the early days of their voyage, heading to the Midway Islands, they took advantage of a 
83 Ralph E. Lapp, “The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part I] Harper’s (December 1957), 28.  
84 Von Neumann specifically used the term “weather control” to describe what he hoped to achieve in 
leading the Meteorology Project at the IAS. See Dyson, Turing’s Cathedral, 162.   
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“spanking west wind” to speed steadily to their first destination.85 En route to the 
Marshall Islands, where they hoped to yield a better catch of tuna, heavy winds and rains 
forced the men to miss an important day of fishing. The next day they responded with 
“somewhat unorthodox techniques in order to make up for lost time–disregarding wind 
direction while hauling the line,” Lapp observed.86 Two storms had also delayed the 
fishermen’s progress, leading the captain to decide that March 1, 1954, would mark their 
“fourteenth and last try” to bring in a good catch before returning to Japan. That morning 
the unusually calm weather began to show faint signs of change—clouds had rolled in 
and the wind had strengthened slightly—but none of the men expected to awake to the 
sight of a blazing fireball on the horizon. Though it had occurred to them earlier that their 
boat would be near the U.S. nuclear proving grounds, no tests had taken place there since 
1946. Three hours after the fishermen witnessed the blast, winds carried in a light rain of 
white ash, which the men did not immediately understand to be radioactive fallout. They 
let this mysterious rain fall onto their bodies, and some, “wondering if it was salt,” tasted 
the flakes.87 While the Japanese fishermen may have been ignorant of the knowledge that 
would have kept them safer in this hazardous situation, Lapp clearly felt that the more 
problematic ignorance was that of the U.S. military in overestimating their ability to 
control the fallout.  
The second illustration that Shahn included in the Lucky Dragon series depicts a 
mushroom-shaped cloud (fig. 3.14)—one that does not conform to Lapp’s description of 
85 Lapp, “Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part I] 28.  
86 Ibid., 29. 
87 Ibid., 32. 
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the “ball of flame” but, rather, appears related to the numerous references in the text to 
the wind. Slender streaks of swirling, parallel lines give volume to the cloud, breaking 
from its dense center in all directions. The changing wind, which in Lapp’s portrayal had 
played as much a part in shaping the fate of the Lucky Dragon crew as the fishermen 
themselves, is here again treated as another character in the story. Reinforcing the volatile 
quality of the cloud, a maniacally grinning beast materializes among the blowing wisps of 
vapor and dust. In its uncontrolled movements, its arms and legs flailing in a wild dance, 
the beast behaves erratically, just as the weather did that day of the test. An allegory for 
unpredictability, the cloud-beast is a stand-in for all the mysterious meteorological 
phenomena born of the hydrogen bomb, as told by Lapp, from the sudden appearance of 
a “high fog” (the fallout cloud) to the “white sands . . . falling from the heavens” (the 
radioactive ash).88 More of a playful jester than a ferocious monster, it serves not to 
intimidate or cause fear but to mock the American readers, flaunting itself in the face of 
their claims to scientific intelligence. The U.S. had failed to understand and learn from 
past disasters that fallout from nuclear explosions, like the untethered beast, can neither 
be contained nor its path predicted. 
  Noticeably absent from the remaining eleven illustrations for Harper’s were any 
allusions to the survivors of Hiroshima or Nagasaki who had also suffered from radiation 
sickness, in spite of the article mentioning them several times. At first, Shahn had thought 
they were important to his pictorial version of the story; in his notes, presumably taken 
while he read a draft of the article sent to him by the magazine’s editors, he jotted down 
88 Ibid.  
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the words Hiroshima and Nagasaki, along with other themes drawn from the article: 
“Japan [underlined], hospitals, fishing, towns, villages, science, fish markets, A.E.C. 
individuals, newspaper, women, children, celebrations, red and black carp, bomb tests, 
Geiger counter, funeral, white pigeons, daughter carrying photo, and urn with ashes.”89 
All of these became the subjects of his drawings in this series or in the related paintings 
he made later, except for the sites or people associated with the first atomic bombings. It 
seems that he came to reject the correlation between those precedents and the Bravo test, 
which had been carried out with a new type of bomb. As the article discussed, scientists 
turned to the findings from Hiroshima and Nagasaki for clues, but the differences 
between the victims’ health conditions were too significant to help those fishermen who 
had ingested fallout matter. After returning home, they outwardly appeared unaffected, 
but radioactivity gradually was harming them from within.90   
In 1955, just two years before Shahn began the Lucky Dragon series, twenty-five 
badly burned survivors of the Hiroshima bombing—called hibakusha in Japan—visited 
the U.S. for reconstructive plastic surgery and thus reawakened Americans to the horrors 
of nuclear weapons. Of all the publicity generated by their eighteenth-month stay, the 
89 Letter from Harper’s to Shahn regarding Lucky Dragon story, reverse side, Shahn Papers, frame 53, 
folder 11, box 13, AAA. 
90 A total of twenty-three crew members suffered from radiation sickness, only one of whom eventually 
died as a direct result of the poisoning. Eager to study the radiation effects, the U.S. authorities immediately 
offered the services of their American doctors at the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC) in 
Hiroshima to treat the crew members upon their return from the sea voyage. The Japanese scientists who 
oversaw the care of the men at a hospital in Tokyo refused the ABCC’s offer, viewing it as an opportunistic 
attempt to study human “guinea pigs,” as the Japanese press often characterized the American attitude 
towards the victims. Some historical accounts of the Lucky Dragon incident in the context of other events 
and topical issues include: Robert A. Divine, Blowing in the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–
1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), and Richard G. Hewlett and Jack M. Holl, Atoms for 
Peace and War, 1953–1961: Eisenhower and the Atomic Energy Commission (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1989).   
 
 
                                                 
199 
appearance of two “Hiroshima Maidens” on the popular television show This Is Your Life 
created the greatest media sensation, though it was an “appearance” in only the loosest 
sense of the word. “To avoid causing them any embarrassment,” the host Ralph Edwards 
explained, “we will not show you their faces.” Instead, the camera showed the women’s 
faces in shadowy silhouette, hidden behind a translucent screen. Ostensibly, this 
concealment was intended to show respect for the different standards of propriety in 
Japanese culture, yet the awkwardness of the moment, as presented on television, only 
heightened Americans’ perception that such foreign customs were strange. According to 
scholar David Serlin, while the Maidens were visiting America, they “often suffered as 
much from the social stigmas attached to ethnic or national difference as they did from 
their radiation burns.”91 To obscure their keloid-scarred faces and bodies was not just to 
reinforce the shame of those victims, but also inadvertently to expose similar feelings in 
Americans, deemed ill-prepared to see the intense physical and psychological damage 
that their atomic bombs had caused. Historian Paul Boyer has argued that no symbolism 
in relation to Hiroshima ever fully took hold in the American consciousness. “In the 
realm of cultural images,” Boyer writes, “‘Hiroshima’ has functioned as a kind of empty 
vessel that replicated the literal void created in August 1945.”92 Americans tended to fill 
that “empty vessel” with whatever cultural meaning suited their current needs—for 
example, the coincident resurgence of the nuclear test-ban campaign in the mid-1950s—
but these meanings were continually tainted by the pervasive belief that the U.S. was 
91 David Serlin has published two insightful writings on the hibakusha. See David Serlin, “The Clean 
Room: Domesticating the Hiroshima Maidens,” Cabinet, 11 (2003) 7–13, and Replaceable You: 
Engineering the Body in Postwar America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), esp. Chapter 2.    
92 Boyer, “Exotic Resonances,” 316.  
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justified in using atomic weapons to end World War II. By the time Harper’s asked 
Shahn to contribute to its article in 1957, the fading focus on the Maidens, coupled with 
the development of newer nuclear weapons to replace the kind used in the Japan 
bombings, made clear that references to Hiroshima had lost their cultural poignancy.  
For Shahn, the moment was right to replace the image of the disfigured survivor 
with one of an ordinary person who could conceivably stand for the “whole world as a 
radiation casualty,”93 to reiterate Susan Sontag’s startling characterization of the 
ubiquitous health crisis engendered by hydrogen bombs. Shahn, in keeping with Lapp, 
singled out a fisherman named Kuboyama (fig. 3.15), a leader among his comrades and 
the only one of them to die soon after their exposure to radioactive fallout aboard the 
Lucky Dragon. In Shahn’s depiction, Kuboyama is devoid of a full head of hair, which 
has fallen out in clumps, and stripped of clothing on the top half of his body, apparently 
to receive an examination in the hospital. Although the portrait did not appear until the 
second installment of the article, Lapp had established from the beginning and repeatedly 
made reference to what kind of man Kuboyama had been before the incident. His habits 
and mannerisms likely had a familiar ring to an American audience: he worked hard to 
support his wife and children, occasionally indulged in heavy drinking (of saki), hoped to 
find a profession that would allow him to spend more time with his family, and possessed 
keen instincts. It was Kuboyama who had warned the captain to stay away from Bikini, 
remembering that the U.S. had used it as a proving ground years earlier. He also quickly 
discerned, well before anyone else, a difference between the atomic explosion that the 
93 Sontag, “The Imagination of Disaster,” in Against Interpretation, 218.  
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fishermen had witnessed and the Hiroshima bombing, which had not produced any ashes. 
The irony that he was more conscious of what was happening than anyone else aboard 
the ship, yet that he would come to be called “the world’s first hydrogen bomb victim,”94 
was not lost on Lapp. Nor did Shahn limit the figure of Kuboyama to only those 
characteristics that marked him as ordinary; rather, captured in a moment of pensive self-
reflection, when he seems to realize that he is fated to die, Shahn’s Kuboyama is a man of 
extraordinary awareness.     
Without those things that would typically serve as markers of his ethnic identity, 
Kuboyama bears little difference in physical appearance from other middle-aged men. 
Only his slumped shoulders and downcast gaze signal the presence of some unseen 
abnormality. He exposes the underside of his right arm and rests it on his knee in 
preparation to receive a blood transfusion, the treatment administered to those fishermen 
who were hospitalized for radiation poisoning. Japanese doctors had identified strontium-
90 in the ashes, a radioactive substance absorbed by calcium in bone marrow, where it 
accumulates and emits radiation upon the surrounding blood cells. Though the lethal 
effects of strontium-90 were well known to the Japanese doctors, as well as the American 
scientists who came to Japan to conduct first-hand analyses of the patients’ conditions, 
neither set of experts could offer a solution to prevent the internal spread of radiation 
beyond giving antibiotics to supplement the transfusions. No one knew what to do with 
Kuboyama, the worst of all the cases, who was proving untreatable in his body’s rejection 
of the treatments that had previously worked on the atomic-bomb victims of Hiroshima 
94 “Rites for H-Bomb Victim Held,” New York Times, October 10, 1954.  
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and Nagasaki. It was as though the mysterious bomb, which remained the Americans’ 
secret, had given rise to a mutant form of human being. 
Like the Nuclear Age type that Shahn had imagined in his earlier “humanoid” 
drawings of Oppenheimer and the anonymous fallout victims in the advertisement for 
Edward Murrow’s show See It Now, Shahn’s portrait of the Japanese fisherman marks his 
continued search for a universal figure to represent the new mutated condition. In an 
artist’s statement for Shahn’s solo exhibition at the Downtown Gallery in late 1961, when 
he exhibited his drawings related to the Harper’s article with a new set of paintings based 
on those drawings, Shahn was explicit about his intention to make the story of the Lucky 
Dragon relatable to all and thus comprehensible as a global crisis. He reflected on what 
had changed and remained the same since he began the series in 1957:  
With the sense of tragedy still insistent and undiminished I also felt more strongly 
the need for universality. . . I have, during the past year, been mainly absorbed in 
seeking to formulate the possible coming cataclysm. If tragedy is universal, this 
imminent tragedy is simply total. In this most recent group of pictures I find that I 
have returned to the very early device of focusing upon the particular in order to 
illuminate the universal; but at the same time I have drawn strongly upon an 
almost archetypal symbol, fusing the two to express something that I feel with 
overwhelming oppressiveness.95 
 
There were precedents for this trajectory towards universality in his body of work, the 
most relevant of which was the metamorphosis that Oppenheimer underwent in Shahn’s 
hands. The first portrait, in which the celebrity physicist’s diminished stature alludes to 
his diminished status, evoked the particular circumstances of Oppenheimer, whereas he 
was simply invoked as a metaphor for the folly of expertise in the symbolic portrait 
95 Shahn, artist’s statement on “Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” Downtown Gallery Papers, Box 26, Reel 
5553, frames 1031 and 1032, AAA. 
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Scientist. Employing a similar strategy on Kuboyama, Shahn diminished the figure’s 
difference in order to emphasize his similarity to a broader range of people, meant to 
imagine themselves as being in his situation of living a healthy life one day and facing 
death the next.  
Shahn’s belief that the “tragedy is total,” meaning that everybody had an equal 
stake in the consequences of fallout, sharply contrasted with a prominent view in the 
conservative press. “We Were Trapped by Radioactive Fallout,” read the headline of an 
article published in the Saturday Evening Post in 1957—the same year in which Lapp 
and Shahn’s article appeared in Harper’s—referring to the nine American scientists 
stationed twenty miles from ground zero of the Bravo test. Narrated by Dr. John C. Clark, 
the news story told of the harrowing situation that Clark and his team confronted when 
the extreme radiation forced them to barricade inside a sand-covered blockhouse for 
several hours. Dr. Clark, the so-called “Man under the Mushroom Cloud,” embodied the 
image of the brave military hero that the magazine seemingly wanted to put forth as a foil 
to the foreign fallout victim, Kuboyama. With a photograph and a one-sentence 
summary, the Post did acknowledge the plight of the twenty-three Japanese fishermen, 
but failed to mention their severe illnesses and Kuboyama’s death—or even his name.96 
Two side-by-side maps (fig. 3.16) were shown to compare the geographical location of 
the American station to that of the Lucky Dragon. The American station clearly fell 
within the zones marked “Original Danger Area” and “New Danger Area” (based on the 
96 Dr. John C. Clark, as told by Robert Cahn, “We Were Trapped By Radioactive Fallout,” Saturday 
Evening Post 230 (July 20, 1957). The article reproduces a photograph of one of the fishermen being 
treated for burns by Japanese doctors.  The caption repeats the same information provided in the text: “23 
Japanese fishermen suffered burns from the atomic dust.”   
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Americans’ reassessment after the test), whereas the fishing boat rested just outside the 
borders of both. This unambiguous visual aid would have erased any doubt about who 
had the greater potential to suffer under the circumstances, even if the Japanese fishermen 
“all received burns” in reality.97    
The Saturday Evening Post article unequivocally implied that the American 
scientists were the true “unsolicited human guinea pigs,” who managed to survive 
unscathed despite being the group stationed closest to ground zero. Twenty-eight other 
American servicemen positioned at open-air weather stations “received radiation,” 
purportedly because they had no recourse to adequate shelter. As if to treat all the 
experiences of the Americans and the Japanese as the same isolated incident, Clark’s 
account localized the fallout problem, extending none of its repercussions to worldwide 
populations, and claimed that fallout could be managed with the proper precautions. 
Clark ignored the fact that the “one unpredicted wind shift,” which had led the scientists 
to take shelter, was ultimately a failure of the American weather service; in fact, he 
accepted the “margin of error” as a result “certainly welcome to the scientists.”98 Shahn’s 
pictorial narrative, by contrast, showed no tolerance for such errors, given that they 
proved fatal.   
Despite the focus on the main characters in the fallout saga in both Lapp’s story 
and the broader press, the cloud-beast would become the defining image of Shahn’s 
series in Harper’s, for it was featured twice. Shahn created a second version (fig. 3.17) 
97 For the opinion that the Lucky Dragon boat had been outside the danger zone, see Ralph Lapp “Voyage 
of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part III] Harper’s (February 1958), 72–79. 
98 Ibid., 66.  
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for the final installment, in which the beast is barely discernible in the dark cloud, except 
for the sharp claws and scaly tail of a dragon, protruding outside the blackened, billowing 
mass. Devoid of the distinctive linear patterns, this cloud is reminiscent of iconic 
mushroom-cloud representations found in photographic documentation of nuclear tests. 
Tiny palm trees line the beach in the foreground, for instance, just as nuclear-testing 
images often include trees in the same frame as the explosion, providing a sense of 
comparative scale.99 That the trees are blowing diagonally indicates the close proximity 
of the mushroom cloud to the beach. The title “Beast of the Atoll,” where “atoll” refers to 
the ring of coral islands enclosing a lagoon, further links the cloud to the specific site of 
detonation.  
The distinctions between these two drawings, however minor they might initially 
seem, suggest that the clouds represent different “beasts” entirely: the patterned cloud, 
illustrated first in the three-part article, corresponds to the radioactive dust that spread 
miles away from ground zero, and the dense cloud to the massive explosion. Although 
the explosion necessarily precedes the fallout in an actual sequence of events, Shahn’s 
choice to reverse this order comports with the text. As Lapp describes in his introduction, 
just five minutes after the “gaudy display” of the fireball had subsided, the darkness of 
night revealed a new phenomenon to behold: “Looking to the west the men could make 
out the outlines of towering clouds which billowed up from the horizon.”100 Soon, still 
eighty-five miles east of the atoll, the men noticed that the cloud was approaching, just 
99 See Scott Kirsch, “Watching the Bombs Go Off: Photography, Nuclear Landscapes, and Spectator 
Democracy,” Antipode 29, 3 (1997), 227–255.  
100 Lapp, “Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part I], 31.  
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before it began to rain radioactive dust upon them. It is not until the third installment, in 
which appears “The Beast of the Atoll,” that Lapp circles back to the question about the 
location of the blast cloud—that is, where the explosion had occurred in relation to the 
fishing boat. In other words, Shahn takes cues from Lapp’s writing to define two types of 
clouds, one towering above the islands and the other moving wildly with the winds. 
The Harper’s article was not Shahn’s final engagement with the fallout beast. 
When he took up the subject again around 1960, for a large painting entitled We Did Not 
Know What Happened To Us (fig. 3.18) in the second part of the Saga of the Lucky 
Dragon series, he rendered the swirling patterns so prominent that they almost fill the 
entire canvas. The outstretched arms of two figures—the Japanese fishermen—cut 
through the dense smoke. Its tendrils envelop their bodies, threatening to penetrate 
through the oversized hand that covers the face of the man on the left. At right, another 
figure stiffly extends his arms overhead, where his clasped hands are seized by the 
sharply clawed foot of the beast. Here, as opposed to the earlier iteration, it has sprouted 
a fifth limb with which to abduct victims. The beast casts a malevolent gaze upon the 
man chosen as its sacrificial lamb, the first hydrogen-bomb casualty, while he contorts 
his neck back to the point that his head is parallel with the picture plane, his eyes locked 
on those of the viewer. Barely discernible under this figure’s arm, due to the milky fog 
that has descended upon the boat deck, the head of a third figure suggests that still further 
victims are wholly obscured by the heavy darkness.   
That most distinctive feature of the whirling wisp in We Did Not Know What 
Happened To Us closely resembles the fallout pattern associated with maps charting the 
 
 
207 
infamous Bravo test on March 1, 1954. In a statement issued by the Atomic Energy 
Commission in early 1955, almost a year after Bravo and after the agency had last shared 
its post-test analyses with the public, the AEC described the “fallout pattern of 1954” as a 
deposit of “radioactive particles in varying amounts over an elliptical or cigar-shaped 
area.”101 From then on, these descriptive designations for the pattern were commonly 
used and sometimes applied to unrelated events. Shortly after the above statement was 
released, for example, a news story in the Washington Post visualized a fallout trajectory 
from a hypothetical hydrogen-bomb attack on Norfolk, Virginia, with what it called a 
“cigar-shaped” symbol (fig. 3.19). Similar forms later appeared on pages (fig. 3.20 and 
fig. 3.21) of the official AEC report, The Effects of Nuclear Weapons, a revision of the 
1945 handbook that was updated in 1957 to include new information on thermonuclear 
weapons.102 Each figure correlated to the period of time that had passed between the 
detonation of the bomb and the measurement of radiation in the air, and each curve inside 
the nesting doll–like figure showed the radiation dosage relative to distance from ground 
zero. Although the new data proved that the radioactive fallout had spread farther than 
cartographic illustrations had previously suggested, even in contemporaneous news 
stories like the aforementioned article on American fallout survivors in the Saturday 
Evening Review, none of the patterns in the AEC report were shown in the context of a 
geographical map. They revealed nothing about the direction in which the radioactive 
material had travelled in the Pacific, and therefore simply served as corrective to the 
101 “Report Issued by the Atomic Energy Commission on Effects of H-Bomb Explosions,” New York 
Times, February 16, 1955.  
102 Samuel Glasstone, ed., The Effects of Atomic Weapons (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense 
and U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1957).  
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initial scientific findings, but not to the American response to human tragedy that had 
befallen the Japanese fishermen. If the U.S. government at first denied that the Lucky 
Dragon had ever crossed into a dangerous area after the Bravo test, the revised 
government reports of the late 1950s completely omitted any mention of the effects on 
the Japanese and obliterated evidence of them from the charts.   
It was thus with no small amount of irony that Shahn adopted the elliptical 
pattern, simultaneously using and destroying its form, in his 1960 painting We Did Not 
Know What Happened To Us as a means by which to reinsert the Lucky Dragon into the 
visual record of Bravo. Although Shahn had produced no cartographic representation for 
the 1957 article illustrating the Lucky Dragon incident, he nonetheless might have noted 
Lapp’s reference in the text to a fallout pattern. (After all, Shahn did appropriate the 
painting’s title from the article.) Lapp had written that the fishing boat was positioned on 
the “northern edge of the immense cigar-shaped pattern” when the bomb went off,103 
thereby prompting his readers to conceive of the Lucky Dragon in relation to the abstract 
design. If the fishermen had immediately attempted to steer their boat in the opposite 
direction of the explosion, Lapp explained, they would have escaped the fallout zone. 
Instead, the boat failed to breach the outermost edge of the ellipse, which ultimately 
marked the border between contamination and safety. The familiar source of Lapp’s text 
in Harper’s thus pointed the way, for Shahn, toward equating the inner area of the ellipse 
with exposure to a life-threatening level of radiation, a sobering visual analogy that he 
103 Lapp, “Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part III] 77. Lapp also mentioned that earlier maps had pictured 
the boat in a safe area: “The New York Times ran photos of an injured crewman and printed a chart showing 
that the Lucky Dragon had been well outside the danger zone around the Eniwetok-Bikini Proving 
Grounds.” Lapp clearly intended his articles to revise this misinformation.  
 
 
                                                 
209 
made explicit in We Did Not Know What Happened To US by patterning the fallout cloud 
with an absurd play on the pattern.  
As Shahn may have known, Lapp was an early and vocal advocate for 
establishing the ellipsis in the visual culture of American civil defense. The “fallout 
pattern of 1954”—the phrase that the AEC casually used—not only referred to the major 
weapons test (Bravo) of that year but also to the date on which the pattern first emerged 
in scientific studies, one of the most important which Lapp and his research team 
conducted after Bravo.104 Recognizing that the result of their calculations would displace 
the dangerously inaccurate model for radioactive fallout trajectories, Lapp also 
immediately understood the potential for widespread applications of the pattern. He set 
about persuading the officials at the Federal Civil Defense Administration:   
They were shown colored charts with neat elliptical contours describing the range 
of lethality of the residual radioactivity from superweapon explosions. Up to this 
point FCDA had worked and thought mostly in terms of circles—the symmetric 
patterns of primary damage from superbombs which the Bulletin published last 
month. Now superimposed upon the great circles of H-bomb blast and heat, there 
were zeppelin-shaped ellipses which stretched far beyond the circles of primary 
damage.105 
 
According to Lapp, “these ellipses stunned civil defense planners” and left them with 
such a strong impression that action was taken at once. In the FCDA publicity materials, 
sinuous ellipses supplanted compact circles, variable contours replaced regularly spaced 
rings, and charts revealed what was happening in the atmosphere rather than “ground 
zero.” With the government agency now more cognizant of the extent to which 
104 Pearce Wright, “Ralph Lapp: Manhattan Project physicist who went on to warn the public about the 
dangers of nuclear radiation” [obituary], The Guardian, September 16, 2004. 
105 Ralph Lapp, “Civil Defense Faces New Perils,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (1954) 349. 
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radioactivity could spread, another feature of the new fallout model was the 
representation of large-scale dispersal. The perception of containment, in terms of 
radioactivity, was no longer the goal of civil defense. Lapp led the charge for this policy 
shift toward decentralization, proposing a plan that would involve building what he called 
“linear cities” connected by a network of straight-lined evacuation routes.106 His strategy, 
at core, was visual, for it centered on the creation of shaped urban areas in the form of 
rods, doughnuts, or loosely clustered dots to allow for streamlined evacuation in the case 
of a nuclear attack. Linearity and fluidity were essential to Lapp’s vision for civil-defense 
cartography—one that he hoped would also take into account the new elliptical shape of 
fallout. 
Although We Did Not Know What Happened to Us retains the key aspects that 
Lapp considered essential to the accurate portrayal of radiation effects, the painting 
transforms his model into a bizarre adaptation. Lapp called for use of the ellipse rather 
than the circle, prompting Shahn to eradicate circular forms from the vocabulary of his 
painting. Not a single circle can be found in We Did Not Know What Happened To Us, 
which displays the new elliptical shape in such excess that it loses its meaning as a 
weather symbol. In its intended context, the ellipse would point in one direction to 
indicate where the fallout will travel, but in the painting the multiplicity of the ellipse in 
different orientations makes mono-directionality an impossibility. While Lapp 
106 Ralph E. Lapp, Must We Hide? (Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Press, 1949), 161–165, 180. See also 
these texts published before the Bravo event: Lapp, “The Strategy of Civil Defense,” Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists 6 (August-September 1950): 241-43; “Hydrogen Bombs IV: What Is the Problem of Organizing 
an Effective Civil Defense Against It?” Scientific American, June 1, 1950, 1–15. For an analysis on urban 
designs in response to nuclear attacks, including Lapp’s proposal, see Robert Kargon and Arthur Molella, 
“The City as Communications Net: Norbert Wiener, the Atomic Bomb, and Urban Dispersal,” Technology 
and Culture 45, no. 4 (October 2004), 764–777. 
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appreciated the asymmetry of the elliptical figure, Shahn liberally construes that quality 
to mean misshapen. Shahn’s ellipses are sometimes dimpled—a blemish that has a ripple 
effect on all the contours within each form—and considerably deviate from the idealized 
versions that the FCDA published in response to Lapp’s cautionary proposal, such as this 
perfectly symmetrical “hypothetical contour for downwind fallout” after a predicted 
attack on Washington, D.C. (fig. 3.22).107 In another move to undercut the norm, Shahn 
interprets Lapp’s notion of dispersal not as a traceable phenomenon, but as total fallout 
contamination, as evidenced by the all-over profusion of the fallout cloud.  
In the painting, these hints of inter-contextual parody, of references to a 
prominent feature of the literary text (the elliptical form) to make a political critique in 
the visual text, recall the satirical commentary of the cartoonist Herblock, whose 
caricature of Oppenheimer seems to have provided the conceptual basis for Shahn’s 
drawing the Scientist. For the humorless situation addressed in We Did Not Know What 
Happened To Us, however, Shahn drew as many lessons from a serious master of science 
as he previously had from the master of satire. Like Shahn, Lapp believed that it was 
important to expose the deficiencies of fallout prediction for improving the probability of 
survival, but the two men ostensibly disagreed on what would be considered an 
acceptable improvement. Lapp sought to shift the scientific methodology in the context 
of civil defense, where Shahn considered the worst fallout effects—human suffering and 
death—incalculable and therefore inexplicable by any method. Given that he openly 
appealed for the abolishment of nuclear testing, the only concrete evidence of his 
107 Richard Bentz et al., “Some Civil Defense Problems in the Nation’s Capital Following Widespread 
Thermonuclear Attack,” Operations Research 5, no. 3 (January 1957), 326. 
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attitudes toward the related issue of fallout, it seems reasonable to assume that works like 
We Did Not Know What Happened To Us imitate Lapp’s elliptical model, as a quotation 
from the original “Lucky Dragon” text in Harper’s, in a purely satirical way.  
If Shahn believed that Lapp’s government-endorsed method of fallout prediction 
was just another smokescreen to obscure the real stakes of bomb tests, his painting 
mimics that analogy of concealment. Resembling a Japanese screen decorated with 
miniature fallout designs, a veil of dense, black fog covers every area of what would have 
constituted the background. Shahn’s intricate camouflage is an artifice, just as 
deceptively benign in its decorative appeal as the “cigar” and “zeppelin” shapes that 
denote fallout. In reviewing the exhibition of the Lucky Dragon series of paintings and 
drawings at the Downtown Gallery in 1961, art critic Brian O’Doherty, of the New York 
Times, perceived in the works an overall element of terrible beauty, specifically pointing 
to Shahn’s “convulsive calligraphy” in both drawings and the painting that feature the 
dragon.  The violent agitation of line excites the viewer’s eye and draws it into “a tangle 
of demonic energies,” emanating from the central figure of the beast in We Did Not Know 
What Happened to Us. “Lethally insubstantial, it twists and curls, clawing and destroying 
the men beneath,”108 O’Doherty writes about the wispy yet formidable creature, which 
seemingly derives physical power not from its mass but from sinewy bands of energy. 
Like their counterparts in maps, these lines disguise themselves as mono-dimensional 
formal elements that flatly lie on the surface of a topographical area, never revealing their 
108 Brian O’Doherty, “Art: Shahn Is Masterly: In ‘Saga of the Lucky Dragon,’ He Gives Inhuman Energies 
Human Perspective,” New York Times, October 12, 1961. According to the Downtown Gallery’s records, 
We Did Not Know What Happened to Us was shown in at least ten other group exhibitions throughout the 
decade, including at the Art Institute of Chicago in 1961 and the Corcoran Gallery of Art’s biennial in 
1962. See the exhibition record, Downtown Gallery Papers, Box 48, Reel 5587, frame 774, AAA.  
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capacity to penetrate volumetric depths, whether they are bodies of water, land, or human 
beings. To O’Doherty, the line appears to be charged with vitality, endowed with the 
power to “thrust” forms “into vital existence” in other works in the Lucky Dragon series, 
whereas he acknowledges that the linear quality of the dragon in the painting 
symbolically refers to “vast invisible forces”—forces that in reality cause the opposite 
effect of extinguishing vitality.109 In this way, Shahn’s line and its attendant patterns 
embody the tension between what can be seen and what cannot be seen. 
Another work in Shahn’s Lucky Dragon series noted in the press was The 
Physicist (fig. 3.23), a painting admired not just for its intricate draftsmanship, as in We 
Did Not Know What Happened To Us, but also for its distinctive palette of predominant 
blue. In terms of its variety of hue, the color in The Physicist could be characterized as 
ultramarine or cobalt blue, the latter being a synthetic and inexpensive substitute for the 
former in pigments developed in the nineteenth century for oil paints.110 O’Doherty, 
describing the scene of the scientist standing before a patchwork of multicolored squares, 
observes that the figure is “half drowned in an inky blue,” like that of the sky “so briefly 
at evening before being extinguished in darkness.”111 For the critic, this crepuscular color 
somehow reinforces the poetry in the “dance of molecules” elegantly drawn on the chart, 
which, in an ironic twist, reveals the “formula for cataclysm” in the form of a nuclear 
explosion. While O’Doherty never makes explicit how he believes the color and the 
atomic chart relate to each other, the New Yorker critic Robert Coates is no less imprecise 
109 Ibid. 
110 Matthew Buckingham, “Colors: Ultramarine,” Cabinet 10 (Spring 2003). See also A. Roy, “Cobalt 
Blue,” Artists’ Pigments: A Handbook of Their History and Characteristics, vol. 4, Barbara Berrie, ed. 
(London: Archetype Publications, 2007).  
111 O’Doherty, “Shahn Is Masterly,” New York Times.  
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in pointing to a connection between the “luminously blue” canvas and its overall “atomic 
age overtones.”112  
In addition to functioning as the name of a color, cobalt conjures up associations 
with a cultural phenomenon of the mid-twentieth century: the most feared yet fabled 
nuclear weapon, called the cobalt bomb. In 1950, the Hungarian-American atomic 
physicist Leo Szilard first introduced the possibility that the hydrogen bomb could be 
unconventionally employed as a radiological weapon if the core were to be encased in 
cobalt, thereby rendering the fallout cloud more lethal. In the wake of J. Robert 
Oppenheimer’s forced resignation from the Atomic Energy Commission in 1954, the 
New York Times reported on President Eisenhower’s public response to inquiries about 
what this change in personnel would mean for the atomic policy, especially in light of the 
fallout disaster that had unexpectedly occurred after the hydrogen-bomb test at Bikini—
the same one that lethally contaminated the Lucky Dragon boat. Although Eisenhower 
assured Americans that the military would not pursue building bigger bombs, “this did 
not dispel the fears, for the nation was also told that if the Bikini bomb were encased in a 
cobalt sheath, the explosion would send a deadly radioactive cobalt dust cloud over 
thousands of square miles.”113 By 1961, the year in which Shahn painted The Physicist, 
the cobalt bomb had yet to be built (and never was to be), but it was still invoked in both 
popular and apocalyptical discourses about the future of arms development, such as in the 
incendiary book Will the Cobalt Bomb Be Your Doom?, self-published by Charles Henry 
112 Robert M. Coates, “The Art Galleries,” New Yorker, December 30, 1961, 54. 
113 E. W. Kenworthy, “The Drama of the Hydrogen Bomb—And Dr. Oppenheimer’s Key Role,” New York 
Times, April 18, 1954.  
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Lowden in 1962. Author Bruce Chatwin, best known for his 1977 travel book In 
Patagonia, described in it his experience of learning about the cobalt bomb in school 
during the late 1940s. Connecting this memory to his recollection of the paint color his 
great-aunt would frequently employ in her religious paintings, he “pictured the cobalt 
bomb as a dense blue cloudbank, spitting tongues of flame at the edges.”114  
If radiation had a color in the Cold War imagination, it was cobalt blue. In the 
painting, that radioactive blue at once shrouds and suffuses the figure of the physicist, 
who wears laboratory scrubs that have been made transparent, as if the color imbues the 
viewer with the superpower most commonly linked with radioactive fallout of the so-
called “super bomb”: x-ray vision.115 Shahn scraped off areas and applied thin layers of 
the cobalt-colored tempera to expose his underpainting. What can be seen through the 
fabric of the physicist’s uniform are patches of flesh to match the scratch marks on the 
bare skin of the figure’s neck and arms, mimicking the lesions that radioactive ash had 
burned onto the bodies of the Japanese fishermen. Under the cobalt skin on the painting’s 
surface are also some squares of the atomic grid, a visual aide developed by scientists of 
another era to make sense of the invisible. Here, the physicist appears to have hand-
drawn the grid himself to create a record of his calculations—a canvas on which he 
literally practices the “art of destroying human beings,” to use Shahn’s phrase.116 Both 
114 Bruce Chatwin, In Patagonia (London: Penguin, 2003), 3, quoted in P. D. Smith, Doomsday Men: The 
Real Dr. Strangelove and the Dream of the Superweapon (New York: Macmillan, 2007), 395. This 
radiological link to cobalt was further reinforced by the use of this radioisotope in cancer treatment, 
including the cobalt-60 therapy that Oppenheimer received for his throat cancer in 1966. 
115 On the relationship between x-ray vision and radioactive fallout in American popular culture, see Joseph 
Masco, “Mutant Ecologies: Radioactive Life in Post–Cold War New Mexico,” Cultural Anthropology 19, 
no. 4 (2004), 517–50. 
116 Shahn, “Art, Freedom and the Human Spirit in the Contemporary World,” 25.    
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flesh and grid suggest the humanity behind the inhumanity of hydrogen-bomb tests. The 
collective result of scientific labor and thought is evinced on a black piece of paper that 
the physicist holds: it depicts a drawing of Shahn’s signature cloud-beast, thereby 
conflating the artist with the scientist into a composite identity. As for the beast, it now 
appears more human in its conception than ever before in the Lucky Dragon series, which 
the artist began in 1957. The disaster narrative has come full circle in this 1961 image, in 
which Shahn turns back to employing fallout as a relatable metaphor for human 
experiences, rather than as a foreign substance that would remain utterly unknowable to 
most people. Like his earliest portrait of Oppenheimer, who assumes the appearance of 
the fallout victims portrayed in Shahn’s ad for the television series “Atomic Timetable,” 
the physically marred figure in The Physicist is equated with those he victimized through 
his complicit involvement in building radiological weapons. He is radioactive blue yet 
engaged in painting the world in the same color, perhaps implying the acceptance on the 
part of the painter—that is, Shahn himself—for his share of the universal culpability in 
these major nuclear events.  
 
“The Terror That Haunts Us All” 
 Throughout his career, in both writings and pictures, Shahn shared many lessons 
that he learned from scientists and demonstrated a certain kinship with them, even as he 
struggled to reconcile their demons. His 1963 mural Atomic Table (fig. 3.24), for 
example, transforms the nearly identical scientific chart from The Physicist into a 
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backdrop for a quotation on human reasoning,117 excerpted from the seventeenth-century 
physicist Robert Hooke’s classic treatise, Micrographia. Inscribed along the top and 
bottom edges of the painting is a passage that essentially expresses in words what Shahn 
illustrates in his drawing of a linear network of molecules, adjoined like string lights:  
So many are the links, upon which true Philosophy depends, of which, if any one 
be loose, or weak, the whole chain is in danger of being dissolved; it is to begin 
with the Hands and Eyes, and to proceed on through the Memory, to be continued 
by Reason; nor is it to stop there, but to come about to the Hands and Eyes 
again.118  
 
Hooke’s comparison between the circularity of reason and the circulation of blood 
through the human body harmonized with the humanistic bent of Shahn’s fallout 
metaphor; both postulate that there are dangerous consequences for those who recklessly 
act on their thoughts. For Hooke, a physicist, the men in his field could be upheld as the 
exemplars of rational philosophy, whereas for Shahn the physicist of the Atomic Age had 
already proven a weak link in the chain of events partly hastened by his own actions. 
Shahn’s physicist, invisibly manifest in Atomic Table through the text, would have done 
well to heed the advice that Hooke had provided in preceding sentence to the excerpt 
included in the mural:  “. . . be sure to make distinction between the sober and well 
collected heap, and the extravagant Ideas, and mistaken Images, which there it may 
sometimes light upon.”119 A judicious thinker, in other words, will discern what theories 
are worthy to be performed in reality, what molecules (in Shahn’s example) can be forced 
117 Pohl, Ben Shahn, 29.   
118 Robert Hooke, Micrographia: or some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies Made by 
Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries Thereupon (London: Royal Society, 1665). Complete 
version of the book available online at: 
http://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/h/hooke/robert/micrographia/complete.html (accessed November 23, 2013).   
119 Ibid.  
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into productive coexistence with his “Hands and Eyes.” Of great concern to Shahn were 
those highly capable individuals whose errors in judgment and failures of conscience led 
them to neglect that final, crucial step in completing the circle of reason. 
Shahn’s work on the subject of nuclear science, ranging from his portraits of a 
suffering Oppenheimer in 1954 and 1955 to his final plea for human empathy in the 
Lucky Dragon paintings of 1961, ultimately begs the question: who is responsible for the 
senseless behavior that perpetuates a policy of nuclear testing? That Shahn portrays a 
divisive public figure like Oppenheimer with sensitivity, attempting to understand his 
intellectual predicament as much as his inexcusable mistakes, suggests that shared 
accountability should be part of the answer. Oppenheimer, considered a brilliant 
theoretical physicist, was nonetheless prone to committing practical errors, as evidenced 
by his tacit approval of the calculations that supplied the grossly inaccurate predictions 
for the Bravo test. Although there is no evidence that anyone pointed a finger at 
Oppenheimer for his role in the fallout disaster—for he was in the midst of receiving 
undue blame for other policy missteps at that time—Shahn represents the physicist as a 
man who is undoubtedly aware of his culpability. Oppenheimer himself admitted to his 
inability to shed the “sin” of his involvement in the development of nuclear weapons.120 
The British philosopher Bertrand Russell, an outspoken proponent of nuclear 
disarmament, urged his contemporaries to recognize the humanizing effect of 
Oppenheimer’s candid admission:   
I do not see how any human person engaged in the kind of work which Dr. 
Oppenheimer was doing could fail to have such feelings. I do not mean to suggest 
120 Shahn, Science and the Common Understanding, 85.  
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that the work ought not to have been done. The scientists were caught in a tragic 
dilemma, and even the most conscientious of them might justly feel that no good 
could come of an individual or unilateral refusal to engage in the researches that 
governments demanded. But it is not difficult to understand how, in moments 
when intricate political arguments were forgotten, the sense of sin of which Dr. 
Oppenheimer speaks would return.121  
  
Oppenheimer’s dilemma was not solely a personal one. “The terror of the beast . . . is 
now the terror that haunts us all,” Shahn wrote in 1961.122  
The domino effect of scientists’ actions meant that everyone experienced 
psychological fallout, though this was a revelation some were unwilling to accept. One of 
the only negative reviews of Shahn’s Lucky Dragon exhibition expresses the discomfort 
of being unilaterally categorized as “victim” by Shahn, even while the observation hits 
squarely on his point: “The real tragedy of these paintings is that something has gone, not 
out of Shahn, but out of us and our time. . . To put the Japanese atom victims into art 
today is to put ourselves into it also, and all Shahn’s flowers and doves will not 
accomplish that. By illustrating them, he illustrates us also, and perhaps we deserve it.”123 
Other were so compelled by the dire consequences of the testing program that they 
intervened: in the U.S., the 1954 Bravo test sparked significant public debate on fallout 
hazards for the first time; by 1958, antinuclear activism had helped to spur negotiations 
on a comprehensive nuclear test ban; in 1963, these negotiations eventually resulted in 
the Limited Test Ban Treaty that outlawed atmospheric nuclear tests.124  
121 Bertrand Russell, “The Mind of Robert Oppenheimer,” review of The Open Mind, by J. Robert 
Oppenheimer (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1955), New Republic, November 21, 1955.    
122 “Shahn in Amsterdam,” Art in America 3 (November 1961), 62.  
123 Jack Kroll, “Exhibition at Downtown Gallery,” Art News 60 (November 1961), 20. 
124 Carolyn Kopp, “The Origins of the American Scientific Debate over Fallout Hazards,” Social Studies of 
Science 9, 403 (1979), 404–05.  As Kopp points out, the extent of radioactive contamination after Bravo 
was far more widespread than initially believed, which contributed to the public outcry about the incident. 
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At every step, Shahn inserted his visual and written statements to bind together 
links in the nuclear-thought chain, aligning himself with scientists no matter how far 
apart they stood ideologically. There was of course Oppenheimer, recurrently invoked in 
Shahn’s art, but also scientists at Princeton and Harvard, where he lived and briefly 
worked, and physicist Ralph Lapp, who eventually came to embrace nuclear 
disarmament.125 Oppenheimer and Lapp became acquainted in Los Alamos on the 
Manhattan Project and overlapped in tangential ways thereafter, including when Lapp 
published an article, entitled “Atomic Candor,” in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 
adopting the term that Oppenheimer made famous a year earlier in his article on atomic 
policy.126 It was this link to Lapp, the father of the “linear city,” that may have sharpened 
Shahn’s concept of linear mapping, in which contiguous lines create vital links and 
broken lines lead to disaster. In his writings, which Shahn illustrated, Lapp made the 
ellipse central to the visual vocabulary of fallout, and Shahn subsequently imbued his 
depictions of the cloud-beast with a fluid linearity that echoed the new aesthetic of fallout 
models in the 1950s— not to endorse the practice of “weather intelligence” but to render 
this idea of this predictability absurd. Because fallout prediction was essentially an act of 
interpretation, the process by which scientists reasoned that a nuclear test could be safely 
conducted was vulnerable to miscomprehension, even by the most venerated physicists. 
For solutions to this narrow intellectual conundrum and the broader humanistic crisis, 
“The debate over fallout hazards began in early 1954, sparked by the accidental irradiation of almost 300 
people exposed to radioactive fallout from an American test explosion of a prototype hydrogen bomb. The 
bomb, tested 1 March 1954 at the Pacific proving grounds, exploded with a force twice as great as had been 
expected (later estimated at 15 megatons, or 750 times that of the Hiroshima- and Nagasaki-type bombs).”  
125 Joe Holley, Obit. “Ralph E. Lapp, 87; Nuclear Physicist,” Washington Post, September 13, 2004. 
126 Ralph E. Lapp, “Atomic Candor,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10, no. 8 (October 1954), 312–314.  
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Shahn ultimately turned to Hooke, an expert of the scientists’ own kind, whose credo on 
reason provided a formula that, if followed, would end nuclear tragedy.  
 This chapter began with the question of whether Shahn held out any hope to slow 
the quickening pace of the atomic clock—which “ticks faster and faster,” Oppenheimer 
warned, in 1953127—or “Stop!” the clock altogether, as Shahn’s poster demanded. More 
than the ambivalence some have seen in his work on the subject, what Shahn conveys is 
at times concern and desperation and other times anger and exasperation, but never, 
explicitly, fear. The following chapter will turn to another artist, Bruce Conner, who 
openly admitted that he saw himself and his fellow San Franciscans as the future victims 
of some apocalyptic global event. Unlike Shahn, however, Conner wanted no part of 
being at the center of tragedy, unless that drama was playing out in the fictionalized 
“theater” of his art. 
127 Oppenheimer, “Atomic Weapons and American Policy,” 529.  
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Fig. 3.1 Ben Shahn, Stop H-Bomb Tests, 1960. Silkscreen poster.  
 
Fig. 3.2 Ben Shahn, Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer, 1954. Ink brush drawing, Published in 
Waldo Frank, “An American Tragedy: The Oppenheimer Case,” Nation, September 25, 
1954, 246.   
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Fig. 3.3 Henri Matisse, Portrait of Edgar Allan Poe, 1930–32. Etching, plate 26 from 
Poésies de Stéphane Mallarmé.  
 
Fig. 3.4 Photograph of J. Robert Oppenheimer (proper left) and Robert Serber (proper 
right). April 23, 1946. Associated Press.  
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Fig. 3.5 Ben Shahn, Head of Oppenheimer, 1955. Drawing. Facsimile in Ben Shahn 
Papers, Archives of American Art. [current location of drawing unknown] 
 
Fig. 3.6 Ben Shahn, Oppenheimer, 1955. Drawing. Facsimile in Ben Shahn Papers, 
Archives of American Art. [current location of drawing unknown] 
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Fig. 3.7 Ben Shahn, Robert Oppenheimer, 1955. Published in Waldo Frank, 
“Oppenheimer’s ‘Folly’: An Alsop Fable,” Nation, March 5, 1955, 194. 
 
Fig. 3.8  Ben Shahn, advertisement for “Fallout,” an episode of the television program 
See it Now. Published in New York Times, March 30, 1958.   
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Fig. 3.9  Ben Shahn, Scientist, 1957. Screenprint, with hand additions. 
   
Fig. 3.10 Herbert Block (“Herblock”), “Who’s Being Walled Off from What?” Published 
in Waldo Frank, “An American Tragedy: The Oppenheimer Case,” Nation, September 
25, 1954, 248.   
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Fig. 3.11 Herbert Block (“Herblock”), “You Mean I’m Supposed to Stand on That?” 
Published in Washington Post, March 29, 1950.   
 
Fig. 3.12 Ben Shahn, Ed Murrow Slaying the Dragon of McCarthy, 1955. Ink brush 
drawing. 
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Fig. 3.13 Ben Shahn, Boys’ Day, 1957. Ink drawing. Printed in Ralph E. Lapp, “The 
Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part I] Harper’s (December 1957), 28.  
 
Fig. 3.14 Ben Shahn, The Beast #2, 1957. Ink drawing. Printed in Ralph E. Lapp, “The 
Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part I] Harper’s (December 1957), 30. 
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Fig. 3.15 Ben Shahn, Kuboyama, 1957. Ink drawing. Printed in Ralph E. Lapp, “The 
Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part II] Harper’s (January 1958), 55.  
 
Fig. 3.16 Left: “Voyage of the ill-fated fishing vessel, Lucky Dragon.” Right: “Bikini 
Atoll: Map shows distance from blockhouse, which sheltered scientists, to point of 
explosion.” Printed in Saturday Evening Post, July 20, 1957, 19.  
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Fig. 3.17 Ben Shahn, Beast of the Atoll, 1957. Ink drawing. Printed in Ralph E. Lapp, 
“The Voyage of the Lucky Dragon,” [Part III] Harper’s (February1958), 72. 
 
Fig. 3.18 Ben Shahn, We Did Not Know What Happened to Us, from the series The Saga 
of the Lucky Dragon, ca. 1960. Tempera on wood. Smithsonian American Art Museum. 
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Fig. 3.19 Cartographic representation of “cigar-shaped” distribution of radioactive fallout 
after a hypothetical hydrogen-bomb attack on Norfolk, Virginia. Published in Warren 
Unna, “Blast at Norfolk Could Kill Persons on Edge of D.C. Strauss Indicates,” 
Washington Post, February 16, 1955.  
 
Fig. 3.20 “Dose rate contours from fallout at 1, 6, and 18 hours after a surface burst with 
fission yield in the megaton range (15 mph effective wind).” Published in Samuel 
Glasstone, et al. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic 
Energy Commission), 414.  
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Fig. 3.21 “Idealized total (accumulated) dose contours from fallout in first 36 hours after 
high yield explosion at Bikini Atoll on March 1, 1954.” Published in Samuel Glasstone, 
et al. The Effects of Nuclear Weapons (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Atomic Energy 
Commission), 425.  
 
 
Fig. 3.22 “Hypothetical contour for downwind fallout showing 2-day accumulated 
radiation dosages. The total area is approximately 7000 square miles.” Published in 
Richard Bentz, et al., “Some Civil Defense Problems in the Nation's Capital Following 
Widespread Thermonuclear Attack,” Operations Research, (January 1957), 326. 
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Fig. 3.23 Ben Shahn, The Physicist, from the series The Saga of the Lucky Dragon, 1961. 
Tempera. 
 
Fig. 3.24 Ben Shahn, sketch for Atomic Table, 1957. Pencil and gouache on paper, laid 
on canvas. Original mosaic mural, executed by Gabriel Loire for the ship S.S. Shalom, 
now in New Jersey State Museum, Trenton. 
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CHAPTER 4: Bruce Conner: The Contaminated Environments of the “Ratbastard”  
J. Robert Oppenheimer characterized the “modern nuclear laboratory” as a novel sensory 
experience, whereby the “clicking counters and flashing lights and occasionally even the 
ringing bells . . . make the doings of individual atoms very vivid and immediate”—a far 
cry from the once “private and remote” atmosphere that scientists enjoyed before the era 
of weapons development.1 Indeed, atmospheric nuclear testing at the height of the Cold 
War redefined the boundaries of laboratories in which radiological experiments had 
historically taken place. If Oppenheimer’s description called to mind the buzzing 
ambience of a city, it might have been on account of the actual overlap of the nuclear 
laboratory within the urban environment, beginning in 1942 with the establishment of 
government-operated research facilities for the Manhattan Project, such as Chicago’s 
Metallurgical Laboratory.  
This laboratory appears to have been a significant place for Moholy-Nagy, who 
became so fascinated about what nuclear activities had occurred inside that he researched 
them in the Smyth Report, the first postwar publication on the Manhattan Project. What 
also seems to have piqued his curiosity was the fact that the laboratory was practically 
located next door to his home and to his school. For the Bay-Area artist Bruce Conner, 
the subject of this final chapter, the local environment of nuclear experimentation, 
conducted in radiological laboratories similar to the “Met Lab” in Chicago, struck him 
not as intriguing but as particularly pernicious. While Crawford and Shahn explored 
laboratory settings farther afield in the Bikini islands of the Pacific, Conner, like Moholy-
1 J. Robert Oppenheimer, Science and the Common Understanding (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), 
28.  
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Nagy, was keenly aware that evidence of radiological effects could be found closer to 
home—and, from Conner’s perspective, this proximity to some of the most active 
laboratories in the U.S. nuclear project was deeply unsettling. Through the representation 
of self-destruction in his assemblages and films, which this chapter will explore in depth, 
Conner manifested his sense of personal and cultural entrapment inside a lethal 
environment. 
Judging by the running “fever chart” of man-made ecological disasters that the 
New Yorker journalist E. B. White enumerated in his column in 1946, cynically entitled 
“These Precious Days,”2 nearly every part of the world, circa 1960, was serving as a 
laboratory for the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. And it was happening in places far 
away from New York City (though it, too, was vulnerable): from the South Pacific, 
where atomic debris blanketed human-inhabited islands surrounding the U.S. proving 
grounds at Bikini, to San Francisco, where military and scientific activities frequently 
comingled. To be sure, the people on the Pacific islands endured fallout conditions from 
hydrogen bombs many times more hazardous than any populations in America, but White 
made sure to alert Americans to analogous environmental perils of their own localities. 
“One aspect of a primitive man’s life in this century is that his habitat is an experimental 
2 E. B. White, “Notes and Comment,” New Yorker, March 9, 1946, 17. When White first began 
commenting on the future of radioactive contamination before the first postwar atomic tests ever happened, 
he hinted at what he might mean by the title of his later column, “These Precious Days.” In 1946, he 
remarked, “Bikini Lagoon, although we have never seen it, begins to seem like the one place in all the 
world we cannot spare . . . It all seems unspeakably precious, like a lovely child stricken with a fatal 
disease.”   
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laboratory for men who are less primitive,”3 he wrote, leaving the object of his critique 
open to interpretation and the habitat universal.  
In 1957, after Conner had completed a year of graduate studies in art at the 
University of Colorado, he moved with his wife, Jean, to San Francisco to take part in a 
subcultural scene that many Americans might have considered “primitive.” The close-
knit group around the Conners—including artists Jay DeFeo, Wally Hedrick, Joan Brown 
and poets Michael McClure, Philip Lamantia, Lawrence Ferlinghetti, and Robert Duncan, 
among many others—were all impoverished yet provided each other with all the 
encouragement and interest they needed to produce and share their work.4 Rather than 
holding formal exhibition openings, for example, the artists threw parties for themselves, 
because none of them had the financial backing of the art-world establishment, which in 
any case had minimal foundations in San Francisco at the time.5  
Despite being part of this supportive and vibrant community, Conner knew where 
he and his friends stood in the pecking order. Self-consciously identifying as a primitive 
of a certain sort, he described the most downtrodden groups, including artists, as the 
“lowest people employed by society” and those “who were themselves ostracized or 
3 E. B. White, “These Precious Days,” New Yorker, June 20, 1959, 99. 
4 For further reading on the Beat subculture of San Francisco in the 1950s, see Rebecca Solnit, Secret 
Exhibition: Six California Artists of the Cold War Era (San Francisco: City Lights Books, 1990) and 
Thomas Albright, Art in the San Francisco Bay Area, 1945–1980: An Illustrated History (University of 
California Press, 1985).   
5 Oral History Interview with Bruce Conner by Paul Karlstrom, August 12, 1974, AAA. As Conner noted 
in the interview, “It was a real audience. And you didn't have to wait six months or a year or anything. You 
did it right now. You planned a party for the next weekend and you'd do a show.” Most of Conner’s friends 
were fellow artists or poets, the latter on account of his prior connection with the poet Michael McClure, a 
friend he had known since his childhood and college years in Wichita, Kansas. McClure encouraged 
Conner to come to San Francisco, where the poet would introduce the artist to the isolated but vibrant 
artistic community that thrived through small exhibitions and poetry readings at places like the City Lights 
Bookstore, the Six Gallery, the Batman Gallery, coffee shops, and bars. 
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alienated from full involvement in society.”6 He even nicknamed his subset of San 
Francisco friends “rat-bastards,” evoking not only the rodents that scavenged for food 
and infested the gutters, but also the kind experimented on in laboratories and nuclear-
testing grounds, which in many ways had become interchangeable. This analogy between 
the alienated figure and the rat would be applied again when he recalled his experience of 
living in New York City, where he took classes at the Brooklyn Museum School of Art 
for a semester between college and graduate school. As he described it, the city “was like 
a maze, a rat maze, going from one little box to another little box.”7 Finding both 
environments inhospitable to the inhabitants, he identified with the oppressed condition 
of the rat, not just in terms of how it was viewed by others but also how it felt and 
defined itself in relation to its surroundings.   
In San Francisco, Conner was drawn to make assemblages, such as 
RATBASTARD (fig. 4.1), that employed dirty and degraded materials—including 
stretched nylon stockings, rusted nails, twisted wire, and, on the front of the two-sided 
work, a photographic reproduction of a cadaver laid on a table. These represented aspects 
of Conner’s daily experiences, thoughts, relationships, and observations in what he called 
“story form.”8 To begin works like RATBASTARD, Conner would imagine “relating to an 
6 Bruce Conner, interview with Peter Boswell on June 15, 1983, quoted in Peter Boswell, “Bruce Conner: 
Theater of Light and Shadow,” in Peter Boswell, Joan Rothfuss, and Bruce Jenkins, 2000 BC: THE 
BRUCE CONNER STORY, PART II (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1999), 41. The scorn and derision 
directed at such groups by the mainstream could be summarized by the following characterization of a 
“Beatnik,” who “experiments with every social taboo, including narcotics, crime and perversion, and 
conducted in the poorest and least sanitary conditions imaginable.” See Joe Hyams, “Good-bye to the 
Beatniks,” Los Angeles Times, September 28, 1958.  
7 Oral history interview with Bruce Conner by Paul Cummings, April 16, 1973, Archives of American Art 
(AAA), Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 
8 Oral history interview with Bruce Conner by Paul Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, Archives of American Art 
(AAA), Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. 
 
 
                                                 
238 
object in itself”—an imagined rat or the cadaver in the photograph are potential 
candidates for this work—“and then developing an environment around it, or using 
materials to create a simulated space of some time or place, or relating [it to] a sort of a 
drama [or] a characterization.”9 Subsequently used as a “template for further 
elaboration,”10 to use the phrase of Conner scholar Kevin Hatch, RATBASTARD 
establishes the local surroundings as a recurring setting and the aggregate of environment 
conditions as a persistent “combatant,” a type of theatrical character that he associated 
with his work. All the assemblages treated in this chapter, as well as his concurrent and 
later films, speak to Conner’s preoccupation with the contamination and ruin of places, 
which could sometimes take the form of a nuclear menace.   
In the autumn of 1961, Conner and his wife sold all of their worldly possessions, 
packed up their car in San Francisco, and drove to a town outside Mexico City, where 
they settled for a year. This move to Mexico has been acknowledged as a key event in his 
career, primarily for prompting a discernible shift in his treatment of assemblages, the 
type of work with which he was most engaged in the late fifties and early sixties.11 But 
for Conner, Mexico meant far more than a place in which he would discover new 
possibilities for his art, as influential as the local landscape and people proved to be as 
sources of “found” objects. He also believed, as this chapter will show, that Mexico 
would offer the possibility for him to live without the fear of death hanging over his head. 
The brief time in which he was able to break momentarily free from the perilous 
9 Ibid.  
10 Kevin Hatch, “It has to do with theater: Bruce Conner’s Ratbastards,” October 127 (Winter 2009), 121.  
11 See Kevin Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2012), 87, and Peter Boswell, 
“Theater of Light and Shadow,” in Peter Boswell, Bruce Jenkins, and Joan Rothfuss, 2000 BC: The Bruce 
Conner Story Part II, exh. cat. (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1999), 42.    
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circumstances of life in the United States can be understood as a defining aspect of his 
career, both reinforcing and extending his belief that to stay in San Francisco would have 
been personally disastrous. In the years that Conner lived there, the persistent rhetoric of 
nuclear war had escalated to such a frightening level that he was “sure the bomb was 
going to drop and we’d be annihilated,” he recalled decades later. 12  
 
The Testing Grounds of San Francisco  
Although these apocalyptic notions pervaded the national discourse, they perhaps 
struck San Franciscans as more local in nature than in other regions, given the essential 
and varied parts that their city proudly played in nuclear research. In addition to the two 
illustrious radiation laboratories at Berkeley and Livermore, best known for their 
collaborations with Los Alamos on nuclear-weapons design, San Francisco boasted its 
very own Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory. In reading any number of local media 
sources, residents could have gleaned a virtual résumé of the NRDL’s unclassified 
activities—activities that would alarm anyone, like Conner, who looked skeptically on 
the claims of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission about the relative harmlessness of 
radioactive fallout.13 As this chapter will discuss in relation to Conner’s conception of his 
immediate environment, several NRDL experiments involved testing the effects of 
artificially produced “fallout” that was then poured in parts of the ocean or spread on the 
soil in areas surrounding the city.  
12 Solnit, Secret Exhibition, 97. 
13 For this conservative viewpoint that downplayed radiological hazards, see Edward Teller with Allen 
Brown, “The Fallout Scare,” [Parts I, II, and III] Saturday Evening Post, February 3, 10, 17, 1962.  
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Perhaps the most disturbing experiment of all, on account of its lasting several 
years, was the radiological testing on battleships that had been blasted (and barely 
survived) in the first postwar atomic explosions at Bikini. In the unlikely case that 
Conner had not already heard the local legend about the radioactive ships in San 
Francisco Bay, stationed there since 1946,14 he certainly knew of them by the time he 
produced the short film CROSSROADS in 1976, for which he researched declassified 
footage and documents about the very tests that contaminated those ships. The 
experiments of the Naval Radiological Defense Laboratory began during Conner’s first 
period of residence in San Francisco and continued well after he returned to the city—this 
time, for good—in 1965. In the earlier years, the bomb and its radioactive aftermath 
consumed Conner’s thoughts until he reached a breaking point.  
Conner was hardly alone in pondering his own post-apocalyptic survival.  He may 
have considered his chances much better if his access to shelter or safety had looked 
more promising. Between 1957 and 1961, he lived in the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood, 
on the eastern edge of Golden Gate Park, which he described as a “lower middle class 
area with low rents.”15 It seems unlikely that such a neighborhood would have a public 
14 Barton Hacker has reported that, after Operation Crossroads, “The navy decided to tow twelve former 
target vessels to the mainland for more detailed study. Six were destined for the naval base at Bremerton in 
Puget Sound, six for Hunter’s Point in San Francisco Bay, where they also became training grounds for 
future monitors.” This figure does not accord with the contemporaneous congressional testimony by a 
representative of the Arms Control Research Center, a San Francisco–based non-profit organization. Citing 
information obtained via the Freedom of Information Act, the witness claimed that “potentially twenty 
ships were brought into San Francisco Bay for the purpose of decontamination.” See Barton C. Hacker, The 
Dragon’s Tail: Radiation Safety in the Manhattan Project, 1942–1946 (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1987), 15, and Contamination of the San Francisco Bay: Oversight Hearing Before the 
Subcommittee on Water and Power Resources of the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, House of 
Representatives, Ninety-Ninth Congress, Second Session, on Contamination of the San Francisco Bay, 
Hearing Held in San Francisco, CA, August 4, 1986 (Washington , D.C.: U.S. G.P.O., 1987).  
15 Oral history interview with Bruce Conner by Paul Cummings, April 16, 1973, AAA.  
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fallout shelter, or that a low-rent apartment building would include one in the basement. 
In either case, by the mid-1950s, the Federal Civil Defense Administration, under the 
new leadership of Governor Val Peterson of Nebraska, shifted its policy from promoting 
a nation-wide program to build shelters to advising its local branches to devise 
evacuation plans that would direct people outside city centers.16 Not only did Conner live 
in the heart of San Francisco, making traffic congestion an additional problem, but the 
evacuation plan for the city called for residents of the Haight-Ashbury neighborhood to 
take a longer route than necessary. According to It’s Your Life, the authoritative civil 
defense manual of San Francisco as of 1956, Conner resided in “Zone 2,” sandwiched 
between two other upper zones and stacked above three bottom zones (fig. 4.2). Although 
the clearest and closest point of exit would be the Golden Gate Bridge, the plan would 
have the population of “Zone 2” drive south, through downtown; it also would close a 
northern route over the Bay Bridge (between San Francisco and Oakland) to evacuees, 
leaving only six routes out of the city, with two of them merging just past the southern 
edge of the city limits.17 As it turned out, Conner preemptively followed the plan when 
he headed far south to Mexico, doing so before he believed it would be too late to save 
him.  This point seems relevant to his artistic practice insofar that the notion of escape 
from death, for Conner, was not just plucked from a magazine or newspaper headline. 
Rather, the struggle to survive apocalypse played out in the “theater” of his assemblages 
even before it did, through his actions, in real life.   
16 Gene Marine, “Our Stupid Civil Defense: Playing Politics with National Survival,” Nation, February 9, 
1957, 113.  
17 It’s Your Life . . . The San Francisco Plan (San Francisco: San Francisco Disaster Council and Corps, 
1956).  
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However much Conner abhorred having to deal with some of the more disturbing 
aspects of American life, cultural attitudes towards death intrigued him intellectually. 
They sometimes served as the conceptual fodder for his work, as in the violently themed 
assemblage BLACK DAHLIA (fig. 4.3) that constructs an abstract “dialogue” between 
characters in a drama, wherein contemporary “attitudes” towards the story are conceived 
of as “elements of the construction I was performing with.”18 This was Conner’s 
explanation about the ways in which his assemblages could communicate and prompt 
commentary on current issues and open them up to questioning. Titled after a much-
publicized news story in 1946, BLACK DAHLIA pictures an erotic substitute for the 
victim of this unsolved crime: a young woman who had come with her family from 
Medford, Massachusetts, to San Francisco, where her father worked in a naval shipyard. 
She later moved on her own to Los Angeles and was brutally murdered, as reported in 
macabre detail by the press, which nicknamed her “Black Dahlia.” In the assemblage, a 
photograph of a sexualized stand-in for the victim displays her bare back and backside to 
the viewer, who occupies the implied, dominant space of the unknown perpetrator. 
Engaging the viewer in an active role—as if, through the act of looking, one is forced to 
simulate the kind of voyeuristic observation that led to her gruesome death—BLACK 
DAHLIA demands acknowledgement of the part people play in dehumanizing each other. 
Rather than the “material excess” of the object disrupting any attempt to read its 
18 Interview with Conner by Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, AAA. 
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“narrative,” as Hatch has argued, the assemblage in fact treats narrative as a framework 
for an aggregate of ideas and issues that relate to death, an ever-present theme.19  
Although scholars have regarded the photograph (fig. 4.4) of the cadaver in 
RATBASTARD as a de-contextualized artifact, analogous to the other non-descript 
“found” materials pasted on the surface, this image holds as much narrative potential as, 
for example, the historically significant title BLACK DAHLIA, on account of the 
photograph having been chosen by Conner.20 Taken from an issue of Life magazine, as 
Conner himself recalled,21 the photograph depicts the mutilated body of a Russian 
Orthodox priest, named Georgy Gapon, who was believed to have betrayed his comrades 
in the Socialist Revolutionary Party and was lacerated and hanged under this suspicion. 
Written in 1958, the anti-communist Life article traces the roots of the Russian 
Revolution of 1917 to earlier uprisings and revolts, revealing an inherent tendency 
toward destruction. The “Russian revolutionary mind,” according to the article, believes 
in “all or nothing, chaos or heaven, and in the meantime the existing world must be swept 
away,” as confirmed by Dostoevsky’s claim that “‘nihilism was born in Russia.”22 A 
readership familiar with Cold War rhetoric may have recognized this history lesson as an 
attempt to suggest the Soviet Union’s deep-seated aggression, adopted by its 
19 Hatch argues that Conner’s assemblages “bury any potentially intelligible narratives under the weight … 
of their own sheer physicality.” Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 122–23. For commentary on the theme 
of death in his work, see Philip Leider, “Bruce Conner: A New Sensibility,” Artforum 1, no. 6 (November–
December 1962), 30. Leider writes, “The effect is a tone of total hopelessness, a sense of unrelieved 
depression, a sense of wretchedness, melancholy, despair—and death. The death symbol in Conner’s work 
is always the dead object, and the dead object is always present. Overtly, Conner’s concern would appear to 
be less with death itself than with the hideous forms death has taken in our times: mass murder, atomic 
bombing, torture, mutilation. But the omnipresent dead objects are ‘momento mori,’ pure and simple.”  
20 The current scholarship on Conner has not identified the exact source of the photograph.  
21 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 38. 
22 Alan Moorehead, “The Russian Revolution, Part II: Relentless Rise of the Conspiracy,” Life, January 20, 
1958, 60,  
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contemporary leaders. Reinforcing the historical connection to present times, another 
photograph (fig. 4.5) in the article pictures a “secret laboratory,”23 in which 
prerevolutionary radicals fabricated bombs underground—a reference that bears obvious 
comparison to the more sophisticated laboratories for making nuclear bombs in Russia.  
While top-secret laboratories were part of the recent past in the U.S., by 1958 the 
government felt, by publicizing a small fraction of the results of tests conducted by 
openly funded laboratories, that it could take the moral high ground against the Soviet 
Union’s continued policy of complete secrecy. Scientists at the Livermore Radiation 
Laboratory, near San Francisco, played a leading role in exposing the clandestine 
practices of their Russian counterparts in 1958, the year in which the Life article was 
published, which marked the beginning of negotiations among the Soviet Union, the 
U.S., and Britain on a nuclear-testing ban. Their diplomatic talks raised questions about 
the most effective means by which to monitor and verify compliance with the ban, with 
top Livermore physicists Edward Teller, the “father” of the hydrogen bomb, and Ernest 
Livermore, the laboratory’s founder, arguing for on-site inspections that would open the 
doors to the Soviet Union’s nuclear-research facilities.24 On the American side, the 
humiliating fallout disaster brought about by the Bravo test of 1954 had already put 
pressure on U.S. officials to reduce radiological hazards, whether through building so-
called “clean” bombs, conducting underground tests, or eliminating nuclear testing 
altogether. Until negotiations began, a favorite American political technique to deflect the 
23 Ibid., 67. 
24 See Gregg Herken, Brotherhood of the Bomb: The Tangled Lives and Loyalties of Robert Oppenheimer, 
Ernest Lawrence, and Edward Teller (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2013), and Zuoyue Wang, In 
Sputnik’s Shadow: The President’s Science Advisory Committee and Cold War America (New Brunswick, 
NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2009).  
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blame for fallout was to point fingers at the Russians, or at least to point out that their 
tests contributed to the “critical levels” of radioactive Strontium-90 in the atmosphere.25 
The year 1958 did see the three nuclear powers agree to a temporary testing moratorium, 
but it collapsed by 1961. With this troubling shift in policy, the city of San Francisco 
found itself back in an especially compromised position—not only in the crosshairs, if 
tensions between the Russians and Americans escalated to the point of war (as some local 
defense authorities predicted),26 but also in the geographical cross winds of radioactive 
fallout between the Soviet Union across the Pacific and the radiological laboratories in 
the Bay Area.  
RATBASTARD, as well as other assemblages that belong to what has been termed 
the “ratbastard” subset (for several include the word “rat” in the title), employ certain 
visual strategies that support the photograph’s allusion to expanding Cold War tensions 
and to the death those tensions promised to bring. On the surface of the ratbastard 
works—RATBASTARD and RAT PURSE (fig. 4.6), for example—no material is left 
untouched by deterioration, as if the disintegrating remnants of nylon, fur, fabric, wax, 
and feathers have reached their “half-life,” to use a radiological analogy, and are losing 
their former luster and effectiveness before our eyes. With decay permeating the entire 
visual field, any sense of differentiation between materials and spatial depth is canceled 
25 The U.S. Radiological Defense Laboratory of San Francisco provided this report. Graham Berry, “Fall-
out Held at Critical Levels Now: Geneticist Says Rise in Rate of Tests May Be Perilous,” Los Angeles 
Times, August 26, 1957. 
26 For example, in a 1957 article in the Los Angeles Times, civil defense organizations shared their 
predictions about the extent to which California’s major cities would be destroyed in nuclear attacks: 
“California disaster workers calculated the results today of a simulated nuclear attack on Los Angeles, San 
Francisco, and San Diego and came up with these mythical but still grim figures: more than 500,000 
persons dead or injured . . . Vast stretches of the State’s three big population centers in smoking ruins . . . 
San Francisco was blasted with a five-megaton bomb that hit on Treasure Island.” See “State Casualties in 
Attack Set at Half Million,” Los Angeles Times, July 14, 1957.  
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out or eliminated over time, the longer one looks. Hatch argues that Conner’s ratbastard 
assemblages tend to “frustrate the desire for, access to something beyond or below” the 
different materials, which appear to inhabit separate spaces momentarily, but then 
dissolve into one another at next glance.27 In RAT PURSE, as in RATBASTARD, where 
the veils of synthetic, chemically produced nylon stockings have been punctured with 
nails and stretched beyond the limits of their elasticity, the tears provide points of entry 
into deeper dimensions, only to reveal another area of destroyed material beneath. This 
false penetrability of the nylon calls into question its function as the top layer of the 
assemblage: does the nylon truly provide protection against outside elements (the 
function it was initially intended to serve for American consumers), or, as Conner 
presents the material, does its affinity with what lies below—brown, dirty, opaque, 
destructible, and vulnerable—instead emphasize a sense of all-over contamination? Does 
the nylon preserve the contents within or expose them to the same destructive conditions 
that destroyed the nylon in the first place?28   
If there is no place on the assemblages’ frontal plane to allow for the illusion of 
depth, there is also no part below the surface that would survive once the tenuous veil 
was fully breached. The phrase “no place to hide” comes to mind, recalling the title of the 
bestselling book authored by David Bradley in 1948, subsequently adopted as a headline 
27 Hatch, “It has to do with theater,” 126.  
28 Pap Ndiaye addresses the fascinating relationship between nylon and nuclear weapons in a historical 
account of the chemical company DuPont, which led the development of both the synthetic material and 
plutonium and subsequently ensured their “stockpiling” in homes and military bases alike. See Nylon and 
Bombs: DuPont and the March of Modern America (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 
2007). 
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for several news stories about nuclear warfare or civil defense.29 One particularly apt use 
of the phrase was for San Francisco–based journalist Gene Marine’s article “Still No 
Place to Hide,” in which he reported on the “National Defense against Atomic Attack” 
symposium held in Berkeley in 1955. After analyzing the remarks of the FCDA president 
Val Peterson, Marine lamented, “For those who are any nearer to the blast [than fifteen 
miles], there is probably no hope. And even those who survive will come out into a 
country without food, fuel, or institutions of government or finance to organize the 
recovery.”30 Marine meant that the extreme fallout effects would force any survivors to 
stay underground for days. He concluded that the “state of our defense is such that we 
can neither avoid being hit nor get off the floor after the blow. There is not only no place 
to hide; the age of hiding and hitting back is over.”31 To Marine’s mind, temporary 
shelter was not only an outmoded concept but also an unviable strategy for civil defense; 
it seemed the only alternative was to find shelter in another country entirely. Conner 
visually articulated the absurdity of “structural protection” in his work by constructing 
shoddy nylon coverings and by equipping RATBASTARD, RAT PURSE, and other 
assemblages with handles for the same easy portability as a suitcase.   
 
 
 
29 David Bradley, No Place to Hide (Boston: Little Brown, 1948); Gene Marine, “Still No Place to Hide,” 
Nation (February 5, 1955), 116–118. For subsequent uses of the phrase in the popular press, see, for 
example, “No Place to Hide,” Time 69 (April 1, 1957), 23, and “No Place to Hide,” Newsweek  50 
(December 30, 1957), 26. 
30 Marine, “Still No Place to Hide,” 118. 
31 Ibid.   
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San Francisco in the Atomic Imagination  
Just as BLACK DAHLIA used the fated victim from the news story to conjure 
discursive associations with the contemporary culture, the group of ratbastard objects 
appears to have shared aspects of the genre of apocalyptic fiction that brought real-life 
comparisons to bear. Fictional dramas that involved San Francisco, in particular, (as in 
the true story of the “Black Dahlia”) played on the scientific identity of the city and 
fueled its citizens’ already heightened awareness of being in the path of danger—what 
has been described, in Conner’s case, as “near-constant dread of nuclear holocaust.”32 
This sense of impending doom was a universal condition among the characters in the 
immensely popular novel, On the Beach. Written by Nevil Shute in 1957, the book 
addresses the total devastation of San Francisco in one powerful passage, but most of the 
story takes place in Melbourne, Australia. Finding temporary refuge from the nuclear war 
that purportedly wiped out the entire population of the Northern Hemisphere, the 
Australian survivors and an American submarine captain named Dwight Towers 
anticipate the imminent arrival of a deadly, cobalt-laced fallout cloud. In a desperate final 
effort to locate survivors and habitable land elsewhere, Captain Towers commands a 
submarine from Melbourne to the Pacific coast of the U.S., arriving first in San 
Francisco. The crew discovers Golden Gate Bridge and the surrounding neighborhood 
(precisely where Conner lived at the time of the book’s publication) in ruins:   
The supporting tower [of the bridge] at the south end seemed to have been 
overthrown. The houses visible from the sea around Golden Gate Park had 
suffered much from fire and blast; it did not look as if any of them were habitable. 
32 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 74. 
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They saw no evidence of any human life, and the radiation level made it seem 
improbable that life could still exist in that vicinity.33 
When the mission fails to discover survivors elsewhere, the remaining inhabitants in 
Australia accept their fate and await their time to succumb to radiation poisoning.  
In keeping with Conner’s storytelling approach to his “theater” of assemblage, 
RATBASTARD set up a narrative scenario similar to that of On the Beach. The 
photograph of a dead body not only introduced a main character in the stage-set of the 
work, but also other players, the survivors gathering around to inspect the body. Whether 
or not the viewer knew the true identities of these men, it would be easy to understand the 
basic dichotomy of their relationship: those who have thus far escaped death and those 
who have not. Mirroring the two categories of human existence in On the Beach, the 
photograph informed the viewing audience on how to relate to the total work as a life-
and-death situation. Hatch has contended that, rather than the assemblages performing for 
the artist, from his personal perspective, Conner’s “strange objects” instead “pitilessly 
imposed on their audience the experience of ‘miming’ the disorders of their day.”34 I 
would argue that Conner initiated this process of “miming” cultural disorders by making 
visible his own sense of the cultural malaise. By Shute’s fictional account of this Cold 
War kind of disorder, all San Franciscans would perish in a nuclear attack. But, as the 
title of Conner’s assemblage implies, the artist imagined himself and his fellow “rat-
bastards” somehow inhabiting the scene as survivors; in their role as the lowly, the 
ostracized, and the alienated of San Francisco, they may not have suffered the same fate 
33 Nevil Shute, On the Beach (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1957), 160. In 1959, the book 
was adapted as a blockbuster film, directed by Stanley Kramer and starring Gregory Peck and Ava 
Gardner.   
34 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 74 (italics in the original). 
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as the rest just yet, but they are forced to live with environmental conditions most people 
would consider intolerable. It seems the rat-bastards of Conner’s group belong to the 
category of the living but, like the survivors in the book, they anticipate and ponder their 
own death. On the Beach reinforces this notion that one category is no more favorable 
than the other, since the extant humanity is only prolonging the inevitable.  
Another tale of nuclear disaster, which Conner was less likely to have known than 
On the Beach, nonetheless describes the experience of slow death from radiation 
sickness—a popular subject not unique to this specific story—that manifests in the 
moribund aesthetic of several assemblages. The short story “Nine Days to Die,” 
published in the Saturday Evening Post in 1960, tells of an ordinary person turned 
radiation victim that, like On the Beach, delivers an unsubtle dose of fatalism. The main 
character is given the ironic surname “Vitali” and kept alive only long enough to 
understand the unavoidable outcome of his encounter with radiation. Late one night just 
outside the city limits of San Francisco, a truck from Livermore Radiation Laboratory 
skids off the road and drops containers of radioactive waste from the back of the truck, 
which discharge the deadly contents onto an innocent bystander named Joe Vitali.  The 
scientists called in to treat him shave his entire body and give him several showers, hard 
scrubbings, and enemas to purge the contaminants. This shedding of clothes, skin, hair, 
and waste makes his body so raw on the outside, compounded by the “hot” sensation 
coming from inside, that the laboratory team packs Vitali in ice. In an effort to explain to 
Vitali’s wife what has caused his suffering, one of the scientists describes for her the 
concept of radioactive waste and its method of disposal: packaged in shielded, concrete-
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filled containers, hazardous materials are transported from laboratories to naval bases, 
loaded onto ships, and dumped into a designated burial site in the ocean. Typically, this 
method is safe, the scientist assures her, but accidents are bound to happen, with tests on 
nuclear energy constantly undertaken to “develop the power of that force for the good of 
all people.” When Vitali ultimately dies, his widow is told that “there is a meaning and 
purpose in Joe’s death,” implying that he was sacrificed for the greater good.35 The theme 
of sacrifice, and its association with bizarre rituals to prepare for death, would appear in 
Conner’s assemblages of this period—perhaps not coincidentally, in the “ratbastard” 
assemblages that conjure up the sacrificial condition of the rat in society.   
 
Laboratory Rats  
Before September 1961, when Conner departed for Mexico, he imagined his own 
death would occur in a specific way, not unlike that of the characters in these disaster 
fictions, and that it would happen in San Francisco. It is this fantastical but not entirely 
unrealistic situation that he evokes by creating the illusion that his ratty constructions are 
hanging onto their lives by a thread.  In RAT PURSE, for example, Conner swathes the 
fragile materials in a nylon web, analogous to the ice-packing treatment Vitali received in 
“Nine Days to Die,” as if to mitigate their degradation in spite of knowing they will 
naturally deteriorate with or without the protection. In a similar way, Conner often 
carefully performed maintenance on his finished assemblages. He welcomed some 
organic changes, such as the accretion of dust and dirt, which altered the object’s exterior 
35 William Sambrot, “Nine Days to Die: The Story of an Atomic-Age Ordeal,” Saturday Evening Post, July 
9, 1960, 95. 
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appearance, yet he insisted on treating any signs that it was irreversibly slipping closer to 
death, as a conservator would do.36 Fetishizing this moribund state, Conner seemed to 
think that surface patina contributed a certain authenticity to the aesthetic of decay, but 
the work’s survival took precedence. A similar strategy could be observed of the worn 
sheath of nylon that envelops RAT PURSE. More of a placebo than an antidote to 
destruction, the material simply serves as a life-support device to maintain a façade of 
liminality, of teetering on the edge of death.   
With its appendage of a large bundle that hangs like a pendulum, RAT PURSE 
portrays containment—perhaps not of something precious but, considering the 
assemblage’s other allusions to death, of something hazardous. Suspended by a swath of 
nylon, which looks as though it could snap at any moment, the bundle contains a metal 
can. It possesses the quality of a talismanic charm with hidden power, its energy stored 
from within. In San Francisco in the 1950s, the concept of containment was inexorably 
linked to the packaging and disposal of radioactive byproducts from nuclear testing. 
Located approximately forty miles west of the city in the Pacific Ocean, the atomic 
dumping ground was, as of 1957, home to “ten thousand concrete barrels of atomic 
radioactive waste,” each containing enough radioactivity that a “radsafe” worker would 
“have to stand off and stir that with a long pole,” as one American scientist described the 
36 Of the “ratbastard” assemblages, Hatch observes, “Conner himself expressed contradictory feelings about 
the fate of his assemblages. While consistently asserting that the works are ephemeral and subject to the 
vicissitudes of time (for example, the accretion of dust), he nonetheless remained vigilant to the point of 
obsession concerning their care and expressed anger in not being allowed to conserve works in private 
collections.” Hatch, “‘It has to do with the theater,’” 118, fn. 24.  
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dangerous conditions that accompanied the handling of this material.37 Because the 
process, from manufacture to transportation, was exceedingly expensive, some scientists 
proposed cheaper methods of disposal, including the injection of atomic waste below the 
water table, thereby avoiding any harm to people.38 For at least the next decade, the old 
method of byproduct storage continued, though not without controversy. As an example, 
in 1960, a resident of southern California, who had been subcontracted by the Atomic 
Energy Commission to store nearly two-thousand barrels of radioactive waste (many of 
which reportedly came from Livermore near San Francisco) in his private salvage yard, 
was charged by the city of Long Beach with “running a junk business without a license,” 
in spite of the AEC’s claim that the barrels were harmless.39 This anecdote reveals an 
analogy between atomic “junk” and ordinary refuse and therefore an important link to 
Conner: San Francisco’s association of garbage collectors, called the Scavengers 
Protective Association, inspired Conner to found the “Rat Bastard Protection 
Association” with his group of friends, as a gesture of solidarity with fellow junk 
handlers, who doubtlessly encountered dangerous materials in the neighborhoods of 
laboratories.40  
In relation to RAT PURSE, the title’s reference to the “rat” further alludes to the 
idea that the “purse” is a receptacle for contaminated waste. Both in bomb detonations 
and in radiation laboratories, which produced the radioactive substances necessitating 
37 “Atomic Refuse Leaves Pacific Unaffected,” Los Angeles Times, December 3, 1957. 
38  “Panel Gives Plan on Atomic Waste: U. of California Study Group Proposes Injecting ‘Hot’ Materials 
into the Ground,” New York Times, October 6, 1957.  
39 Bill Becker, “Atomic Junkman Faces Scrap Heap: Ordered by California City to Give Up Disposal Job 
for A.E.C.,” New York Times, January 17, 1960. 
40 See Boswell, “Theater of Light and Shadow,” 41, and Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 44.   
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special methods of disposal, rats were the ubiquitous testing subjects. Previously the 
unsavory scourges of unsanitary living conditions, rats underwent a cultural redefinition 
of sorts by becoming the most widely used animal in nuclear testing. Numerous reports 
on these experiments made clear that rats had come to serve a utilitarian purpose in 
society, sacrificing their lives for the sake of scientific discovery. Prior to the first 
postwar atomic tests in 1946, five-thousand rats, about twenty-five times more than any 
other animal, were loaded onto ships in San Francisco, where they joined military and 
civilian personnel, equipment, and other experimental animals—all bound for the U.S. 
Pacific testing grounds.41 William Shurcliff, a physicist who participated in the tests and 
authored the book Bombs at Bikini, wrote of these “time-honored experimental animals 
of radiology” that rats were a “logical choice, since so much is known about their 
response to radiation and the correlation of their responses with man’s.”42 Conner would 
later read Shurcliff’s book in conducting research for CROSSROADS, the artist’s 1976 
film that reinterprets the birth of the atomic age with declassified documentary footage of 
these early nuclear explosions, as will be addressed in this chapter.43 
Regardless of whether Conner was aware of Shurcliff’s account when making 
RAT PURSE in 1959, several other news stories reinforced the idea of a radiological 
affinity between rats and humans. In particular, scientists debated whether rats would 
literally carry dangerous amounts of radiation in their organs and, by extension, whether 
41 William A. Shurcliff, Bombs at Bikini: The Official Report of Operation Crossroads (New York: 
William H. Wise and Co., 1947), 87. 
42 Ibid., 85.  
43 William Moritz and Beverly O’Neill, “Fallout: Some Notes on the Films of Bruce Conner,” Film 
Quarterly 31, no. 4 (Summer 1978), 36. 
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radioactive substances would take hold in people.44 The first extensive study to test such 
correlations occurred after the nuclear tests at Bikini, as graphically told a year later in a 
Life article on the findings of those experiments. The article included a two-page spread 
of photographs: pictured on the same page were samples of fabrics exposed to the 
aftereffects of the first blast, including a singed “tan” piece that resembled Conner’s 
damaged nylon stockings, and, below this image, a flayed rat (fig. 4.7), illustrating how 
overexposure to radiation had resulted in the enlargement of the animal’s organs.45  
“Conner’s assemblage stages a flaying, a ritualized sacrifice—as evinced by the spilling 
innards of RATBASTARD,” Hatch observed of the antecedent to RAT PURSE.46 Although 
the latter work covers rather than flays its core, the secrecy about the quarantined 
contents of the hanging pouch enhances the desire to discover what is held inside. If 
Conner believed there was a symbolic connection to be made among him, his junk-
collecting friends, rats, and waste, RAT PURSE could be understood, at least on one 
level, as Conner’s attempt to equate the conditions of “rat bastards” with laboratory rats, 
the involuntary subjects of radiological experimentation.  
This association between rats and men was a culturally rooted notion, particularly 
embedded in the identity of San Francisco. As radiological testing on rats continued into 
the 1960s, Time magazine featured a report on the scientists of San Francisco’s National 
Radiological Defense Laboratory, which operated under the auspices of the U.S. Navy. 
Investigating the hypothesis that rats could sense the presence of radiation, the NRDL 
44 AEC scientists studied “possible after effects which might remain in living things in the [fallout] area.” 
See “Snakes, Rats, and Birds Thrive on A-Bomb Site,” Science News-Letter 56 (July 30, 1949), 79.  
45 “What Science Learned at Bikini: Latest Report on the Results” Life, August 11, 1947, 74.  
46 Hatch, “‘It has to do with theater,’” 131–32.  
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expressed optimism that they could soon extend their experiments to humans: “The 
nerves and sense of rats and men are basically alike,” said one Navy scientist, noting that 
the only missing link to be discovered before human experimentation could begin was 
“just how rats do their radiation detection.”47 Conner himself sensed that radioactivity 
was pervasive in his environment but, unlike what the scientists were assuming of the 
rats, he did not trust his instincts alone. By the account of one friend, Conner regularly 
measured the radiation around his home with a Geiger counter, as if to accept this 
monitoring as a natural extension of his housekeeping routine. 48 Although the Time 
article that discussed the radiation experiments on rats was published the year after 
Conner had left for Mexico, other news stories had already established the rat-human 
affinity as a cultural trope.49 For Conner, it was something more of a malaise that made 
men feel like subjects being tested, but he seemed to acknowledge the comparison 
nonetheless. 
Rendered around the same time as RAT PURSE, the assemblage CHILD (fig. 4.8) 
suggests more about the afflictions Conner observed of the broader culture than his 
immediate locale. Seated in a salvaged high chair, the figure of a young child is not only 
nameless but faceless, its visage partially obscured by a blindfold and completely charred 
to match the mutilated body. Art historians have tended to read CHILD as a grotesque 
portrait of Caryl Chessman, a California man initially accused of sexual molestation and 
47 “How to Avoid Radiation Without Really Knowing It,” Time 79, no. 22 (June 1962), 48.  
48 As experimental filmmaker  Lynne Sachs recalls, “In 1985-86, the year I spent working with [Conner], 
we often drove around San Francisco in his Cadillac looking for Geiger counters to measure the 
radioactivity under his home.” Lynne Sachs, “Bruce Conner Remembered,” accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://www.lynnesachs.com/medium/writing/bruce-conner-remembered-08082008/ 
49 For example, see also: “Rats to the Rescue,” Newsweek 45 (1955), 87, and “Irradiated Food Doesn’t Hurt 
Rats,” Science Digest 40 (1956), 19.  
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later sentenced to death for what many considered the trumped-up charge of 
kidnapping.50 This interpretation of the assemblage seems to have stuck, partly because 
the figure exhibits male genitals (thus signifying a grown man), but also because Conner 
has mentioned Chessman as the original inspiration behind CHILD. Referring to the 
criminal in a 1974 interview, the artist remarked, “He was being sacrificed by the system. 
And my view of him was that he was entirely a child of our society. And it was because 
the parents were upset by the fact that they had failed so miserably in their bringing up of 
this child that they were going to destroy it.”51 But as Conner began to contemplate the 
broader implications of “our society” mistreating its children, he realized that CHILD 
“meant more than just that particular event [involving Chessman]. It meant that concept 
of the relationship with the child to the parent,” still broadly defined as “society.”52 
Conner’s own recalibration of his thought process has transformed CHILD into an open 
text, loosely hinging on the themes of punishment and sacrifice.    
In the same interview, Conner discussed how he tended to frame the “characters” 
of his assemblages in terms of the “mythology that I observed in the movies,” particularly 
in science fiction films that played with the notion of dehumanization. He cited Creature 
from the Black Lagoon, starring the Gill Man monster, as one influential example that 
addressed the relationship between “mindless creatures” and the “deformed society” by 
which they were produced, often as the result of “scientists that [sic] invented very bad 
50 Boswell, “Theater of Light and Shadow,” 41.  
51 Oral history interview with Conner by Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, AAA.  
52 Ibid.  
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things.”53 As Conner recounted, the Gill Man’s sexual arousal in response to the lead 
woman character increases each time scientists “dump some poison into the water.” 
These actions directly implicate the men in engendering a sexualized mutant who feeds 
on their toxic fuel. Understood by anyone familiar with these monster movies of the 
1950s, the irony of the scientists’ attempt to kill the Gill Man with poison was that these 
mutants were originally created by radioactive waste, a different kind of manmade poison 
that polluted oceans, lakes, rivers, streams, and swamps alike.54 Historian Joseph Masco 
has argued that another film of that year, Them!, was among the first of its genre to link 
directly the “dispersal of nuclear materials in the environment” with the creation of “new 
kinds of mutant life, as species are reinvented at the genetic level.”55 Extending this 
notion of mutation, Creature from the Black Lagoon shows that the scientists responsible 
for studying the environmental effects of radiation had also undergone a radical change: 
they have come to distribute these toxic materials as much as deter their use.   
That Conner fixated on the ecological consequences of contamination in the film 
was not an insignificant detail, particularly because he related this theme of science 
fiction to his assemblages. In San Francisco, where Conner lived when he conceived of 
and executed all the works discussed thus far, the reality of contaminated water began to 
mirror atomic fiction.  A source of increasing concern was the “radwaste” site—what 
53 Ibid. In a contemporaneous published interview, Conner discusses his purchase of 18mm film of 
Creature from the Black Lagoon, among other old films. See Kristine Stiles and Peter Howard Selz, eds., 
Theories and Documents of Contemporary Art: A Sourcebook of Artists’ Writings (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1996), 332.  
54 See Nathan Abrams and Julie Hughes, eds., Containing America: Cultural Production and Consumption 
in 50s America (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2000). 
55 Joseph Masco, “Mutant Ecologies: Radioactive Life in Post–Cold War New Mexico,” Cultural 
Anthropology 19, no. 4 (2004), 520. 
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would become the largest undersea dumping ground for radioactive waste in the United 
States—adjacent to the Farallon Islands, located twenty-five miles off the city’s coast.56 
Near this site, the U.S. Navy reportedly sunk the radioactive ship U.S.S. Independence 
after many failed attempts to decontaminate it, along with several battleships that the 
military had originally towed to the Bay after nuclear tests, beginning in 1946.57 Fallout 
experiments conducted in areas surrounding the base further contributed to the 
radiological pollution of natural water sources. For example, to test the theory that 
saltwater clams were biologically engineered to “collect” and store the radioactive 
isotope cobalt-60 in their bodies, thereby endangering any animal that consumed those 
clams, the NRDL scientists “added a little cobalt to San Francisco Bay water.” The 
problematic consequences that the news report did not discuss were not only whether 
humans should be concerned about consuming other animals or plants that possibly 
contained dangerous concentrations of radioactive isotopes, but also that another 
radioactive substance had been introduced into the densely populated, urban coastline.58   
Though in Conner’s private correspondence and interactions with friends he had 
hinted before at his morbid fascination with nuclear destruction (and would subsequently 
continue to do so), his reference to “poison” in relation to the film Creature from the 
Black Lagoon hints at how he viewed the invisible effects of radioactivity on humankind. 
His concept of the cinematic relationship between human and monster was similar to that 
56 Michael Steinberg, “Hot Spots: Radioactive in San Francisco,” San Francisco Bay View, December 29, 
2013. 
57 “After Year Ships Are Radioactive,” Life, August 11, 1947, 84. 
58 “Hot Clams,” Time 69, no. 17 (April 29, 1957). Another water-based experiment near San Francisco 
involved scientists mixing radioactive gold into river water and testing whether radioactivity diminished as 
water moved downstream. See “Gold Thrown into River to Measure Flow,” Los Angeles Times, July 10, 
1957. 
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of the parent sacrificing its child through inhumane punishment, as in the example of 
CHILD. Considering that Conner already conceived of this assemblage in terms of its 
perceived relationship with the “parent” of society, it may be productive also to view the 
work through the lens of nuclear culture. He made the analogy between sci-fi monsters 
and children explicit when, in the interview in which he discussed Creature from the 
Black Lagoon at length, he mused, “They were like children. Frankenstein, King Kong, 
and the rest of them.”59 In following this trope of the mid-century science-fiction film, 
CHILD puts the figure’s sexual arousal on prominent display, with the inclusion of an 
oversized phallus, to suggest vulnerability to a barrage of unhealthy stimulation.  
In reality, evidence of the mental and physical damage imposed on children who 
lived downwind of radiological testing sites was abundant. In 1959, the year in which 
Conner began the assemblage, the NRDL reported on another of its local tests, this time 
conducted at a military camp in the town of Pleasanton, about thirty miles outside San 
Francisco and only a half-mile from a public school with “several hundred Pleasanton 
school children” in attendance.60 In an effort to “improve techniques and equipment” 
necessary in radiological emergencies, such as the unexpected onset of a “deadly 
radioactive ‘rain,’” the Navy scientists staged a hypothetical scenario in which they 
“sprinkled” ten tons of radioactive sands over a four-mile area of the camp.  Although the 
sands would remain there for eight days before the process of decontamination began, the 
Laboratory determined that the children “will not need to be evacuated.”  
59 Oral history interview with Conner by Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, AAA.  
60 “Navy to Sprinkle Radioactive Sand over Camp to Test Fallout Cleanup,” The Washington Post, 
November 14, 1959. 
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In another article published in 1959, experts challenged the laissez-faire attitudes 
of their NDRL counterparts, who treated children, the involuntary lab rats in the 
experiment, as incidental factors in what the AEC called the “controlled risk” of such 
tests.61 Alfred H. Sturtevant, a geneticist at the California Institute of Technology, 
opposed this kind of gamble with human lives—a risk “over which the individual has no 
control”—as did Sturtevant’s colleague, chemist Linus Pauling, an even more outspoken 
dissident of nuclear testing.62 While the NDRL only studied the effects of nuclear 
explosions, never directly conducting them, Pauling would have nonetheless considered 
the San Francisco–based laboratory a source of the same harmful “bomb debris” 
associated with actual explosions. “For every bomb that is exploded,” Pauling estimated 
that “fifteen thousand children are caused to be born with gross physical and mental 
defects,” further noting that no person was safe, in any case, since radioactive fallout 
from high-yield detonations already “blankets the entire planet.”63 As the article 
describes it, the method that scientists used to “catch” those particles for laboratory 
analysis—gummed sheets of film placed high in the air—evokes images of flypaper, 
sticky webs, or other such matted nets, not unlike debris-collecting nylons that entangle 
the figure in CHILD. 
Also calling to mind this assemblage were the plastic test dummies featured in the 
widely publicized images of “doom towns,” mock American villages constructed in the 
Nevada Test Site in the early 1950s. The AEC built the towns to study blast and radiation 
61 Steven M. Spencer, “Fallout: The Silent Killer,” Saturday Evening Post 232, no. 9 (August 29, 1959), 89. 
62 Ibid. 
63 Ibid., 86.  
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effects on various structures, including houses and the furniture, appliances, food, and 
“human” families contained therein. As the narrator of the 1950 civil defense film Let’s 
Face It noted, “It’s a weird, fantastic city, a creation right out of science fiction.”64 In the 
several tests on these towns, mannequins took the place of real people, and these human 
substitutes, poignantly articulating the inhumanity of the desert tableaux, proved a 
favorite subject in propaganda films produced by the Federal Civil Defense Agency and 
national and local periodicals. Life magazine, one of the numerous media outlets that 
showed “before” and “after” pictures (fig. 4.9) of the mannequins from the “Operation 
Cue” testing series in 1955,65 assessed their varying degrees of bodily harm, ranging 
from alive to “presumed dead.” A “scorched” mannequin, considered a survivor, wears a 
suit of dark fabric that would apparently protect a human enough to be “burned but 
alive.” Another is “burned up except for [his] face.” One of them may be the same 
mannequin depicted in the civil defense film of the test, in which the plastic body is 
shown being lifted by one of the workers out of the rubble of a blasted house.  
Of the many other lifelike dolls pictured in local news stories across the country 
after the 1955 test, the young mannequin girl (fig. 4.10) in the Oregon Journal, 
Portland’s daily newspaper, perhaps most closely resembles Conner’s CHILD than any 
64 The woman narrator adds, “Textiles and synthetic fabrics were also to be tested.” See Federal Civil 
Defense Administration, Let’s Face It (United States Air Force: Lookout Mountain Laboratory, no date), 
originally from U.S. Department of Energy, MPEG video, 13:25, 
https://archive.org/details/FederalCivilDefenseAdministrationletsFaceIt. 
65 “Victims at Yucca Flat,” Life, May 16, 1955, 58. Secondary literature on the subject of doom towns 
includes: Tom Vanderbilt, Survival City: Adventures Among the Ruins of Atomic America (New York, NY: 
Princeton Architectural Press, 2002), and Laura McEnaney, Civil Defense Begins at Home: Militarization 
Meets Everyday Life in the Fifties (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000).  
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other example.66 Like Conner’s monstrous variation on the child test subject, she sits 
with her legs unnaturally splayed, in a chair that appears too large for her body. While the 
charred limbs of Conner’s figure have broken off, rendering them raw stumps, the legs of 
the mannequin in the photograph still are pristine. She cocks her head to the side, as if to 
respond to the man who kneels beside her, though she appears not to look at him or the 
object he holds in his hand. With the focus of her gaze indeterminate, the mannequin 
assumes the look of a blind person, who strains to hear rather than see, just as the crude 
imitation of a toddler in CHILD exhibits blindness. In both examples, a youthful victim is 
made monstrous in the hands of its parent, who led the unwitting child into danger. 
Conner may have consciously cultivated this allusion to nuclear-related hazards through 
his narrative presentation of the obliterated doll. 
BOMB (fig. 4.11) is the sole assemblage by Conner whose title makes explicit 
reference to violence. Like the weapon after it has exploded, BOMB is no longer extant 
and has thus not received much critical attention. Rebecca Solnit has provided the only 
known interpretation, which rightly situates the historical context of the work in the 
specific locale of San Francisco, as art historians have attempted with several of Conner’s 
works. Solnit claims that BOMB was “inspired by the slow annihilation of the Victorian 
houses of the Western Addition’s black community,”67 though she does not say whether 
Conner himself had linked the assemblage to this concept of “urban renewal.” If Conner 
had in fact thought about the city’s housing controversy when he constructed BOMB, the 
66 “Bill Browne and Dummy A-Bomb Test,” 1955, Oregon Journal, accessed January 10, 2014, 
http://ohp.dev.research.pdx.edu/articles/historical-records/bill-browne-amp-dummy-a-bomb-test-
1955/#.U2deDFcSGSo.  
67 Solnit, Secret Exhibition, 68. 
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subject may have brought to mind a more concrete association to weapons than Solnit 
had meant to suggest in her observation. Following the destruction of many houses 
owned by African Americans in the Fillmore district (also known as the Western 
Addition) in the mid- to late 1950s, the majority of the city’s black population relocated 
to Hunter’s Point, a neighborhood best known as the site of the nuclear research facility, 
NRDL, at a large naval shipyard.68 Hunter’s Point had also notoriously served as the 
transfer point for fissionable materials used in the first atomic bomb; they were loaded on 
a ship at the naval yard for transport to the island of Tinian, where the B-29 bomber plane 
Enola Gay awaited its cargo, to be dropped on Hiroshima.69 In addition to these isolated 
events, the regular work in and around Hunters Point involved both the creation and the 
receipt of radioactive waste, eventually bound for its burial site in the ocean. Thus, 
whether BOMB evoked the demolition that drove a large number of San Franciscans to 
Hunter’s Point or “the Bomb” that most other Americans considered the point of 
reference for explosions, both ideas pointed to the common condition of radioactivity in 
the aftermath of that destruction.  
These narratives about annihilation, one on the local level and the other national, 
developed concurrently in the mid-1950s and reached a peak around the turn of the 
decade, just before Conner fled San Francisco. In a letter to his friend, Michael McClure, 
that explained his rationale, he unambiguously made reference to the kind of bomb that 
was foremost in his mind at the time of his departure in 1961: “It was called BOMB and 
68 Paul T. Miller, The Postwar Struggle for Civil Rights: African Americans in San Francisco (New York: 
Routledge, 2010), 3. See also Daniel Edward Crowe, Prophets of Rage: The Black Freedom Struggle in 
San Francisco, 1945–1969 (New York: Taylor and Francis, 2000), 69, and Arthur E. Hippler, Hunter’s 
Point: A Black Ghetto (New York: Basic Books, 1974).  
69 See Norman Polmar, The Enola Gay (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2003), 27.  
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war and hate surrounding and I finally realized there is no talk left and the end 
inevitable,”70 emphasizing the operative word in all caps (just as he did with all the titles 
of his work). The increasing frequency with which local reports placed San Francisco at 
the center of that “talk” about nuclear war perhaps intensified the tensions that Conner 
described. Imagining that San Francisco were a target, some forecasters predicted that 
anyone living within the bull’s eye—that is, the city center, which encompassed Hunter’s 
Point and Conner’s Fillmore neighborhood—would likely die, if not from the blast then 
certainly from radiation overdoses (fig. 4.12).71 It is not known whether Conner had 
access to a blast or fallout shelter at the time, but graphical illustrations like these, which 
went to a new extreme by incorporating representations of dead bodies, would have 
indicated that a shelter would not improve his chance of survival. The speculations of this 
study, conducted by a research group at Stanford University in 1960, were typical of 
other sources of public information that drew on national rhetoric to heighten preexisting 
local fears. Immediately following the cessation of the Partial Test Ban Treaty in 1961, 
for example, the Los Angeles Times offered bleak news about the fallout conditions on 
the West Coast, where the two major cities in California saw the “highest radioactivity 
levels since the Russians resumed nuclear testing,” estimated at 7.5% (and trending 
higher) of the maximum permissible dose in San Francisco.72 When even the hard data 
70 Bruce Conner, letter to Michael McClure, February 12, 1962, Bruce Conner Papers, Bancroft Library, 
University of California-Berkeley, quoted in Kevin Hatch, “Looking for Bruce Conner, 1957–1967,” (PhD 
diss., Princeton University, 2008), 84, fn174.  
71 Roger S. Cannell, ed., Three Plans for Survival in a Nuclear Attack (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford Research 
Institute, 1960), 10. In a foreword address to the staff of the Stanford Research Institute, Cannell wrote, 
“Fortunately we live in an area geographically so related to potential enemy targets that it would be 
possible to save lives.” This was one of the paradoxes of living in the Bay Area at this time.  
72 “L.A. Radiation Highest Since A-Tests Resumed,” Los Angeles Times, September 26, 1961. 
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found in such reports supported the more abstract predictions of a worsening political and 
environmental climate, this kind of rhetoric insured the warning calls would be heard 
close to home. Conner clearly listened to them.  
 
“Running from Death” to Mexico  
In spite of the vital counterculture that Conner helped to establish in San 
Francisco, there was something, or many things, he found so deathly about the city that 
he felt compelled to leave in 1961. Extreme as this action may at first appear, it was not 
entirely unusual for an American to flee the country for fear of atomic annihilation. 
Conner unwittingly aligned himself with the subculture of survivalism and was even 
slightly ahead of the curve, according to a 1962 article about this emerging phenomenon. 
During the three months in which journalist Grant Flint gathered research for his story, 
apparently coinciding with the period in which Conner traveled to Mexico, the reporter 
“met directly with, or heard reliable reports of, nearly 1,200 Americans who are planning 
[to] escape from the bomb and about 500 more who have already fled.”73 The movement 
followed a general ethos, some facets of which differed from Conner’s motivations for 
his escape and others of which he shared. One significant difference was the organization 
of survivalist groups. They often required memberships, with fees, that stipulated active 
participation in a “survival colony” after relocation. Flint observed, “Each [colony] tends 
to view its venture as the nucleus of a new way of life, as a social experiment which 
73 Grant A. Flint, “Flight from Doomsday,” Nation, January 20, 1962, 53.  
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might serve as a model for the external world—if the external world survives.”74 Conner 
had no such aims to inspire a new paradigm with his reclusive lifestyle or to be 
accompanied by anyone on the journey but his wife, Jean.  
Apart from the social aspirations of the survivalists, however, he could relate to 
their view of themselves as ideologically at odds with the majority of Americans. 
Echoing Conner’s rationale for leaving San Francisco, members of the movement were 
“convinced that all-out thermonuclear war is an imminent certainty rather than a 
dangerous possibility,” Flint wrote. “They believe there remains only one realistic course 
of action – escape.”75 For the survivalists, even if fallout from the nuclear war eventually 
killed them in their remote colonies it would be better to live a short time longer, under 
healthier living conditions, than to perish among the complacent. Conner, who initially 
shared this perspective, came to the realization that he was simply “running away from 
death” in Mexico,76 as if the inevitability of the end result, whether he was located here 
or there, became crystal clear.   
Based on Conner’s recollection of that time, he planned to arrive in Mexico City 
and then “figure out how to live in the mountains after the Bomb dropped.”77 Although 
he ultimately stayed in Mexico City for the year that he lived in the country, the Sierra 
Madre surrounded the entire metropolis. Walter Hopps, owner of the Ferus Gallery in 
Los Angeles, which had showed Conner’s work since 1959, visited the artist shortly after 
his move and accompanied him on an impromptu, archaeological excavation at the foot 
74 Ibid., 54.  
75 Ibid., 53.   
76 Solnit, Secret Exhibition, 97. 
77 Ibid.  
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of a mountain range in nearby Puebla, where a professional dig was taking place.78 
Hopps remarked about the curious pleasure Conner took in unearthing old relics: “We 
dug up some old pots and artifacts—nothing spectacular, no gold or anything. It was 
dusty and difficult work . . . but [Conner] was really interested in doing this.”79 In this 
passage, Hopps apparently intended the reference to gold as a link to his own grandfather, 
who was a prospector in Tampico, Mexico, in the late nineteenth century, “much like the 
old man in Treasure of the Sierra Madre,”80 a 1927 novel adapted as a film in 1948. 
Updating this classic gold-rush story with a contemporary twist, a later film, The Atomic 
Kid of 1954 (fig. 4.13), features two amateur prospectors, played by Mickey Rooney and 
Robert Strauss, who try to make their fortune in uranium, which had usurped the previous 
century’s most profitable metal.81 They stake a claim on what they believe is uranium-
rich land, not knowing that their radiation-detecting equipment had led them onto an 
active atomic-testing site.  
Conner and Hopps may not have been looking for uranium, but their fanciful 
search for hidden treasure in the mountains evoked the new prospecting phenomenon as 
much as the old. The two friends may not have even known about The Atomic Kid or the 
several other films like it; many years would pass until Conner reportedly carried a 
Geiger counter, seemingly not in ironic imitation of such prospectors but for actual safety 
concerns. Yet in the early 1960s, it was easy to recognize that the American uranium 
78 The excavation took place on the property of Hopps’s relatives “outside of Puelba, south of Mexico City, 
on the side of a mountain.” Walter Hopps, “Bruce Conner,” BOMB no. 80 (Summer 2002), 9.  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid.  
81 See Tom Zoellner, Uranium: War, Energy, and the Rock That Shaped the World (New York: Penguin, 
2009).  
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boom of the previous decade was coming to a close, abruptly ending in 1962 when the 
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission ceased its offer to buy uranium sites from 
individuals.82 At the height of “uranium fever” in 1955, however, Life magazine reported 
that, in rocky outcroppings across North America, “thousands of full-time uranium 
prospectors” are joined by “some 10,000 people [who] spend weekends tramping the hills 
for uranium.”83 Like each of those adventure-seekers described in Life’s how-to guide, 
hoping for the “chance he will make that rare, bonanza discovery,”84 Hopps and Conner 
engaged in their own diversion in earnest, in the very region where the artist had intended 
to survive the bomb’s aftermath.  
Even when engaging in such situations that could be considered mainstream (or in 
the case of the survival-by-escape movement, countercultural), Conner drew upon those 
social experiences differently than most people and often registered that difference in his 
work. In San Francisco, responding to what he called the “environment” of the “time or 
place” through his assemblages,85 he exposed the filthy, degraded, decaying, deformed, 
mutilated, and shabbily protected underbelly of everyday urban life—characteristics that 
could serve as analogies, in forcefully material ways, to the consequences of all that was 
immaterially and invisibly toxic about the Bay Area. While most people accepted these 
82 See Catherine Caufield, Multiple Exposures: Chronicles of the Radiation Age (New York: Perennial 
Library, 1989), esp. 75–88; Michael Amundson, Yellowcake Towns: Uranium Mining Communities in the 
American West (Boulder, CO: University Press of Colorado, 2002); Arthur R. Gomez, Quest for the Golden 
Circle: The Four Corners and the Metropolitan West, 1945–1970 (Albuquerque: University of New 
Mexico Press, 1994).  
83 “History’s Greatest Metal Hunt,” Life, May 23, 1955, 25. Although this article focuses on the boom in 
the western United States, in places like New Mexico, Colorado, and Utah, mining prospects extended into 
countries all over the world, including a small number in the Sierra Madre regions of Mexico. See Franz J. 
Dahlkamp, Uranium Deposits of the World, Volume II (Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Verlag, 2009), 417. 
84 Ibid.  
85 Interview with Conner by Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, AAA.  
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conditions without much protest, persuaded by the government’s insistence that the “rad-
lab” tests were harmless, the assemblages convey Conner’s sense of kinship with the 
involuntary testing subject. This relationship is most directly evinced in his giving the 
moniker “ratbastard” to both the debased type of assemblage and to himself, but also in 
his tangibly echoing in those works an awareness of the pervasive contamination of 
everything around him.  
Further demonstrating the affect Conner’s surroundings had on his practice, the 
assemblages he made in Mexico shed their formerly ratty appearance and took on a new 
look. Hopps attributes the aesthetic change to what materials were available on the streets 
of Mexico City—for him, exemplified in GUADALUPE (fig. 4.14), with its prominent 
swath of natural fabric that offered a far less synthetic look than the thick nylon 
sheaths—resulting in qualities characterized as “handmade” and “vulnerable.” 86 Hatch 
and Boswell, both of whom acknowledge extreme apprehension of “nuclear holocaust” as 
the impetus for Conner’s geographical move,87 discern visible differences in the work. 
For Hatch, they are primarily formal: the “wrapping” strategy of the previous 
assemblages has given way to the “layering” of the new, and the former “veil” of the 
nylons (“still present” in other Mexican-period works, but less intrusive) has transformed 
into a subtler play between “revealing and concealing” with collaged paper.88 Boswell 
locates the shift more in the works’ mode of address, from “social perception” to “private 
vision,” which he identifies particularly with Conner’s use of ritual objects, such as the 
86 Hopps, “Bruce Conner,” 9.  
87 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 74, and Boswell, “Theater of Light and Shadow,” 42. 
88 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 86.  
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rosaries and devotional cards featured in GUADALUPE. 89 In this work, a gesture as 
simple as the casual drape of cloth, by comparison to the tightly wound and repeatedly 
punctured nylon in the earlier assemblages, implies the crux of all three scholars’ 
interpretations about the new work. While they suggest a relaxing of past preoccupations, 
allowing for a sense of ease, permeability, and individual identity to enter into a visual 
register, I hope to have shown in this chapter a more explicit correlation between the state 
of escalating tensions Conner perceived in the outside world and the responses he 
incorporated into his aesthetic of destructivity prior to leaving San Francisco. In Mexico 
he produced works with tattered and discolored materials, but none of them ever 
approached the degree of damage evidenced in CHILD, Conner’s ultimate statement 
about unconscionably inhumane methods of destruction. 
 
 Atomic Visions in Film   
For Conner, exploration of any kind, whether it involved aimless wanderings or 
artistic pursuits, was often prompted or accompanied by a vision. He recalled that when 
he took the hallucinatory drug peyote for the first time, the images it conjured in his mind 
foretold some coming threat: “I experienced myself as this very tenuously held-together 
construction—the tendons and muscles and organs loosely hanging around inside—and it 
seemed like at any moment disaster could strike and you could fall apart.”90 The 
89 Boswell, “Theater of Light and Shadow,” 42.   
90 Solnit, Secret Exhibition, 63. As Solnit discusses in her book, this kind of foreboding was similar to the 
life-changing nightmare of Conner’s friend, Jess Collins. Jess worked as a radio-chemist at the Oakridge 
national laboratory, producing plutonium for atomic bombs during the war, and at the Hanford Nuclear Site 
to work on similar projects until around 1948. He decided to renounce this career when, sometime in the 
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disintegrating form his body took in this drug-induced state was akin to one of his 
ratbastard assemblages, as if he were embodying the tenuous existence of his work. 
Rather than deter him from seeking out such experiences in the future, the peyote dream 
was among several hallucinogenic “trips,” including one he had while camping at the 
archaeological site in Mexico,91 that help to connect disparate threads of his output as an 
artist.  
At the same time that Conner envisioned impending doom with the aid of peyote, 
whilst constructing the early assemblages, he shot film footage that conveyed a 
paradoxical message—the heightened sense of being alive—during his search for (and, 
judging by the frenetic result, possibly after his procurement of) psychotropic 
mushrooms. He recorded these scenes with his camera mostly in Mexico but also earlier 
in San Francisco, culminating in the short film LOOKING FOR MUSHROOMS (fig. 
4.15), which he produced several years after returning to the U.S. “We'd gone around 
looking for mushrooms in Mexico,”92 Conner said of his adventure with Timothy Leary, 
a Harvard psychologist and advocate of the use of psychedelic drugs, who visited the 
artist in 1962. Although shots of Mexican people—laborers and peasants wearing straw 
cowboy hats and woven blankets, men shuffling Tarot cards—document his quest in the 
rural landscape, the film clearly captures more than just this single expedition. Edited to 
three minutes of running time when it was completed in 1967, LOOKING FOR 
MUSHROOMS brims with brightly colorful images that appear energetically charged 
postwar period, he had a dream that nuclear war world incinerate the entire world within the next twenty-
five years. Ibid., 31.   
91 Hopps, “Bruce Conner,” 9.  
92 Interview with Bruce Conner by Paul Cummings, April 16, 1973, AAA.  
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even in depicting objects at rest, exhibiting just the opposite visual sensibility as his 
vision of the “tendons and muscles and organs loosely hanging.” Tightly packed into a 
continuous, rapid-fire sequence, which grows increasingly fast and layered in the second 
half of the film, fragments and flickers of daisies in the park, fireworks, commercial 
signage, window shops, moving hands on a clock, gates and gravestones, painted lines on 
pavement, patterned fabrics, silhouettes of unidentifiable figures reveal more slices of 
everyday life than can be completely apprehended, for some frames read only as 
abstracted colors and shapes.  
With imagery coming in such a forceful rush, the entire film conveys unmitigated 
vitality. Yet, on the flip side of that coin, the persistent themes of the passage of time and 
ephemerality also suggests an attempt on Conner’s part to fit in all these experiences 
while he still can. Adding to this more ambivalent view of the film is the knowledge of 
what he was “looking for” in Mexico, beyond the sheer intoxication of unreality; 
originally, in seeking refuge in another country, he was guarding himself from 
mushrooms of another sort—of the metaphorical kind that refer to such explosions as 
those repeatedly featured in Conner’s earlier and later films.93 As Hatch aptly observed 
about COSMIC RAY, which preceded LOOKING FOR MUSHROOMS by a few years, 
the mushroom cloud was “quickly becoming a signature image for Conner at the time,”94 
93 Filmmaker Stan Brakhage encourages viewers of LOOKING FOR MUSHROOMS to recognize that the 
film does not simply represent Conner’s fantasy, but also his actual impressions and obsessions of the real 
world: “Make no mistake, this is not simply a peyote documentary or a travelogue of Conner’s Mexican 
sojourn; nor is it simply a “trip” movie. He titles his films accurately, so don’t forget the word “looking” in 
the title. It is partly a word of instruction to the audience. We should be looking for mushrooms, mushroom 
shapes, references to mushrooms, peyote buttons, etc., throughout our experience of the film.” See Stan 
Brakhage, Film at Wit’s End: Eight Avant-Garde Filmmakers (Kingston, NY: Documentext, 1989), 142.  
94 Hatch, “Looking for Bruce Conner,” (PhD diss.), 133–4.  
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much as nylon had become a distinguishing material of his assemblages. It therefore may 
be worth considering that the word “mushrooms” in the film’s title, rather than 
functioning as a literal reference, invokes his metaphorical play with the recurrent image, 
which, like the fantastical effects of the drug itself, creates an opening for various 
discursive associations. The mushroom, in Conner’s oeuvre, at once enhances life and 
threatens to take it away.   
In this chapter my treatment of Conner’s films will focus on the nuclear-themed 
content, not as an analysis of iconography but of individual images that construct distinct 
meanings in the relational context of other scenes. The films to be discussed—A MOVIE 
(1959), COSMIC RAY (1961), REPORT (1963–67), and CROSSROADS (1976)—
constitute the only works that include direct representations of “the Bomb” in Conner’s 
early and mid-career (he would later make prints on this theme), in each instance 
carefully and conspicuously placed to serve a specific role within the sequence of 
imagery. Remarking on A MOVIE, the first film Conner ever produced, he himself made 
clear that the emphasis on this nuclear imagery was deliberate: “Nobody had ever used 
the image of the atomic bomb in this way before.”95 He was referring to his novel 
technique—an approach to film-making without precedent at the time—96of splicing 
together various sources of stock footage, among them film strips produced by the U.S. 
military task-force personnel to document nuclear tests. This material originally fell 
under the regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission, which allowed the images to be 
95 Mitchell Stephens, The Rise of the Image, the Fall of the Word (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1998), 137. 
96 As film curator Bruce Jenkins put it, “Conner would almost single-handedly redirect the materialist 
perspectives of late modernism onto cinema.” Bruce Jenkins, “Explosions in a Film Factory,” in Boswell et 
al., 2000 BC, 186. 
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used primarily in television news reports and in civil-defense propaganda films. Taking 
his material from these secondary sources (with the exception of CROSSROADS), Conner 
paired the atomic scenes with unrelated “found” footage to bring about a thoughtfully 
crafted amalgamation of once-disparate cultural artifacts, by means strikingly comparable 
to his method of assemblage. The remainder of this chapter will address the nuclear-
testing footage on its own terms, honing in on its singular role in Conner’s body of 
cinematic work.  
A MOVIE was Conner’s earliest moving-image project to incorporate found 
footage of atomic explosions (fig. 4.16), the scenes for which the black-and-white film is 
best known. In setting the stage for the first of these images, Conner constructs a string of 
action scenes that loosely maintains a narrative coherence, beginning with the top of a 
periscope searching the surface of the ocean.97 The film cuts to the interior of a 
submarine, where a naval officer peers through the other end of the instrument to find, as 
the next shot reveals, a scantily clad woman posing on a bed. Reinforcing the legibility of 
the sequence, the officer appears again in the subsequent shot, this time in a profile view, 
still looking through the scope. But before Conner moves to what the viewer anticipates 
will be an image of another tantalizing seductress, he shows a close-up view of a hand 
pushing a round button, followed by a torpedo launching through the water. Thus, when 
an atomic explosion flashes onto the screen, it only comes somewhat as a surprise 
because of the misleading set-up of the “girlie” footage. If this false point-of-view shot 
upends expectations, it feeds into others by linking the sexualized woman to the “phallic 
97 Jenkins states that this footage was taken from a 1940s German propaganda film. Ibid.,192.  
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symbolism” of the torpedo.98 Yet, another possible reading would note the visual 
correlation between the view from the peering “eye” of the periscope and that of the 
unseen camera capturing the mushroom-cloud footage from a low-to-the-earth angle, 
parallel to the distant horizon line.  
In other words, the latter scene, which retains the vantage point of the former, 
suggests the continued presence of a human observer. Conner achieves a hint of irony in 
emphasizing the act of looking, whereby the witness to the explosion engages in a similar 
kind of macho voyeurism as watching a movie in which a female subject is objectified. 
This analogous relationship is made apparent through a slight trace of storytelling in the 
submarine-and-bomb sequence of A MOVIE, as in assemblages like CHILD (see fig. 4.8), 
which builds off the central idea of inhumane punishment. In this way, the film harkens 
back to Conner’s description of the “dialogue” that his assemblages mime through 
“relating to an object in itself and then developing an environment around it.”99 Familiar 
elements are placed in a relationship unfamiliar enough to render the whole new, 
destabilizing, and worthy of a closer look.   
This introduction to the nuclear subject in the film marks the opening of four 
back-to-back images of the same expanding form of dust and water, seen at various 
stages. After less than two seconds, the frontal view of the atomic burst is displaced by an 
aerial shot, which lingers only slightly longer on the screen. The third representation of 
the explosion returns to the original position from which it was viewed, but the top has 
ballooned in size. As it spreads outward, the scene jumps slightly ahead to another frame 
98 Ibid., 192.   
99 Interview with Conner by Karlstrom, March 29, 1974, AAA.  
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in the same shot, showing a more matured mushroom, with a band of white growing 
ever-larger at the bottom of the base. This convergence, where the vertical water shaft 
and the ocean meet, is the formation of an immense wave, which comes crashing over a 
battleship in the following scene. A delicate orchestral melody from Ottorino Respighi’s 
Pines of Rome hums in the background, drowning out any sound of the violent forces at 
play. By the time the fifth and final atomic cloud materializes in the film’s last section, 
the music has reached a booming crescendo to accompany the disturbing images of 
wartime atrocities preceding the nuclear climax.   
Even by 2008, the year in which Conner died, A MOVIE was still famous for its 
embrace of atomic spectacle. As the New York Times noted in a posthumous biographical 
sketch on the artist, the film was made in the same year, 1958, that a “B-47 lost a 
hydrogen bomb off the coast of Georgia and a second B-57 accidentally dropped an atom 
bomb in South Carolina.”100 Although the article exaggerated the seriousness of these 
situations, implying that they involved actual weapons rather than their constituent parts, 
the idea that U.S. military planes would accidentally discharge their hazardous cargo onto 
American soil might have made for absurd visualizations of these scenes. It was apt to 
point to the news as a potential source of material for Conner, who did acquire many rolls 
100 Manohla Dargis, “An Artist of the Cutting-Room Floor,” New York Times, July 12, 2008.  
A plane returning to an air force base accidentally dropped an unarmed nuclear bomb—that is, 
unassembled components, including TNT—on a farmhouse in Florence, South Carolina, injuring two 
adults and four children. Regarding the accident near Georgia, the Air Force simply said that one of its 
planes was forced to release part of a nuclear weapon into the ocean near Savannah. These accidents indeed 
created considerable ideological rumblings in the U.S. and abroad, particularly in Britain and the Soviet 
Union. On the accident in South Carolina, see Jack Raymond, “U.S. Moves to Bar A-Bomb Accidents,” 
New York Times, March 13, 1958; “Unarmed Atom Bomb Falls on Dixie Town,” Los Angeles Times, 
March 12, 1958; “No Radiation Noted at Atom Bomb Scene,” New York Times, March 13, 1958. On the 
accident near Georgia, see Jack Raymond, “U.S. Admits Peril in Atom Mishaps,” New York Times, 
February 15, 1958.  
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of used film from a local camera shop in San Francisco to repurpose into his own work. 
The article’s mention of the atomic accidents also implies that the nuclear footage was, in 
its time, especially fitting within the broader context of “wipeouts and crashes” that 
Conner composed in A MOVIE.101 The second half of the twelve-minute film gives 
special prominence to several clips of follies—what film historian Bruce Jenkins calls 
“sight-gag catastrophes”102—picturing humans who attempt to prove their prowess and 
fail miserably in the process: a surfer falling off his board from the force of a giant wave; 
a driver forcing his racecar to careen off the track; a motorcycle racer getting stuck in a 
deep puddle, with his bike kicking up a fountain of mud; bomber planes exploding in 
midair. All these scenes follow a succession of atomic explosions at approximately the 
midway point of A MOVIE. The accidents that involve technology, in particular, are 
perhaps more clearly connected to the concept of nuclear disaster than the subtler yet 
related connotations embedded in the film’s sequence of blunders that take place in the 
water.  
The atomic material that Conner selected for A MOVIE, immediately preceding 
the scenes that show men playing water sports, depicts the earliest underwater atomic test 
conducted at Bikini Atoll in 1946. As discussed in the previous chapters, this “Baker” test 
was the second in a two-part series, called Operation Crossroads, the first of which 
(“Able”) yielded a far less spectacular explosion. The particularly menacing aspects of 
Baker were its aqueous effects, making the lagoon extremely dangerous long after the 
mushroom cloud had dissipated. Ralph Lapp wrote that the Baker detonation “saturated 
101 Dargis, “An Artist on the Cutting-Room Floor.”   
102 Jenkins, “Explosion in a Film Factory,” 192.  
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the mushroom cloud with awesome quantities of radioactivity. Millions of tons of salt 
water were erupted into the air and a misty radioactive steam surged across the lagoon 
surface.”103 Water was one aspect of a two-pronged fallout situation, the other being the 
post-blast cloud, which read visually more as a remnant of the explosion than a 
radioactive threat. To represent fallout as a distinct phenomenon on camera, the massive 
ocean swell that resulted from the enormous impact provided an effective image—or a 
series of images, as the stock footage portrayed battleship after battleship completely 
swallowed, overturned, or launched into the air by the uprush of water. Of the sixty-five 
naval ships stationed in that area on Baker Day, some survived as the visible icons of 
contamination after they were relocated to San Francisco Bay (until the navy sunk them 
off the coast, after clean-up efforts failed). Other ships sunk to the ocean floor at Bikini, 
where they emitted radiation for years afterward, never to be removed.104  
In A MOVIE, a number of scenes are reminiscent of the ways in which water is 
featured in the original testing footage. Conner immediately emphasized this subject upon 
the completion of the four-part bomb sequence, by replacing the bodies of battleships 
with those of humans, who tumble into the roiling ocean (fig. 4.17). Surpassing the 
thematic repetition of the explosion, there are ten consecutive shots of water-related gags, 
including the wipeout scene of a surfer, plus bare-chested seafarers being tossed about in 
open boats and water-skiers attempting acrobatic stunts. All these “performances” end 
with nature overpowering man, when the sheer force of the water hits the figure and 
103 Ralph Lapp, “Civil Defense Faces New Perils,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 10 (1954), 349. 
104 James Farrell provides a strong historical analysis of Operation Crossroads. See “The Crossroads of 
Bikini,” Journal of American Culture 10, no. 2 (Summer 1987), 55–66.    
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knocks him down. Less than a minute later in the film, after briefly turning to land 
activities, a bridge collapses (fig. 4.18) and dumps its detritus into the water below. The 
lead-up to this destruction of the bridge, which eerily alludes to (but does not actually 
depict) the most famous real-life example of a suspension bridge, the Golden Gate in San 
Francisco,105 shows cars swaying back and forth on the road over the water, as the cables 
above give way. The previous shot of the collapse had depicted these cars colliding with 
the water and disappearing, as if to anticipate the close-up scene of a sinking battleship—
again, probably one from the archival footage of Baker (see fig. 4.18)—slowly 
descending until it is entirely submerged. In the final moments of the film, the ship seems 
to reappear underwater in the form of an ancient substitute, which, in this framework that 
Conner has provided, evokes atomic ruins. A deep-sea diver swims around the algae-
covered wreckage and darts into a cavernous space, ending A MOVIE with the theme of 
exploration of the unknown, of the darkness that exists in the human world. This closing 
message reinforces that the visual contexts built around the nuclear-testing imagery, 
though they can certainly be understood in literal terms as part of Conner’s trenchant 
social commentary, also function powerfully on the level of metaphor. Illustrating 
disasters that people invited upon themselves, the paired scenes of atomic and human 
actions share a visual language about experiences, not just of everyday life in one’s 
immediate surroundings, but of living in the broader environment of the present.     
The bomb imagery in Conner’s next film, COSMIC RAY, comes in and out of 
sight with such velocity that it could hardly register as anything but a sign of itself. Then 
105 The footage depicts the collapse of the Tacoma Narrows Bridge in Washington in 1940.  
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again, the entire four-minute movie flickers on pace with the accelerated tempo of the 
soundtrack, a live performance of blues musician Ray Charles’s “What’d I Say.” 
Conner’s signature mushroom cloud provides a fleeting reminder of its continued 
presence in the popular imagination, as preserved in vintage newsreels and brought back 
to life in Conner’s film, first in the form of a stem-and-bulb cloud seen from above (fig. 
19) and followed by a similar bird’s-eye view of a city labeled “Nagasaki.”106 What 
comes before and after this split-second sequence is also a blur, partly because Conner 
brackets the atomic-themed shots with mirror images of empty frames, which he 
intentionally altered with splatter marks,107 coupled with the backs of two people who 
appear to be jumping up and down at a concert. The increasingly seductive dancing of a 
solitary figure, performed by artist Beth Pewther, constitutes a major portion of film, 
along with alternating images of flickering lights, out-of-focus fireworks, countdown 
leaders, and more damaged frames. By the last minute of the film, these types of graphics 
are intermixed with battle scenes appropriated from cartoon and war footage, leading into 
a finale that flashes and pops with the firing of multiple canons and attendant explosions. 
Amidst this military display, it is surprising not to see one last, strategically placed 
mushroom-cloud image, as in A MOVIE, which begs the question why Conner included it 
at a less conspicuous point during the course of COSMIC RAY.    
A clue about the placement of the iconic explosion may lie in the film’s title, an 
obvious reference to Ray Charles and possibly also a pun on the scientific concept of 
106 A possible type of source of this imagery is the genre of postwar propaganda films produced by the U.S. 
military, which predated most civil defense films. See, for example, Effect of Atomic Bomb on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki (Department of Defense, September 1945), from National Archives, accessed February 1, 
2014, https://archive.org/details/342-USAF-17679.  
107 Jenkins, “Explosion in a Film Factory,” 198.  
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radiation.108 This allusion makes sense considering the frenetic back-and-forth 
transference of the content that Conner both found and filmed himself, of which various 
depictions of energy comprise the primary typology. Conner precisely coordinated the 
visual movements with the beat of the recording to create a synchronized choreography 
of the female figure’s dance, her disrobement, and the final firefight. When the rhythm of 
the music seems to swell almost to a breaking point at the film’s end, the rate at which 
the frames change also accelerates. Yet it is the imagery that betrays the cinematic 
climax—in particular, a cartoon image of a phallus-shaped cannon barrel that 
immediately deflates upon releasing the ball, transforming into something like a limp 
noodle. If one goal of the film is to link sexual and military impotence, Conner must 
show the atomic bomb, the most powerful instrument of war, detonating and expending 
its energy in the beginning. Afterward, the ongoing appearance of virility is exposed as a 
façade. The band plays on and works the audience into a state of frenzy, while all along 
Conner plans to disrupt this trance by firing a dud—thus ending the film not with a bang 
but with a thud.   
For REPORT, a film conceived as a response to the assassination of President 
John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963, Conner made his metaphorical use of the 
mushroom-cloud footage (fig. 20) far more obvious than in COSMIC RAY. Rather than 
coming on screen in the first half, as in the earlier film, the aerial burst occurs in what 
Conner called the “epilogue,” the second section of the film distinctly reserved to 
examine the aftereffects of the President’s tragic death depicted in the previous 
108 Regarding the reference to Ray Charles, see transcript of discussion with Bruce Conner at the Robert 
Flaherty Film Seminar, 1968, Film Comment 5, no. 4 (Winter 1969), 17.  
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section.109 And unlike COSMIC RAY, in which images are synced to music, REPORT 
overlays the recycled footage with live narrative commentary from a radio broadcast, as 
if to illustrate the oral reportage. In the scene preceding the mushroom cloud’s 
appearance, Conner matches the reporter’s remark on Jacqueline Kennedy’s “brilliant red 
roses,” which she receives upon disembarking the plane in Dallas (see fig. 20), with 
images of the bouquet in her hands and on seat of the limousine, by then stained with the 
President’s blood at the time this footage was taken later that day. In the subsequent 
scene, when the reporter goes on to note the fine weather, declaring, “we have a brilliant 
sun,” Conner inserts the rising fireball.  
In doing so, the artist was already playing on a well-established trope for the 
bomb, long compared to the sun since people first began to search for the language to 
describe this phenomenal sight.110 Film curator Bruce Jenkins, the author of two often 
cited essays on Conner’s films, has written about REPORT on the meta-symbolism of this 
stand-in for the sun, “a brief image that nevertheless melds a materialist humor with a 
forcefulness that retroactively transforms the repeated countdowns [a reference to the 
extensive use of countdown leaders in REPORT] into an allegory of the atomic doomsday 
clock and a reminder of such nuclear threats as the then-recent Cuban Missile Crisis.”111 
Although Jenkins does not mention any personal connection Conner may have had to the 
109 Ibid.  
110 For example, see Paul S. Boyer, By the Bomb’s Early Light: American Thought and Culture at the 
Dawn of the Atomic Age (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 6. Boyer cites an example 
of the earliest reactions to the secret bomb test in Alamogordo, New Mexico, reported in New York Times, 
which quoted a railway engineer who inadvertently witnessed the explosion: “All at once, it seemed as if 
the sun suddenly appeared out of the darkness.”  
111 Bruce Jenkins, “Contesting Camelot,” in Ted Perry, ed., Masterpieces of Modernist Cinema 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2006), 245. Jenkins takes these exact lines from his earlier essay 
in the exhibition catalogue for the Walker Art Center’s retrospective on Conner in 2000. Jenkins, 
“Explosion in a Film Factory,” 207. 
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Crisis of October 1962, the observation seems entirely appropriate in light of the fact that 
Conner’s return to the U.S. from Mexico coincided with this major world event, which 
brought the Americans and Soviets closer to nuclear war than they ever had been or 
would subsequently be. The political stand-off with Cuba, in a way, served as Conner’s 
re-introduction to the relatively new president, who successfully orchestrated a resolution 
to the conflict. Over the course of the nearly four years that Conner spent splicing 
together the scant television and radio coverage of the assassination that he was able to 
procure (but not without great difficulty), the figure of Kennedy, even more than the 
public reactions to his death, came to fascinate the artist so much that he almost lost 
himself in the process of editing the material.112 His inclusion of the atomic footage in 
REPORT, in itself a self-referential gesture, therefore marked a convergence of two 
personal obsessions—Kennedy and the bomb—that were instantly recognizable to 
everyone as interconnected to the notion of catastrophe.113 
 
 
 
 Imaging the Radioactive Environment   
112 Jenkins, “Explosion in a Film Factory,” 204–5. 
113 The atomic imagery may not have been part of his original idea, as Conner initially intended to spend 
several months gathering his own material for the film by recording local responses to the assassination in 
Brookline, Massachusetts, the birthplace of Kennedy and the borough of Boston where Conner himself had 
moved a year before the President’s death. For various reasons, including a change in the site of Kennedy’s 
burial from Brookline to Arlington, Virginia, Conner quickly abandoned this initial plan and sought to 
acquire footage from the famous Zapruder film. Because the government classified this material as 
evidence for their investigation into the assassination, Conner then turned to a third option: newsreels. 
Among this category was nuclear-testing scene, which may have provided filler to compensate for 
Conner’s lack of television footage on the Kennedy assassination.       
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Of Conner’s four films that explicitly address the nuclear subject, only 
CROSSROADS, completed in 1976, looks retrospectively at the period of the 1950s and 
1960s in which such testing was, quite literally, still part of the global atmosphere. The 
film could be seen as a final manifesto, bringing together the conceptual focus of his 
assemblages on the contamination of micro-environments and the imagery of his earlier 
films, including A MOVIE, which incorporates a shorter sequence of footage of the same 
event—the Baker test—that occupies the entire thirty-six minutes of CROSSROADS (fig. 
21). Using declassified film reels recently released by the Department of Defense, Conner 
combined over twenty shots of a single explosion, without adding any kinds of film 
leader that he had extensively employed in the earlier works. His artistic alterations to the 
archival material were purely compositional: he selected different positions at which the 
cameras had captured the cloud from the land, air, and sea, set them to varying speeds, 
and added hypnotic music with sounds of explosions—an original score by Patrick 
Gleeson and Terry Riley. The last third of the film includes only six scenes of the 
explosion, each one occupying a greater length of time on the screen than in the first part 
of the film. The ending shot lasts for almost eight minutes, lingering on the wave of 
radioactive spray that engulfs the ships anchored in the lagoon, which is concealed in the 
complete whiteout until, at last, the black silhouette of a hull slowly comes into focus.     
 Through extreme slow-motion, Conner reverses the typical aesthetic of 
documentary atomic-testing footage, which relied on high-speed camera technology to 
record every millisecond of the expanding explosion. Film historian William Wees has 
recognized that Conner was able to draw out one second of real-time footage to three 
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minutes in his film, as the result of the sheer number of frames that the raw material 
supplied.114 During World War II, the U.S. government commissioned an engineer 
named Harold Edgerton (like Conner, an alumnus of the University of Nebraska at 
Lincoln) to develop a special camera that would capture the incipient stages of an 
explosion, before it resembled anything like a mushroom, for the purposes of measuring 
its yield and rate of increase. Edgerton’s invention of the rapatronic camera, equipped 
with three shutters to end the light exposure at one-millionth of a second, was 
subsequently used in large quantities for postwar atomic tests.115 The camera was also 
employed for non-military photography, mostly by Edgerton himself, to render stop-
motion images of projectiles passing through ordinary objects. Conner integrates one 
such image—a bullet striking and shattering a light bulb—into his found-footage 
montage in REPORT.116 CROSSROADS, by contrast, does something radically 
subversive with the technology, which Edgerton had specially designed to photograph 
atomic subjects. Conner at once exploits the camera’s ability to capture split-second shot 
and, in the final scene, finds a detail of visual information so scientifically insignificant 
that it undermines the utility of Edgerton’s invention. 
114 William C. Wees, “Representing the Unrepresentable: Bruce Conner’s Crossroads and the Nuclear 
Sublime,” INCITE: Journal of Experimental Media 2 (Spring-Fall 2010), accessed February 1, 2014, 
http://www.incite-online.net/wees2.html#23; For other essays on CROSSROADS, see Scott MacDonald, 
The Garden in the Machine: A Field Guide to Independent Films About Place (Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 2001), 322–323; Moritz and O’Neill, “Fallout: Some Notes on the Films of Bruce 
Conner,” 36–42. 
115 James Elkins, “Harold Edgerton’s Rapatronic Photographs of Atomic Tests,” History of Photography 
28, no. 1 (2004): 74–81, and Elkins, ed., After and Before: Documenting the Bomb (New York: PPP 
Editions, 2003).  
116 Jenkins observes that one of the shots in another film, VALSE TRISTE, resembles Edgerton’s high-speed 
photographs. Jenkins, “Explosions in a Film Factory,” 222.  
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The final scene of CROSSROADS underscores Conner’s use of sections of the 
atomic footage that had never before been given such prominence, even by Conner 
himself, who had previously allowed the mesmerizing explosions to characterize his 
representations of nuclear testing. In CROSSROADS, the climax is supplanted by the 
protracted aftermath of the blast, allowing the viewer to ruminate on consequences of the 
action rather than on the spectacle. While A MOVIE draws attention to the hazardous 
nature of the water surge with unrelated comical scenes, the later film provides no such 
relief from the serious act of contamination evidenced on the screen—in a scene that 
“feels interminable on viewing,” according to Hatch.117 For him, this concluding shot 
proves that the unknowable aspects of the bomb “lie outside the realm of representation, 
able only to be figured indexically by cinema.”118 The lack of intellectual effect, in other 
words, mirrors the vagueness of the image. Similarly, scholar Art Simon has compared 
CROSSROADS to Andy Warhol’s painting Atomic Bomb, in which the “surface of the 
image seems obscured by the density of the mushroom cloud . . . simultaneously 
suggesting how the image mediates and distances the devastating effects of the bomb.”119 
Given Conner’s wish to engage more deeply with the subject than ever before, perhaps at 
some level to understand that which he wished to forget, he would likely find such 
conclusions unsatisfying. His slow-motion technique, taken to great extreme, forces 
acknowledgment of the bomb’s lasting and pervasive devastation and clarifies how this 
invisible threat can be revealed in a single image.   
117 Hatch, Looking for Bruce Conner, 184. 
118 Ibid.  
119 Art Simon, Dangerous Knowledge: The JFK Assassination in Art and Film (Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 2010), 135. 
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 Although Conner stopped making new films in the 1980s, he continued to rework 
some old material, including LOOKING FOR MUSHROOMS in 1996, and to be an active 
participant within his community of experimental filmmakers. In 2001, director Dominic 
Angerame produced an unabashed imitation of Conner’s aesthetic in the short film Battle 
Stations: A Navel Adventure, which both stylistically paid homage to the old master and 
starred him as one of the leading characters. From the very first shot, Conner dominates 
the opening scene as he wanders outside a fenced area, where a battery of cautionary 
signage is posted, taking radiological readings with the Geiger counter that he wields in 
his gloved hand (fig. 4.22). The counter emits a rapid ticking noise, like static, to indicate 
the presence of radioactivity. Something catches Conner’s eye inside the fence, and the 
camera cuts to a close-up shot of a grouping of large, plastic-covered piles. Secured to the 
ground by insubstantial haystacks, the earthen mounds call to mind the shabby 
constructions of the artist’s early work in assemblage. Conner holds up his Geiger 
counter once again to test the situation, drops his hand, and walks away from the camera, 
apparently giving up the experiment. Although at first it seems his instrument detected 
some radiation, as evidenced by a clicking sound, the continuation of the noise even as he 
exits the scene suggests that it was a false reading. Conner’s apparent disappointment was 
confirmed by Angerame, who recalled that they had visited the site at Hunter’s Point 
because they had “heard that there were toxic materials from radioactive ships all 
around” but ultimately “find no radioactivity.”120     
120 Dominic Angerame, description of his film Battle Stations: A Navel Adventure, The New American 
Cinema Group: The Film-Makers’ Coop, accessed February 10, 2014, http://film-makerscoop.com/rentals-
sales/search-results?fmc_author=27 
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In addition to demonstrating that Conner’s preoccupation with all things atomic 
never abated, his appearance in Battle Stations illustrates the persistence with which he 
attempted to uncover aspects of nuclear culture that the government would have rather 
not have people see. To Conner, the effects of the Cold War arms race, especially its 
radiological perils, were an inescapable part of the cultural experience, perniciously 
permeating the places in which he lived. Recognizing that these toxic conditions were 
imposed upon him, he seems to have taken cues from this aggressive approach. For his 
assemblages, he would confiscate junk, rip images from periodicals, shreds nylons, 
expose the materials’ overall vulnerability—and, finally, call them “ratbastards,” the 
same denigrating name he adopted for himself and his friends. And for his films, he 
claimed found material as his own and forced extreme viewing exercises upon his 
audience, whether by assaulting their eyes with his stroboscopic imagery or by 
demanding almost superhuman patience to watch a single scene. In all these instances, 
however, he proved effective in catching and pulling people inside the murky 
environments of his own making—which, in the end, can perhaps be seen as a final act of 
appropriating strategies from the very system against which he turns his work.  
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Fig. 4.1 Bruce Conner, RATBASTARD, 1958. Wood, canvas, nylon, newspaper, 
photographic reproduction, wire, oil paint, nails, bead chain, etc. Walker Art Center, 
Minneapolis. 
 
Fig. 4.2 San Francisco Evacuation Areas for “Zone 2.” Published in It's Your Life: The 
San Francisco Plan (San Francisco, CA: San Francisco Disaster Council and Corps, 
1956), 22. 
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Fig. 4.3 Bruce Conner, BLACK DAHLIA, 1960. Offset photograph, feather, nails, paper 
collage, tobacco, rubber hose, fabric, sequins, string, etc. Private collection. 
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Fig. 4.4 “End of Gapon.” Photograph. Published in “The Russian Revolution, Part II: 
Relentless Rise of the Conspiracy,” Life, January 20, 1958, 70. 
 
 
Fig. 4.5 “Secret Laboratory.” Photograph. Published in “The Russian Revolution, Part II: 
Relentless Rise of the Conspiracy,” Life, January 20, 1958, 67. 
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Fig. 4.6 Bruce Conner, RAT PURSE, 1959. Nylon, wax, gold leaf, glass, feather, sequins, 
fabric, string, cardboard box, nails, tin can, fur, tobacco, etc. Private collection. 
 
Fig. 4.7 “Flayed Rat.” Photograph. Published in “What Science Learned at Bikini: Latest 
Report on the Results,” Life, August 11, 1947, 76. 
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Fig. 4.8 Bruce Conner, CHILD, 1959–60. Wax, nylon, cloth, metal, twine, and high chair. 
Museum of Modern Art, New York. 
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Fig. 4.9 “Burned Up.” Photograph. Published in “Victims at Yucca Flat,” Life, May 16, 
1955, 58. 
 
Fig. 4.10 “Bill Browne and Dummy A-Bomb Test.” Published in Oregon Journal, 1955. 
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Fig. 4.11 Bruce Conner, BOMB, 1959. Mixed media. No longer extant.  
 
Fig. 4.12 “An Attack on Bay Area Population and Industry.” Cartographic representation 
of distribution of radioactive fallout after a hypothetical hydrogen-bomb attack. 
Published in Roger S. Cannell, ed., Three Plans for Survival in a Nuclear Attack (Palo 
Alto, CA: Stanford Research Institute, 1960), 10. 
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Fig. 4.13 Scene from The Atomic Kid showing two prospectors, 1954. Film still. Directed 
by Leslie H. Martinson.   
 
Fig. 4.14 Bruce Conner, GUADALUPE, 1962. Fabric, mirror, magazine photographs, 
plastic, fur, Mexican necklace, Masonite, etc. [current location unknown]  
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Fig. 4.15 Bruce Conner, LOOKING FOR MUSHROOMS, 1959–1967. Film stills from 
16mm film.  
 
 
 
        
Fig. 4.16 Bruce Conner, A MOVIE, 1958. Film stills from 16mm film.  
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Fig. 4.17 Bruce Conner, A MOVIE, 1958. Film stills from 16mm film.  
 
 
 
   
Fig. 4.18 Bruce Conner, A MOVIE, 1958. Film stills from 16mm film.  
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Fig. 4.19 Bruce Conner, COSMIC RAY, 1961. Film still from 16mm film.  
 
 
 
  
Fig. 4.20 Bruce Conner, REPORT, 1961. Film stills from 16mm film.  
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Fig. 4.21 Bruce Conner, CROSSROADS, 1976. Film stills from 16mm film.  
 
 
 
   
Fig. 4.22 Dominic Angerame, Battle Stations: A Navel Adventure, 2001. Film stills from 
16mm. 
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CONCLUSION 
In the mid-twentieth century, there was virtually no precedent for representations of 
radiation or radioactivity that squarely existed in the territory of the visual arts. 
Historically, beginning in the late nineteenth century, the sciences had afforded several 
kinds of optical experiences of invisible rays. The radiograph, an extension of Wilhelm 
Röntgen’s discovery of x-ray radiation in 1895, immediately found widespread use in 
medical imaging and, for a brief period, in x-ray portraiture of people.1 But beyond this 
earliest example of a visualizing technique, which I have discussed in relation to Moholy-
Nagy’s photograms that conjured an analogous magic between light and photosensitive 
paper, such opportunities to “see” the manifestations of rays were largely limited to 
scientists working in the isolation of their laboratories. On the heels of the x-ray’s 
emergence as a subject of scientific inquiry, scientists began to study other luminescent 
minerals, such as uranium, because they appeared to share some unknown relationship to 
the new kind of radiation. Like x-rays, energy-emitting uranium produced striking visual 
effects on photographic materials, prompting physicist Henri Becquerel to experiment 
extensively with this image-making (fig. 5.1) in the last years of the nineteenth century, 
shortly before it was even known what property (radioactivity) caused the photosensitive 
plate to fog in reaction to uranium.2  
1 Although many scholars have briefly noted this trend in x-ray portraiture, Rachelle Dermer provides the 
most thorough account in an entire chapter devoted to the topic in her dissertation. See Rachelle A. Dermer, 
“Photographic Objectivity and the Construction of the Medical Subject in the United States,” (PhD diss., 
Boston University, 2002), esp. 99–132. 
2 The distinction between the properties of “radiation” and “radioactivity” are subject to constant 
redefinition. In general terms, radiation refers to the high-frequency waves or particles of energy, whereas 
radioactivity is a process by which atoms emanate even higher-frequency alpha and beta particles. These 
two types of energy have different energetic-release mechanisms, but they produce very similar 
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In 1898, it was Marie Curie who coined the term “radioactivity,” based on her 
own studies of uranium. But in contrast to Becquerel, Curie explicitly chose a non-visual 
method for this analysis, hypothesizing that the ionizing radiations of uranium, which 
varied by very small degrees, would be easier to qualify if she worked with conventional, 
rather than photographic, equipment. Yet, in continuing to test the properties of 
radioactivity with other substances, in collaboration with her husband and fellow 
physicist, Pierre Curie, she relished the routine but wondrous occasions, always at 
nighttime, to observe the bluish-green phosphorescence that emanated from the test tubes 
scattered about their shared workspace. As Marie later recalled, she and Pierre “perceived 
on all sides the feebly luminous silhouettes of the bottles or capsules containing our 
products. It was really a lovely sight and one always new to us. The glowing tubes looked 
like faint, fairy lights.”3 The “glowing tubes” turned out to contain radium, an element 
she discovered in the process of those experiments, leading her to ponder whether she 
would have a similar aesthetic appreciation for radioactive polonium—a new element she 
had named slightly earlier.4     
These examples emphasize the temporal dimensions that necessarily affect the 
optical experience of radioactivity. For Curie, the constraints to certain times of day and 
to transitory moments heightened the sense of immediacy in the encounter: she appears to 
physiological effects. Given this dissertation’s greater focus on effects than exact atomic processes, I 
interchangeably use the terms radiation and radioactivity. For a discussion of these terms, see Michael F. 
L’Annunziata, Handbook of Radioactivity Analysis (San Diego, CA: Academic Press, 2012), esp. 2–4, 70–
72.   
3 Marie Curie, Pierre Curie, trans. Charlotte and Vernon Kellog (New York: Dover, 1963), 92.  
4 Marjorie C. Malley, Radioactivity: A History of a Mysterious Science (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2011), 210. Malley mentions another scientist, a German chemist named Friedrich Giesel, who wrote 
to the Curies upon learning that they were investigating the same radioactive substance, describing how his 
material emitted a beautiful bluish glow. Ibid., 27.  
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have delighted in the fantasy of just happening upon the laboratory scene and catching 
the radium samples in the middle of their natural processes of decay. As she well knew 
from radiation experiments conducted by her scientific colleagues, like Becquerel, there 
was no way to replicate the luminosity of radium’s emanation in a photographic image or 
to rival the impression that the sight left in her mind’s eye. Thus, ever since the x-ray and 
radioactivity became known phenomena at the turn of the twentieth century, some 
scientists recognized the limitations of radiographs and other photographic 
representations as useful paradigms for visualizing real-time effects of ionizing rays and 
particles.  
In Nuclear II (see fig. 1.1), for example, Moholy-Nagy draws out this 
restrictiveness of x-ray photography when he instead chooses painting to convey his 
expanded knowledge of nuclear science in the last years of his life, allowing his ability to 
control the pigment, and thus his facture, a way by which to articulate the processes that 
radiation performed. By activating the subject in “space-time”—his catch-all term for a 
mode of existence in which time is measured by spatial movement—Moholy-Nagy 
demonstrates what nuclear energy is doing or can do, rather than what it has already 
done.5 In contrast, by the time a viewer sees the x-ray photograph, the work of radiation 
is complete, though its trace remains in every detail—in the foggy gray areas, where rays 
passed partially through the subject, or in the white areas, where they failed to penetrate.6 
Although Moholy-Nagy alludes to such a trace in the painting, which depicts a square 
5 László Moholy-Nagy, Vision in Motion (Chicago: Paul Theobald, 1969), 268. 
6 Bettyann Kevles, Naked to the Bone: Medical Imaging in the Twentieth Century (New York: Basic 
Books, 1998), 21.  
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hole that some unseen force has cut through the nuclear body, the suggestion of radiation 
as a lingering and still-active presence is evident in such details as the “fission” between 
two parts of the canvas and the field of white dots that converge around the orb. The 
painting seems to retain its energy, based on the artist’s depiction of the environment in 
which this invisible activity takes place, whereas radiographs lack any context that would 
provide evidence of radiation still embedded in the image. 
Crawford, Shahn, and Conner, the other three artists addressed in this study, 
similarly treat time and environmental context as two crucial aspects of their depictions 
of radiation and radioactivity. Crawford situates his radiological subject matter in a 
specific place and time—Bikini Atoll, on July 1, 1946 (the date of Test Able)—and 
attempts to mark the transformation in the compositional nature of the blast cloud, from 
fireball to fallout, through the application of meteorological constructs. Meteorology, by 
definition, not only tracks dynamic change in the atmosphere but also offers visual 
models to describe such changes over time, perhaps accounting for Crawford’s rationale 
in making an analogy between this branch of science and nuclear physics. Shahn pursues 
an alternate engagement with the effects of radioactive fallout through the concept of 
mutation, at a time when, in the 1950s, activists like him framed nuclear-testing accidents 
as radiation experiments on human beings. In the global biosphere imagined by Shahn, 
the multigenerational burden of radioactive elements begins to show immediate 
biological consequences, some of which are made visible in the physical deformities on 
both the fantastical fallout beast and the tragic figure of Oppenheimer. Finally, Conner 
approaches the various temporal manifestations of radioactivity through the strategy of 
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mimicking its primary property: decay. Often initiating this process with the destruction 
of nylon fabric that covers his assemblages, he makes the viewer aware that the present 
state of the material will only further deteriorate. His films, which inherently employ 
time-based media, mime the slow pace of decay of those long-lasting radioisotopes that 
exist on the margins of the atomic explosion, from which much of the imagery is drawn.  
Taken together, these artists, including Moholy-Nagy, offer general 
characterizations of the irradiated body and the radioactive landscape, as I have 
categorized this group of work in the title of this dissertation. While their set of methods 
and concepts regarding the radiological subject is by no means cohesive, the four artists 
follow an approach to thinking about the distinctive temporalities of nuclear energy that 
captures the spirit of Curie’s visual observations: the aesthetic experience of radioactive 
substances is most powerful not through the medium of an artifact but in their actual 
presence. Even in cases when the visual record is integral to the work of art, as in 
Conner’s films, the images of a past nuclear event evoke the act of the viewer “being 
there” to partake as an observer, witnessing the genesis of the “historical environment”—
that is, to use Scott Kirsch’s definition, the site of a transformative moment in history that 
changes the character of that place and its surroundings thereafter.7 None of the artists’ 
works make literal reference to the luminosity that Curie described, which they could 
have achieved, for instance, with the use of phosphorescent materials to simulate glowing 
7 Scott Kirsch, “Harold Knapp and the Geography of Normal Controversy: Radioiodine in the Historical 
Environment,” OSIRIS 19 (2004), 169. Kirsch derives the notion of the “historical environment” from 
Bruno Latour’s theory of historicity. See Bruno Latour, Pandora's Hope (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 1999). 
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effects.8 This choice may have been obvious if the artists were interested in a more 
playful interpretation of radioactivity, but they instead approached the subject with the 
seriousness and subtlety appropriate to its elusive nature, as well as to its slippery 
characterization in the scientific world.  
At the time that these ideas percolated among the artists, roughly converging on 
the period of aboveground nuclear testing between 1946 and 1962, the competing notions 
of nuclear energy as alternately harmless, healing, and hazardous complicated the public 
debate over radiation effects.9 Although today there remains no question, due to 
overwhelming data and empirical evidence, of the biological and environmental changes 
engendered by internal and external radiations, these consequences of ever-present 
radioactivity were hardly a foregone conclusion during the early and middle years of the 
Cold War. Thus, it was with some degree of challenge to the official position, which 
consistently denied the full scope of radiological dangers, that all four artists advanced 
visual arguments about the existence of invisible, ionizing rays in and around them. 
Given that radiation and radioactivity were part of the lived experiences of Moholy-
Nagy, Crawford, Shahn, and Conner, their visualizations of these concepts, in the most 
intelligible examples, could be as lucid as if the substances were illuminated before their 
eyes. At the very least, the artists’ collective contribution to the visual arts in terms of the 
8 A contemporary example of an artist who uses of radioactive pigments is Sigmar Polke. In works such as 
Radioactive Waste (1992), he portrays a group of people in Hazmat suits scanning the ground with Geiger 
counters, which offers the only clue that the scene was composed with toxic paint. Polke has also produced 
photograms by placing uranium samples on sheets of photosensitive paper, similar to the method of 
Becquerel. See Judith Nesbitt, Sean Rainbird, and Thomas McEvilley, Sigmar Polke: Join the Dots 
(London: Tate Gallery Liverpool, 1995), 21, and Gary Garrels, Photography in Contemporary Germany: 
1960 to the Present exh. cat. (Minneapolis: Walker Art Center, 1992), 25–26. 
9 For useful discussions on the fallout debate, see Carolyn Kopp, “The Origins of the American Scientific 
Debate over Fallout Hazards,” Social Studies of Science 9 (1979), 403–422, and Robert A. Divine, Blowing 
on the Wind: The Nuclear Test Ban Debate, 1954–1960 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978). 
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radiological subject might be considered the representation of conceptual and temporal 
analogues to the luminous sight of radiating energy.   
In critical discourse, the pursuit to understand how the global preoccupation with 
all things nuclear had repercussions on the experiences of humankind continued through 
the writings of Jacques Derrida. In 1984, near the so-called “end” of the Cold War, 
Derrida posited an inexorable correlation between the nuclear arms race—“more 
precisely, a competition, a rivalry between two rates of speed,” he emphasized—and the 
real and imagined “stakes” for “what is now and again still called humanity” trapped in a 
perpetual state of acceleration.10 To keep pace with the competition meant that “no single 
instant, no atom of our life (of our relation to the world and to being) is not marked today, 
directly or indirectly, by that speed race.”11 For Derrida, the constant anticipation of 
nuclear war, the event associated in the popular imagination with the instantaneous 
explosion that would end all life in a flash, determined the structure of time. He notes that 
writers have used this sense of apocalyptic urgency to productive ends by recognizing the 
precariousness of their existence, which in turn lent “essential finitude” to their texts.12 
Admiring the execution of gravitas by writers of an earlier period, Derrida concludes that 
the “nuclear epoch is dealt with more ‘seriously’ in texts by Mallarmé, of Kafka, or by 
Joyce, for example, than in present-day novels that would offer direct and realistic 
descriptions of a ‘real’ nuclear catastrophe.”13  
10 Jacques Derrida, “No Apocalypse, Not Now (Full Speed Ahead, Seven Missiles, Seven Missives),” trans. 
Catherine Porter and Philip Lewis, Diacritics 14, no. 2, [Special Issue on Nuclear Criticism] (Summer 
1984), 20 (italics in the original).  
11 Ibid. 
12 Ibid., 27.  
13 Ibid., 27–28. 
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In the first decades of the “nuclear epoch,” the most comparable visual 
counterparts to the works of literature by the turn-of-the-century writers in Derrida’s 
canon were perhaps those of Moholy-Nagy, Crawford, Shahn, and Conner. Their 
depictions of long-range radiation effects mirrored the literature’s treatment of the 
humanistic concerns that arise at the threshold between life and death. But rather than 
contemplating a sudden end, the artists conceived of the nuclear subject as continuous, 
which calibrated their mindset to an expanded framework of time. Moholy-Nagy and 
Crawford, working with less concrete information on radiation than their successors, 
could not comprehend the impact of nuclear energy beyond their individual lifespans, 
focused as they were on the present. Shahn and Conner took a longer view of the 
radiological situation, essentially rephrasing the central question of the age from “when 
will it happen?” to “when did it happen?” With each nuclear experiment propagating the 
ecological and biological costs, these artists could legitimately raise the possibility that, 
some years ago, humanity had already seen the beginning of the end.    
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Fig. 5.1 Photographic image made by Henri Becquerel, showing the imprints of uranium 
samples, 1896.  
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(forthcoming, December 2014), Yale University Art Gallery Bulletin.  
 
Entry contributor to Eye on a Century: Modern and Contemporary Art from the Charles 
B. Benenson Collection at the Yale University Art Gallery, 2013. Collection catalogue co-
published by Yale University Art Gallery and Yale University Press.  
 
“Comment of Another Sort: George L. K. Morris and the Representation of World War 
II,” 2012, Yale University Art Gallery Bulletin.  
 
Entry contributor to A Modern World: American Design from the Yale University Art 
Gallery, 2011. Collection catalogue co-published by Yale University Art Gallery and 
Yale University Press.  
 
Atomic Afterimage: Cold War Imagery in Contemporary Art, 2008. Exhibition catalogue. 
Essay and timeline by Keely Orgeman. Foreword by Patricia Hills. 64 pages, 16 color 
plates. Published and distributed by Boston University Art Gallery.  
   
CONFERENCE PAPERS  
 
College Art Association Annual Conference, Association of Historians of American 
Art Panel  
 
 
331 
Paper Delivered: “Visualizing the Irradiated Body of László Moholy-Nagy.” New York  
City, 2013.  
 
Southwest Texas Popular Culture and American Culture Associations Annual 
Conference 
Paper Delivered: “Underneath the Mushroom Cloud Tree: Atomic Imagery in the Art of  
Jay DeFeo.” Albuquerque, New Mexico, 2007. 
  
The Verge Arts Series Conference, Trinity Western University 
Paper Delivered: “Underneath the Mushroom Cloud Tree: Atomic Imagery in the Art of  
Jay DeFeo.” Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada, 2006. 
 
NON-CONFERENCE PAPERS  
 
Material Culture Study Group 
“Colored Light in Orbit: Thomas Wilfred’s Art of Lumia.” Yale University, October 
2013.  
 
“Radio-Medicine: The Art of László Moholy-Nagy and the Political Instruments of 
Atomic Science.” Yale University, April 2013. 
 
Yale Center for British Art, Graduate Summer Seminar  
“Coloring Color,” examining the concept of additive color in light-based art, June 2013.  
     
PROFESSIONAL SERVICE AND MEMBERSHIPS 
 
Member of College Art Association; Association of Historians of American Art; 
Association of Academic Museums 
Curatorial advisor to Cynthia Roznoy, Curator at the Mattatuck Museum, since July 2013 
 
 
